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Abstract—This work investigates soft input decoding for gen-
eralized concatenated (GC) codes. The GC codes are constructed
from inner nested binary Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH)
codes and outer Reed-Solomon (RS) codes. In order to enable
soft input decoding for the inner BCH block codes, a sequential
stack decoding algorithm is used. Ordinary stack decoding of
binary block codes requires the complete trellis of the code.
In this work a representation of the block codes based on the
trellises of supercodes is proposed in order to reduce the memory
requirements for the representation of the BCH codes. Results for
the decoding performance of the overall GC code are presented.
Furthermore, an efficient hardware implementation of the GC
decoder is proposed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Error correction coding (ECC) based on GC codes has a
high potential for various applications in data communication
and data storage systems, e.g., for digital magnetic storage
systems [1], for non-volatile flash memories [2], and for two-
dimensional bar codes [3]. GC codes have a low decoding
complexity compared to long BCH codes [4]. The residual
error rates for GC codes can be determined analytically [5],
which is important for industry applications where a low
probability of a system failure has to be guaranteed. In [4]
a pipelined decoder architecture for GC codes was proposed
which is based on algebraic hard input decoding of the
component codes. In this work we extend this design to soft
input decoding.
A codeword of a GC code can be considered as a matrix.
For encoding the information is stored in the matrix. In the
first encoding step the rows of the matrix are protected by
block codes (the outer codes) over the Galois field GF (2m).
Next each column is protected with binary codes, the inner
codes. Typically binary BCH codes are used as inner codes
and RS codes as outer codes [6], [7]. A decoder processes
the erroneous data in multiple decoding steps. In [4] algebraic
decoding is used in each decoding step. This is adequate if
the channel provides no soft information about the transmitted
or stored bits, e.g., for the binary symmetric channel (BSC).
However, if the channel provides reliability information, e.g.
an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel, this soft
information should be exploited by the decoder. In the case of
GC code, it is sufficient to decode the inner codes exploiting
the soft information.
There exist numerous soft input decoding algorithms for
binary block codes [6]. However, many of these methods
would not be suitable for a fast hardware implementation.
In this work we consider sequential stack decoding as pro-
posed in [8]. Sequential decoding has a low computational
complexity, if the noise level is small. This is the case for many
applications of GC codes, e.g., for error correction coding in
storage systems.
Sequential decoding was original introduced for tree codes.
In order to decode binary block codes, the syndrome trellis is
used as a representation of the code [9]. For block codes the
number of trellis states grows exponentially with the number of
redundancy bits. Hence, the trellis based sequential decoding
as proposed in [8] is only feasible for codes with low error
correcting capabilities. In this work, we use this algorithm
only in the first decoding iteration for the inner BCH codes.
The GC construction is based on nested-BCH codes where
higher levels have higher error correcting capabilities. The
partitioning of the nested-BCH codes can be used to reduce
the space complexity required for representing the code.
We propose a representation based on supercodes. A sim-
ilar method was introduced in [10] to reduce the decoding
complexity of maximum-likelihood decoding. A supercode is
a superset D1 of the original code D ⊂ D1. In order to decode
the original code D, two supercodes D1 and D2 have to be
constructed such that D1∩D2 = D. The supercodes have fewer
redundancy bits and thus fewer trellis states. The supercodes
can be constructed such that each code has half of the original
redundancy bits. This reduces the number of states from O(2r)
to O(2
r
2 ) in standard order notation.
In this work we give a brief introduction into the GC con-
struction, explaining its structure and the decoding algorithm.
Later on we describe the stack algorithm. This algorithm
is used to decode the nested-BCH codes. In section IV we
describe the proposed supercode decoding algorithm. Next
an implementation of the soft decoding of the GC codes is
presented. Finally we show results for the error correction
performance and decoding complexity.
II. GC CONSTRUCTION
In this section we explain the GC construction and its
parameters. A detailed discussion can be found in [5]. The
GC codeword is arranged in an nb × na matrix as depicted
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in Fig. 1, where each column is a codeword of a binary BCH
code B of length nb. The rows are protected by RS codes of
length na. m elements of each column represent one symbol
aj,i from the Galois field GF (2m). Hence, m rows form a
codeword of an outer code A(i).
.
.
.
...
...
b1 ∈ B
(0)
bj ∈ B
(0)
ai ∈ A
(i)
a0 ∈ A
(0)
na
nb
Fig. 1. GC data matrix
Each column is the sum of L codewords of nested linear
BCH codes.
B(L−1) ⊂ B(L−2) ⊂ . . . ⊂ B(0) (1)
Hence, a higher level code is a sub-code of its predecessor,
where the higher levels have higher error correcting capabil-
ities, i.e., tb,L−1 ≥ tb,L−2 ≥ . . . ≥, tb,0, where tb,i is the
error correcting capability of level i. The codeword of the j-th
column is the sum of L codewords. These codewords b(i)j are
formed by encoding the symbols aj,i for 0 ≤ i < L with the
corresponding sub-code B(i). For this encoding (L− i− 1)m
zero bits are prefixed onto the symbol aj,i. The final column
codeword is
bj =
L−1∑
i=0
b
(i)
j . (2)
Because of the linearity of the nested codes, bj is a codeword
of B(0).
The decoder processes level by level starting with i = 0.
Fig. 2 depicts the decoding steps. Let i be the index of the
current level. First the columns are decoded with respect to
B(i) and the information bits have to be inferred (re-image)
in order to retrieve the code symbols ai,j of A(i) where j
the column index. If all symbols of the code A(i) are inferred
the RS code can be decoded. At this point a partial decoding
result aˆi is available. Finally this result has to be re-encoded
using B(i). The estimated codewords of the inner code B(i) are
subtracted from the codeword matrix C before the next level
can be decoded. The detailed encoding and decoding process
is described in [4].
III. STACK ALGORITHM
In this section we describe the sequential decoding proce-
dure using the stack algorithm for block codes as presented
in [8]. This procedure uses the trellis representation. A trellis
T = (S,W) is a labeled, directed graph, where W = {w}
denotes the set of all branches in the graph and S = {σ} is
the set of all nodes. The set S is decomposed into n + 1
disjoint subsets S = S0 ∪ S1 ∪ . . . ∪ Sn that are called
levels of the trellis. Similarly, there exists a partition of the
BCH reimage RS decoder
BCH reencoding
BCH reencoding
RS decoderBCH reimageBCH decoder
BCH decoder
data matrix
1s
t
it
er
at
io
n
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io
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r′
r
′′
b̂j.1
b̂j.0
B(0) A(0)
B(0) A(1)
â0
â1
Fig. 2. GC decoding schemes
set W = W1 ∪ W2 ∪ . . . ∪ Wn. A node σ ∈ St of the
level t may be connected with a node σ˜ ∈ St+1 of the level
t+ 1 by one or several branches. Each branch wt is directed
from a node σ of level t − 1 to a node σ˜ of the next level
t. We assume that the end levels have only one node, namely
S0 = {σ0} and Sn = {σn}. A trellis is a compact method of
presenting all codewords of a code. Each branch of the trellis
wt is labeled by a code symbol vt(wt). Each distinct codeword
corresponds to a distinct path in the trellis, i.e., there is a
one-to-one correspondence between each codeword v in the
code and a path w in the trellis: v(w) = v1(w1), . . . , vn(wn).
We denote code sequence segments and path segments by
v[i,j] = vi, . . . , vj and w[i,j] = wi, . . . , wj , respectively.
The syndrome trellis, can be obtained using its parity-check
matrix [9]. The syndrome trellis is minimal inasmuch as this
trellis has the minimal possible number of nodes | S | among
all possible trellis representations of the same code. With the
syndrome trellis we also introduce a node labeling. The nodes
of the trellis will be identified by (n−k)-tuples with elements
from F2, with 0 referring to the all zero (n−k)-tuple. At level
t = 0 and level t = n the trellis contains only one node, the
all zero node σ0 = σn = 0.
The sequential decoding procedure as presented in [8] is a
stack algorithm, i.e., a stack is required to store interim results.
The stack contains code sequences of different lengths. Let vt
denote a code sequence of length t, i.e.vt = v1, . . . , vt. Each
code sequence is associated with a metric and a node σt. The
node st is the node in the trellis that is reached if we follow the
path corresponding to the code sequence through the trellis.
The metric rates each code sequence and the stack is ordered
according to these metric values where the code sequence at
the top of the stack is the one with the largest metric value.
There exits different metrics in the literature to compare code
sequences of different length. In the following, we consider
the Fano metric which is defined as follows. Let vi be the i-th
code bit and ri the i-th received symbol for transmission over
a discrete memoryless channel. The Fano metric for a code
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bit vi is defined by
M(ri|vi) = log2
p(ri|vi)
p(ri)
−R (3)
where p(ri|vi) is the channel transition probability, p(ri) is
the probability to observe ri at the channel output, and R is
the code rate. The Fano metric of a code sequence vt is
M(rt|vt) =
t∑
i=1
M(ri|vi) (4)
where rt is the sequence of the first t received symbols.
IV. PROPOSED SUPERCODE DECODING FOR NESTED-BCH
CODE
In this section we first describe the supercode decoding
[11]. Then we discuss the proposed application of supercode
decoding for the nested-BCH codes that are used in the GC
code.
A supercode Di of a block code D is a code containing
all codewords of D. For a linear code D we can construct
two supercodes D1 and D2 such that D = D1 ∩ D2. Let
H =
(
H˜1
H˜2
)
be the parity-check matrix of the code D,
this means that H˜1 and H˜2 are two sub-matrices of H. The
sub-matrices H˜1 and H˜2 define the supercodes D1 and D2,
respectively.
As already described the higher level of the code B(i) is a
subcode of its predecessor B(i−1). We can now form distinct
supercodes B˜(i) for each level of B(i) with i = 1, ..., L − 1 .
We can form the parity-check matrices of level L by
H =


H˜1
.
.
.
H˜L

 (5)
where H˜i is the corresponding parity-check matrix of the
supercode B˜(i).
Next we state the proposed sequential decoding algorithm
for two supercodes. Any path stored in the stack is associated
with a metric value as well as two states σt,1 and σt,2
which are the states in the trellis for supercode D1 and D2,
respectively.
Algorithm 1: The sequential decoding starts in the
nodes σ0,1 and σ0,2 of the supercode trellises. Calculate
the metric values for v1 = 0 and v1 = 1. Insert both
paths into the stack according to their metric values. In
each iteration, remove the code sequence at the top from
the stack. Verify whether the branches for vt+1 = 0 and
vt+1 = 1 exist for both nodes σt,1 and σt,2 corresponding
to the top path. If a branch exists in both supercode trel-
lises then calculate the metric for this path and insert the
code sequence into the stack. The algorithm terminates
when a path approaches the end nodes σn,1 and σn,2. The
estimated codeword is the top path in the final iteration.
V. DECODER ARCHITECTURE
In this section we discuss the decoder architecture of a GC
decoder. First we discuss the integration of the stack algorithm
as inner decoder into the implementation of the GC decoder
presented in [4]. Then the stack algorithm implementation
for supercode decoding with its subsystems is presented and
discussed.
The original hard input GC decoder implementation in [4]
uses algebraic syndrome decoding. In this implementation the
first levels of B can decode tb,0 = 1 and tb,1 = 2 errors. Thus
high error correction capabilities of the outer codes A(0) and
A(1) are required. This leads to lower code rates and a high
decoding complexity of those outer codes. On the other hand
the soft decoding complexity of the column codes increases
significantly with each code level. Hence soft decoding is of
interest for the lower levels.
Subsequently the algebraic decoding logic for the column
code remains in the implementation. Therefore it is possible to
check whether the syndrome is zero. In this case the codeword
can be assumed to be correct, i.e., neither algebraic decoding
nor sequential decoding result in a different codeword.
A. System overview
A brief system overview is depicted in Fig. 3. The system
consists of a word array of size nb and a desired width which
stores the q-ary word. Furthermore a demultiplexer selects the
currently processes bit position depending on the top path
of the stack and delivers this value to the metric calculator.
Based on the received codeword symbol ri and the previous
metric M(rt−1|vt−1) the metric module returns M(rt|vt) to
the priority queue block. To represent the supercode trellis
asynchronous ROM is used. Each word of the ROM represents
a trellis node σt,i. The data consists of two pointers for the
successor nodes vt+1 = 0 and vt+1 = 1.
Depending on the top entry of the priority queue the desired
codeword symbol is selected and the next branches for the
actual nodes σt,1 and σt,2 are loaded from the trellis ROM.
The priority queue unloads the top entry and loads the new
paths in a single clock cycle.
B. Priority queue
Each entry of the priority queue contains several elements.
The first element is the metric value. The path in the trellis,
the length of the path, and a pointer to the current node are
stored. All entries have to be ordered by the metric values
such that the top entry has the highest value.
The process of the priority queue starts with its initializa-
tion. The starting node, its initial metric value and the path
length are set. Each update cycle begins with the load phase
in which the next node pointers are loaded from the trellis
ROM. Simultaneously the next codeword symbol is loaded
based on the path length index. The next metric value can
be determined based on the code symbol and the available
branches.
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parity
queue
metric
calculation
A D A D
bit position
DEMUX
received
word
M(rt|vt = 0)
M(rt|vt = 1)
M(rt−1|vt−1)
ROM1 ROM2
Fig. 3. Block diagram of the sequential decoder
With binary codes there exists at least one possible branch
and at most two branches. The resulting branches are pre-
sorted using combinatorial logic. In the following we call these
two entries the major and the minor entries, where the major
entry has the better metric value.
new
major
new
minor
top element
2nd element
last element
.
.
.
Fig. 4. Priority Queue
As depicted in Fig. 4, all priority queue elements are succes-
sively ordered in a chain. Each element can exchange its date
with its previous or next neighbor. Furthermore each element
can decide weather it keeps its own data, take the data from its
neighbor, load the new major data or the new minor data. In
each element the metric value is compared with the new value.
The result of this comparison is signaled to its predecessor
and successor elements. If the signal of a predecessor is false
and the major metric value comparator gives a positive signal
the new major value will be stored. Likewise if an element
receives a false signal from its successor and the minor metric
value comparator signals a new metric value that is less than
the current value, the new minor data is stored. In the case
that an element receives a signal from its neighbors, space for
the new data has to be created by shifting all entries to next
element.
There exists two special cases that have to be taken into
account. The first special case occurs if a node has only a
single outgoing branch. In this case the shifting of elements
has to be prevented by signaling. The second special case
occurs if the new major and the new minor elements are
designated to be inserted into the same entry register. This
case can be detected and preventing by passing this value to
the next element.
comparator
minor
major
comparator
element register
bypass
shift
prev
next
keep/new
major/minor
to previous elementfrom previous element
to next element from next element
pass trough/
≥ 1
≥ 1
Fig. 5. Priority queue element
The algorithm terminates if the maximum possible path
length is reached. The stored path in the top element is the
decoded codeword. In the practical implementation an iteration
counter will terminate after a determined maximum number of
iterations. This abort can be used to mark this decoded GC
column as a erasure symbol for the outer RS code A.
C. Supercode Extension
In order to decode supercodes, the following extensions
have to be implemented. First for each supercode Di a
distinct ROM is needed which represents its trellis. The metric
calculation has to take all trellis branches of each Di into
account. Furthermore all node pointers have to be stored in
the priority queue elements.
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VI. MEASUREMENTS AND COMPARISON
In this section we present an FPGA implementation and
C++ simulation results of the proposed soft input decoder
and compare it with the hard input decoder presented in [4].
We first describe the GC code with its parameters. Next we
compare the error correction performance and the throughput.
Finally we present synthesis results to compare the implemen-
tation complexity.
For the GC code we use six levels with inner nested-BCH
codes over GF (26) and outer codes using GF (29). In the first
level the inner code can correct a single error and therefore
six redundancy bits are needed. Thus the number of rows is
nb = 6 · 9 + 6 = 60.
The hard input decoder uses algebraic decoding. It consists
of the syndrome calculation, the Berlekamp–Massey algorithm
(BMA), and the Chien search module. The soft input de-
coder is implemented as proposed in Section IV without the
described SRAM improvement. It has two limitations. First,
the length of the priority queue is limited to 64 elements.
Furthermore the accuracy of the metric calculation is limited
to 16 bits and we use 3-bit quantization of the input symbols.
We first compare the error correction performance of the
GC code in different decoding modes and a long BCH code.
The first decoding mode of the GC code is the hard input using
algebraic decoding. We present two soft input modes where we
use a 3-bit quantization and a floating point implementation
that shows the maximum achievable gain in comparison with
the hard input decoder. Note that the BCH code and GC code
have different length. The BCH code was designed for blocks
of 1k byte information, whereas the GC code is designed for
2k byte information blocks.
10-3 10-2
BER
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
R
soft input GCC - 3-bit qary
soft input GCC - 32-bit Floating Point accuracy
hard input GCC
1kByte BCH
Fig. 6. Code rate versus bit error rate
Fig. 6 depicts the code rate versus bit error rate. The code
rate was chosen in order to achieve the overall block error rate
of 10−16. As can be seen the hard input curve for the GC code
Module Slices LUT
syndrome 118 234
iBMA 1 800 3 348
Chien search 1 266 2 304
Total 3 184 5 886
Stack alg. 18 487 36 829
Tab. I
COLUMN CODE FPGA SYNTHESIS SIZE
is flatter than the curve for the BCH code. The GC decoder
with 3-bit quantized soft information shows a significant gain.
10-3 10-2
BER
0
50
100
150
200
#i
te
ra
tio
ns
1st level
2nd level
Fig. 7. Average number of iterations for the first and second level
The stack algorithm has a variable execution time depending
on the error pattern. This algorithm needs at least 61 cycles to
traverse the entire trellis if no error occurred. This case can be
omitted by checking whether the syndrome of a column word
is zero. If no error is detected the soft decoding can be avoided
and thus only a single cycle is needed. Fig. 7 compares the
average number of cycles needed for the stack algorithm. It
shows the dependency between the channel bit error rate and
the computational complexity, i.e., fewer errors lead to fewer
decoding cycles. Note that the algebraic hard input decoder
needs four cycles for the first and six cycles for the second
level.
Next we present FPGA synthesis result for the stack algo-
rithm. The synthesis was performed with Xilinx ISE 14.4 and
a Virtex-4 target device. Tab. VI shows the number of slices
and LUT of the hard input and the soft input decoder with
3-bit quantization.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work we have presented a soft input decoder for gen-
eralized concatenated codes. We have proposed a sequential
decoding algorithm based on supercode trellises in order to
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reduce the complexity of the soft input decoding. This imple-
mentation improves the error correction capability significantly
compared with hard input decoding. The implementation of the
stack algorithm is nine times large than the algebraic decoder.
This complexity can be reduces by moving the majority of
the register entries into an SRAM. Nevertheless, the proposed
soft input decoding increases the overall complexity of the GC
decoder only by 72% compared with the decoder presented
in [12]. Consequently, the proposed method is a promising
approach for soft input decoding of GC codes.
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Abstract—This paper presents a filtering approach for semi-
dense probabilistic depth map received from a focused plenoptic
camera. In the probabilistic depth map each valid depth pixel
contains, beside the depth value itself, a variance which gives a
measure for the certainty of the estimated depth. This variance
is used in a weighted filtering approach. Here, beside removing
outliers and filling holes in the semi-dense depth map, pixel
neighborhoods are modeled in a Markov-Random-Field (MRF).
The presented approach is working in two steps, firstly a rough
regularization is performed in each micro image separately and
secondly, after projection to the virtual image space, another
more precise regularization is performed. The presented filtering
approach considers properties of the plenoptic imaging, like vary-
ing spatial resolution over object distance. Besides, it preserves
discontinuities in the depth map. The algorithm aims for low
complexity and due to its nature it can easily be implemented in
parallel.
I. INTRODUCTION
While a monocular camera captures light intensities only
on a 2D sensor, a plenoptic camera gathers intensities in a
sampled 4D light-field representation.
Even though this concept to gather 4D light-field informa-
tion was invented already more than a century ago [1], [2],
it took until the last decade to put the first plenoptic cameras
on the market. One reason therefor is the high computational
cost which has to be spend to process the recorded light-field
information. Nevertheless, today there are several algorithms
available to process the recorded 4D light-field information in,
or at least close to, real-time.
Processing tasks last from subsequent refocusing, over super
resolution imaging, up to depth estimation. Especially plenop-
tic camera based depth estimation and the fact, that a plenoptic
camera records much more information about scene structures
than a monocular camera arouse attention in the computer
vision community. Here, possible applications are for instance
Visual Odometry (VO) or Simultaneous Localization and
Mapping (SLAM) but also gesture and pattern recognition.
This paper continues the work of our prior publication [3]
where a probabilistic depth estimation approach for a focused
plenoptic camera was developed. The method in [3] establishes
a semi-dense depth map, which means that depth is only
estimated for regions of high contrast. Here we present a post
Fig. 1. Sample scene recorded by a focused plenoptic camera. Top left:
Synthesized totally focused intensity image. Top right: Color coded unfiltered
depth map. Bottom left: Color coded filtered depth map. Bottom right: Point
cloud representation of the filtered depth map.
processing step to filter out outliers and stochastic noise to
improve the quality of the depth map.
Due to the fact that we want to use the resulting depth
information in Visual Odometry which is supposed to operate
close to real-time, we were focusing on methods which have
low complexity and can be implemented in an efficient manner.
In this article, we first briefly describe the concept of a
focused plenoptic camera (Section II) which is requisite to
understand our depth estimation approach. This approach is
presented succinctly in Section III. Our filtering method based
on the probabilistic depth map is introduced in Section IV.
Section V shows how based on the estimated depth an intensity
image with a very high depth of field (DOF) (totally focused
image) can be synthesized. Section VI presents the evaluation
of the filtering approach and Section VII concludes our work.
BW-CAR Symposium on Information and Communication Systems (SInCom) 2015
7
Fig. 2. Subsection of the raw image recorded by a focused plenoptic camera.
The raw image consists of thousands of circular micro image arranged on a
hexagonal grid.
II. CONCEPT OF THE FOCUSED PLENOPTIC CAMERA
A focused plenoptic camera (plenoptic camera 2.0) [4], [5],
which the presented method relies on, slightly differs from a
traditional, unfocused plenoptic camera [6], [7]. Nevertheless,
both concepts are based on a micro lens array (MLA) which
is placed in front of the sensor.
The main advantage of a focused plenoptic camera is that it
produces a focused micro image of a subsection of the scene
under each micro lens, as can be seen in the recorded sensor
image in Figure 2. Thereby a higher spatial image resolution
is achieve than with an unfocused plenoptic camera, where
each micro lens just represents one spatial sample.
A focused plenoptic camera can be realized in two different
setups [8], [4], the Keplerian and the Galilean mode. In the
Keplerian mode the light-field sensor (image sensor and MLA)
is placed in a distance further than the image distance bL to
the main lens of the camera, while in the Galilean mode the
light-field sensor is placed closer than bL to the main lens.
Figure 3 shows the interior of a focused plenoptic camera
based on the Galilean setup. Here DL defines the aperture of
the main lens and DM the one of a micro lens. bL represents
the image distance of the projected main lens image (virtual
image). The relation between the image distance bL and the
object distance aL is defined, dependent on the focal length
fL, by the thin lens equation:
1
fL
=
1
aL
+
1
bL
(1)
In the following we will discuss only the Galilean mode.
Nevertheless, similar assumptions can be made for the Keple-
rian mode.
In our research we are working with a Raytrix camera [5],
which is a focused plenoptic camera operating in the Galilean
mode. Besides, a Raytrix camera has as distinct feature an
MLA that consist of three different types of micro lenses
which are arranged in a hexagonal grid. Each type of micro
lens has a different focal length and thus focuses a different
image distance bL and respectively object distance aL on
the sensor. The three focal lengths are chosen such, that the
corresponding DOFs are just adjacent. Thus, the DOF of the
camera is extended. Due to overlap of the micro images it can
be assured, that each virtual image point occurs focused in at
least one micro image.
From Figure 3 one can see, that a certain object point is
projected to multiple micro images on the sensor. Thus, by
B bL0
b
fL
bL
DM
DM
DM
DL
main lenssensor
MLA
Fig. 3. Optical path inside a focused plenoptic camera based on the Galilean
configuration. The MLA and the image sensor lie in front of the virtual image
created by the main lens. A virtual image point in distance b behind the MLA
results in multiple focused micro images on the sensor.
finding corresponding points in the micro images, the distance
b between MLA and the respective virtual image point can be
calculated by triangulation:
b =
d ·B
px
(2)
Here, d represents the baseline distance between two micro
lenses, B the distance between MLA and sensor and px the
measured disparity between the corresponding points in the
micro images. Since points with a large distance b are seen
from micro lenses which are further apart, the lager baseline
distance d can be used to improve the depth estimate. A
detailed derivation of this equation can be found in [9]. Prior
to a metric calibration, the distance B is not known precisely
and thus the depth estimate is defined relative to this distance:
v =
b
B
=
d
px
(3)
The distance v is called the virtual depth subsequently [5].
Besides, we defined the inverse virtual depth z = v−1, which
will be used in the following sections:
z =
1
v
=
px
d
(4)
III. PROBABILISTIC DEPTH ESTIMATION
This section presents our probabilistic virtual depth estima-
tion algorithm, originally published in [3]. The prior section
showed that depth estimation in a focused plenoptic camera
can be solved by finding pixel correspondences between micro
images. Due to the high overlap of the micro images, this
task can be considered as multi-view stereo problem. Since
the focus of our approach lies on real-time applicability, the
presented algorithm searches for corresponding pixel pairs
based on local criteria. To combine all these correspondences
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in one depth map, for each depth observation an uncertainty
measure is defined which is used to establish a probabilistic
depth map, as introduced in [10].
A. Probabilistic Virtual Depth
From eq. (4) one can see, that the inverse virtual depth z is
proportional to the estimated disparity px. The disparity px of
a point in two micro images is estimated based on intensity
error minimization along the epipolar line. Thus, the sensor
noise is considered to be the main error source effecting this
estimate. Since the sensor noise is usually modeled as additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN), we also consider the estimated
disparity px and hence also the inverse virtual depth to be a
Gaussian distributed random variable Z, defined by the mean
z and the variance σ2z .
fZ(x) =
1√
2piσz
e
− (x−z)2
2σ2z (5)
In [3] it is derived in detail how the inverse virtual depth
variance σ2z can be obtained.
B. Virtual Depth Observation
For depth estimation we want to establish stereo correspon-
dences between any possible pairs of micro lenses. Thus, a
graph of baselines is build which defines the micro image
pairs used for stereo matching. For a certain micro lens this
graph contains the baselines to all micro lenses right to the
micro lens of interest. In that way it is assured that each pixel
correspondence is established only once. Figure 4 shows five
sample baselines, one for each of the five shortest baseline
distances.
Each baseline in the graph is defined by its length d as well
as its 2D orientation on the MLA plane ep = (epx, epy)T .
Since the micro images are considered to be rectified, the
orientation vector of the baseline is equivalent to that of the
epipolar line of any pixel under the micro lens of interest.
The inverse virtual depth estimation is performed for each
pixel in the raw image pR := xR = (xR, yR)T which
lies under a micro lens and has a certain intensity gradient
along the epipolar line ep. For each pixels multiple stereo
observations are estimated starting from the shortest baseline
up to the longest possible baseline. This is done, since for a
short baseline it is more likely to find unambiguous correspon-
dences, while longer baselines improve the precision. Thus,
for each observation the prior estimates are used to limit the
search range.
C. Merging Inverse Virtual Depth Observations
The prior Section described already that for a pixel pR in the
raw image multiple inverse virtual depth observations can be
obtained. Each new observation is incorporated into a inverse
virtual depth hypothesis similar to the update step in a Kalman
filter. Here, the new inverse virtual depth hypothesis N (z, σ2z)
Fig. 4. Five shortest baseline distances in a hexagonal micro lens grid. For
a micro lens stereo matching is only performed with neighbors for which the
baseline angle φ is in the range −90◦ ≤ φ < 90◦.
results from the hypothesis prior the observation N (zp, σ2p)
and the new observation N (zo, σ2o) as follows:
N (z, σ2z) = N
(
σ2p · zo + σ2o · zp
σ2p + σ
2
o
,
σ2p · σ2o
σ2p + σ
2
o
)
(6)
IV. POST PROCESSING OF PROBABILISTIC DEPTH MAP
In the probabilistic depth estimation algorithm pixels cor-
respondences are found only based on local criteria. Besides,
each pixel is processed separately without considering a larger
neighborhood. Thus, the estimated inverse virtual depth values
z in the micro images can be considered to be more or less
uncorrelated. This is actually not the case for depth maps of
real scenes, where neighboring depth pixels usually are highly
correlated. Thus, in this post processing step we model the
connection between pixels in a certain neighborhood by a
Markov-Random-Field (MRF).
The regularization is done in several steps. First outlier
removal and hole filling is performed in each micro image
separately (Sec. IV-A). Afterwards the pixels from the micro
images are projected back into the virtual image space which
is created by the main lens projection (Sec. IV-B). Here again
outlier removal and hole filling is performed. Finally the depth
map is updated based on an MRF structure, using all inverse
virtual depth pixel hypothesizes within a certain neighborhood
(Sec. IV-C).
A. Removing Outliers and Filling Holes in Micro Images
1) Removing Outliers: Due to ambiguous structures in
the micro images it happens that wrong correspondences are
established between pixels in the micro images. Thus, in
a first step pixels which are outliers with respect to their
neighborhood are removed. For each valid depth pixel in
the raw image p(i)R , with the depth hypothesis N (zi, σ2zi), an
average inverse virtual depth zi and a corresponding variance
σ2zi of the valid depth pixels NRvalid within the neighborhood
N
(i)
R is defined:
zi =
∑
k∈N(i)x ,k 6=i zk ·
(
σ2zk
)−1∑
k∈N(i)x ,k 6=i (σ
2
zk)
−1 (7)
σ2zi =
|N (i)x | − 1∑
k∈N(i)x ,k 6=i (σ
2
zk)
−1 (8)
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In eq. (8) N (i)x defines the intersection between the set of
neighborhood pixels N (i)R of p
(i)
R and the set of valid depth
pixels NRvalid (N
(i)
x = N
(i)
R ∩NRvalid). Besides |N (i)x | is the
cardinality of the set N (i)x and defines the number of elements
in the set. Eq. (7) and (8) are actually quite similar to the
definition of z and σ2z in eq. (6). The only difference is, that
the sum of the inverse variances is multiplied by the number
of valid neighbors (|N (i)x | − 1).
Each pixel p(i)R that has a inverse virtual depth estimate zi
which does not satisfy the following condition is classified as
outlier:
(zi − zi)2 ≤ 4 · σ2zi (9)
For the experiments in Section VI we defined a squared
neighborhood of 5 pixel× 5 pixel.
2) Filling Holes: After removing the outlier in the micro
images, pixels which have enough gradient but no valid
depth estimate are filled based on the neighboring pixels.
Therefore, again the average inverse virtual depth zi within a
neighborhood region is calculated based on eq. (7). The inverse
virtual depth zi gives the new depth value for the invalid pixel
p
(i)
R , while the corresponding variance σ
2
zi is initialized to some
predefined high value. By setting the initial variance to some
high value, these interpolated depth values can not negatively
effect the later regularization.
B. Projecting Micro Images into Virtual Image Space
After removing outliers and filling holes in the micro
images, all micro image pixels which have a valid depth
hypothesis are projected into the virtual image space. We
define the virtual image space similar to [3] by the pixel
coordinates xV and yV and the virtual depth v = z−1
(xV = (xV , yV , v)T ).
The virtual image coordinates xV and yV are calculated
based on a central perspective projecting thru the correspond-
ing micro lens as follows:
xV = (xR − cx)v + cx (10)
yV = (yR − cy)v + cy (11)
Here cx and cy is the center of the micro lens under which
the pixel pR with the coordinates xR lies.
As described in Section II, a virtual image point is projected
to multiple micro images. Vise verse, when performing the
back projection to the virtual image space, multiple raw image
pixels can fall on the same virtual image pixel and thus have
to be merged. This is done similar to the merging step in
Section III-C (eq. (6)).
C. Regularization of Virtual Image
In the virtual image space firstly outliers which were not
detected in the micro images are removed. Besides, the inverse
virtual depth values are smoothed, while considering the
imaging concept of the camera.
For the virtual image space regularization again for each
pixel p(i)V := x
(i)
V a neighborhood region N
(i)
V is defined.
Each micro lens performs a central perspective projection
and thus, objects with a high virtual depth occur smaller on
the sensor than objects with a small virtual depth. Besides,
virtual image points with a high virtual depth are observed
by more micro lenses. Thus, vise verse back projected virtual
image regions with a high virtual depth consist of more points
which are spread over a larger region. Hence, for the virtual
image regularization, the size of the neighborhood is defined
dependent on the virtual depth vi of the pixel of interest p
(i)
V .
For each pixel p(i)V a radius r(vi) is defined as follows:
r(v) = dn · vie (12)
Here n defines some constant parameter. For lower complexity
in calculation, the radius r(vi) defines the maximum allowed
Chebyshev distance L∞ to the pixel p
(i)
V instead of the Eu-
clidean distance. A pixel p(k)V for instance has the Chebyshev
distance L(k)∞ to the pixel p
(i)
V defined as follows:
L(k)∞ = max
(
|x(i)V − x(k)V |, |y(i)V − y(k)V |
)
(13)
Thus, a squared neighborhood N (i)V around p
(i)
V is defined.
1) Removing Outliers: For removing outliers in the virtual
image, similar to the micro images, the mean inverse virtual
depth zi (eq. (7)) and the mean inverse virtual depth variance
σ2zi (eq. (8)) of valid depth pixels within the neighborhood
region N (i)V is defined:
N (i)x = N
(i)
V ∩NV valid (14)
Here, NV valid is the set of all pixels pV which have a valid
depth estimate. Nevertheless, besides fulfilling the condition
defined in eq. (9) a pixel p(i)V has to have a density of valid
depth pixels in its neighborhood above a certain threshold TD
.
TD ≤ |N
(i)
x |
|N (i)V |
(15)
In the following experiments the minimum density was set to
TD = 0.25.
2) Filling Holes: At that point there are no intensities
available for the virtual image. Thus, pixel validity can not
be defined based on the pixel’s intensity gradient, as it is done
in the raw image. Instead, each pixel in the virtual image pV
which has at least one direct neighbor with a valid depth
hypothesis is filled by a weighted average of neighboring
pixels, defined similar to eq. (7).
3) MRF based Noise Reduction: In a final step the actual
correspondence between neighboring pixels in the virtual
image is established by modeling the neighborhoods in an
MRF. Here the same neighborhood N (i)V as for outlier removal
is defined.
In the MRF for a neighborhood N (i)V two different states
are defined to handle discontinuities in the depth map. Thus,
either a pixel p(k)V in the neighborhood N
(i)
V belongs to the
same object as p(i)V or to a different object. These two objects
can be considered as foreground and background.
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Besides, a weighting function w(d) is defined which models
the lower correlation between further apart pixels. Here d
defines the euclidean distance between two pixels. In our
approach we use a Gaussian curve as weighting function,
where the standard deviation σw is proportional to v.
w(d) = e
− d2
2σ2w (16)
To model the two different states (foreground and back-
ground), the neighborhood is divided in two different sets of
valid depth pixels, Nsim and Ndiff . Here Nsim are all valid
pixels which have a depth value similar to p(i)V (including
p
(i)
V ) and Ndiff contains all valid pixels with a depth value
different to p(i)V . The updated depth value of the pixel p
(i)
V
is then calculated based on the larger one of the two sets as
follows:
zi =
∑
k∈Nx zk · wkσ2zk∑
k∈Nx
wk
σ2zk
(17)
σ2zi =
∑
k∈Nx wk∑
k∈Nx
wk
σ2zk
(18)
Here, Nx is the one of Nsim and Ndiff with the higher
cardinality.
Nx =
{
Nsim if |Ndiff | < |Nsim|,
Ndiff else.
(19)
wk is defined as follows:
wk = w(dk) = w
(
‖(x(i)V , y(i)V )T − (x(k)V , y(k)V )T ‖
)
(20)
V. INTENSITY IMAGE SYNTHESIS
Additionally to the virtual depth map an intensity image is
synthesized. This is done as described in [5]. For each point
p
(i)
V , based on its inverse virtual depth estimate zi a radius Ri
is defined.
Ri =
DM
2 · zi (21)
Here, DM is the diameter of a micro lens as shown in Figure 3.
The radius Ri defines the region around the pixel p
(i)
V in which
micro lenses still see this virtual image point. Hence, the point
p
(i)
V is back projected to all micro images for which the center
lies within this radius around the pixel. Here only the micro
lens types are considered in which the virtual image point
is in focus. Based on the corresponding interpolated intensity
values a weighted mean is calculated.
I(pi) =
∑
k Ik · hk∑
k hk
(22)
Here hk are the respective intensity values received from a
recorded white image. By calculating a weighted mean using
the information of the white image for each pixel the optimum
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is obtained.
For pixels pV in the virtual image which have no depth
estimate it is satisfactory to assume an approximate depth
value to synthesize its intensity. This can be done since such
Fig. 5. Planar chessboard target used for quantitative evaluation. Left: Totally
focused intensity image. Center: Color coded depth map before filtering.
Right: Color coded depth map after filtering.
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Fig. 6. Histogram of virtual depth v across chessboard target.
pixels anyways lie in a neighborhood of little texture and thus
all pixels in the neighborhood have similar intensities.
VI. RESULTS
In this section we evaluate the presented filtering method
based on artificial as well as real scenes. In a first evaluation
we try to measure the filtering results in numbers, as presented
in Section VI-A, while Section VI-B presents a qualitative
evaluation.
A. Quantitative Evaluation
For a quantitative evaluation we used a planar target as
ground truth which was placed in front of the plenoptic
camera, as shown in Figure 5. Here the virtual depth values
across the planar target were evaluated and compared before
and after filtering. Figure 6 shows the histograms of the virtual
depth v before and after filtering.
Besides, Table I shows some calculated statistics for the
virtual depth v across the chessboard target (mean v, median
v˜, standard deviation σv).
As one can see, the standard deviation σv is highly reduce
by the filtering. Furthermore, the arithmetic mean v is effected
quite a lot by the filtering. This is because the virtual depth is
mean v median v˜ std. dev. σv
Before filtering 5.667 5.430 1.304
After filtering 5.413 5.423 0.071
TABLE I
STATISTICS CALCULATED FOR VIRTUAL DEPTH ACROSS CHESSBOARD
PLANE.
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Fig. 7. Real scene recorded by a focused plenoptic camera. Top left:
Synthesized totally focused intensity image. Top center: Color coded unfiltered
depth map. Top right: Color coded filtered depth map. Bottom left: Point
cloud representation of the unfiltered depth map. Bottom right: Point cloud
representation of the filtered depth map.
Fig. 8. Raytrix sample scene [11]. Top left: Synthesized totally focused
intensity image. Top right: Color coded unfiltered depth map. Bottom left:
Color coded filtered depth map. Bottom right: Point cloud representation of
the filtered depth map.
not symmetrically distributed but the inverse virtual depth.This
mapping from z to v has the effect, that the mean is shifted
away from the distributions maximum towards higher virtual
depth values. Nevertheless, the median v˜ stays more or less
constant.
B. Qualitative Evaluation
In this part of the evaluation some real scenes are presented
for which the depth was estimated and filtering was applied.
Figure 1 and Figure 7 show two real scenes which were
recorded with a Raytrix R5 camera. In Figure 8 a sample
scene from Raytrix [11] is shown.
The color coded depth maps show quite well how holes in
the depth map are filled and how pixel in a neighborhood of
low density are removed. From Figure 7 one can see that this
sometimes also removes some valid structures form far away
regions (e.g. at the tool cabinet in the back). This could be
avoided by adjusting the parameters. Nevertheless, this also
might cause some unwanted outliers to be kept.
The bottom row in Figure 7 shows a comparison of the point
clouds before and after filtering. These point clouds nicely
indicate how the noise is reduced but discontinuities are kept.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a method to filter semi-dense
probabilistic virtual depth maps which were estimated based
on a focused plenoptic camera. Besides removing outliers and
filling holes, the approach uses an MRF to smooth the depth
map, while preserving discontinuities.
The presented results show high improvement in com-
parison to the unfiltered depth information. Noise is highly
reduced while most of the details are kept.
The presented method was developed in such manner, that
it later can be implemented as real-time post processing for
instance on a graphic processor unit (GPU). The properties of
the resulting depth map are such that it supplies reliable depth
information which later can be used in a plenoptic camera
based Visual Odometry.
In future one could think of including intensity information
for filtering the virtual image space, similar to the micro
images. Nevertheless, since the correct intensity of a pixel
relies on a correct virtual depth estimate, the problem becomes
more complex.
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Abstract—In this paper a new architectural method for the
dynamic embedment of resources and models into system nodes
at run-time is proposed. One approach for realizing this is
the dynamic embedment of peer-specific resource capabilites,
such as I/O-resources or cloud-based resources, as well as rich
cyber and physical environment models between networked
system nodes by an adapted multi-tier architecture. The method
considers the latest QoS-metrics of the communication link and
ensures a reliable basic system operation, even when the network
fails completely. Generic selection-algorithms for a metrics-based
evaluation of the application-specific sub-algorithms and model-
components are described. An example implementation and
performance evaluation of the proposed architecture is given
with an application from the field out of the renewable energies.
Therefore, a quantitative evaluation of the round-trip-time (RTT)
of the control-loop, as well as trend results of the costs are given
by an economies-of-scale-model.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the main characteristics of a cyber-physical system
(CPS) is the complexity of the system resulting from its
networked components: It consists of two or more system
nodes, each equipped with its own sensors and actuators,
interacting with the physical environment [1]–[3]. They are
interconnected over local and/or wide area networks - like
the Internet - with other nodes, processes or humans (see
Figure 1) [4], [5]. Cloud-based resources can be integral part
of the system as well, in order to provide practically endless
computing capacities and storage space to the other system
nodes [6]–[10]. A main distinguishing feature to already
established types of embedded systems is the openness of
the communication network, to other applications [11]. That
means there can be various participating subsystems from dif-
ferent vendors on the same communication infrastructure and
they may implement applications from two or more different
application domains [11]. Such an environment, which is not
under control of one single person or institution, will never
be guaranteed static [6], [11]. A continuous complementation
of sub-algorithms and model-components becomes essential
to upgrade functionality and react to new system requirements
and dynamic changing environment conditions. This blurs the
old-days strictly defined transition between design-time and
run-time (see Figure 2). Situation-related resource sharing,
enabled through networked system components, becomes a
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Fig. 1. Generic model of a cyber-physical system with scope of a resource-
based view [4], [5]
key technique for diverse development efforts of future cyber-
physical systems (CPS). The following chapters discuss a
method of a dynamic embedment of resource capacities and
rich environment models (REMs) within a CPS, in order to
enable such complementation processes in a comfortable and
economic way through a high-level servicing point.
II. RELATED WORK
In [10] a new architectural approach of cloud-based cyber-
physical control systems was discussed. The proposed software
architecture came with an adapted multi-tier- and multi-layer-
architecture [12], which helps to master the heterogeneities
in between hardware architectures, operating system platforms
and programming languages/APIs (see Figure 3). A solution
for the seamless integration of sensors and actuators into cloud-
based algorithms, as well as the mitigation of the vendor lock-
in effect between different cloud-service providers and system
vendors, was shown. For this reason, a method for a flexible
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Fig. 2. Dynamic CPS workflow showing the blur of design-time and run-time
by the application example introduced in chapter V
application of the Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) [13] and on-
premises model, was explained.
III. STATE OF THE ART
The adapted multi-tier architecture from [10], as seen in
Figure 3, consists of three tier-types, which are redefined
here as follows: A HMI-peer is a kind of peer like a PC,
smartphone or tablet computer. It consumes and/or provides re-
sources from the other peers. The Core-peers consists of cloud-
based resources (Software-as-a-Service, SaaS) or on-premises
resources. They are peers with huge processing- and storage
capacities. That is why they are running complex algorithms
or holding the rich environment models of the application. The
Edge-peers come along with a minimal set of computing re-
sources. They are mostly used as highly specialized Edge-peers
to interface the physical environment with their I/O-capabilities
(see Figure 1), and to provide and/or consume services from
the overall CPS. In the adapted multi-tier-architecture the
separate tiers are named "peers". That is because each of
them can provide as well as consume resource services. Such
a system architecture, where each participating node/tier can
implement client- as well as server-functionalities, is called
a Peer-to-Peer-Architecture (P2P) [14]. A P2P-Architecture is
a key component in dynamically changing environments of
cyber-physical systems, where resource capabilities and rich
environment models shall be embedded over node-borders
bilaterally. Resources are shared between tiers as Web-services
using the REST-protocol (Representational State Transfer),
no specific P2P-Protocol is needed at this time, because the
systems’ peers are considered using static addresses and every
peer knows each other peers addresses.
IV. A NEW ARCHITECTURAL METHOD FOR THE
DYNAMIC EMBEDMENT OF PEER-SPECIFIC RESOURCE
CAPABILITIES AND RICH ENVIRONMENT MODELS
The following sections discuss the space for improvement
of the adapted multi-tier architecture regarding the embedment
of sub-algorithms and models or model-components dynam-
ically at run-time by the evaluation of application-specific
execution-metrics. This realizes two main advantages: The first
is a dynamical increasing of the systems’ fitness, depending
of the metrics evaluation. That means if the metrics pass,
more complex resources can be embedded during run-time
and smarter control algorithms and models can be applied.
This can lead to better control results. The second advantage is
the creation of a high-level servicing point on the Core-Peers.
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Pre-Processing
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m Core-peers
(Data- and Application)
q Edge-peers
(I/O, real-time)
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Fig. 3. The multi-tier architecture including HMI-peers, Core-peers and
Edge-peers
That allows to implement complex algorithms and models
in high-level programming languages like Java. Instead of
changing fragile firmware code, it becomes possible to easily
implement, test and maintain high-level code on the Core-
Peers. The principal details of that architectural aspects are
described below.
A. Dynamic Embedment of Resource Capabilities
The fundamental approach of the proposed method is to
implement at least one very basic version of the application-
specific control algorithm on the Edge-peers. That ensures
a basic operation, independent from the network conditions.
The more complex algorithms, which need more resource
capacities for execution, are located on the Core-peers. The
Core-peers can be realized as cloud-based resources. That
makes them very scalable, if more processing capacitiy is
needed. The Edge-peers are limited in their capacities and can
be optimized for minimal costs or energy consumption. The
idea is to embed the more complex algorithms in the Edge-
peers processing flow dynamically over the network, if the
preconditions are fulfilled. That allows more accurate results
and a more adaptive behavior of the given automation task.
Further reasons are the better utilization of available processing
capacities and storage space on the Core-peers as well as the
integration of more data-sources as they are available on the
Edge-peers (see section IV-B). If the communication link to the
Core-peers fails, the Edge-peers are able to perform their tasks
in a a basic characteristic, without the need for a link to the
Core-peers. For realizing this, the proposed method consists of
a set of application-specific sub-algorithms which are ordered
by their complexity in ascending order (see algorithm 1).
Low complexity means basic characteristic of the algorithm
but it still ensures a working system. High complexity means
better control results but high resource demands respectively
high execution dependancies. Each sub-algorithm is assigned
to a metric, which evaluates its execution dependencies. The
metrics are evaluated, started with the lowest complexity, if
the metric pass, it jumps right to the next-higher complex
sub-algorithm and checks its metric and so on. This may be
QoS-metrics of the communication link between the Core- and
Edge-peers for example, internal error- or fault-states, sensor
thresholds etc. If a metric evaluation fails, the sub-algorithm
with the next-lower complexity will be executed. An example
implementation is given in section V-D and Figure 4.
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Algorithm 1 Dynamic Embedment of Resource Capacities
Require: List of available sub-algorithms Lsa
1: while control 6= aborted do
2: actual sub-algorithm Asa := Lsa[0];
3: for all sub-algorithm Sa ∈ (Lsa) do
4: if assigned metric pass then
5: Asa := Sa;
6: else
7: keep Asa;
8: Include Asa;
9: Execute Asa;
Algorithm 2 Dynamic Embedment of Resources and Models
Require: List of available sub-algorithms Lsa
Require: List of available model-components Lmc
1: while control 6= aborted do
2: actual sub-algorithm Asa := Lsa[0];
3: for all sub-algorithm Sa ∈ Lsa do
4: if assigned metric pass then
5: Asa := Sa;
6: actual model-component Amc := Lmc[0];
7: for all model-component Mc ∈ Lmc do
8: if assigned model metric pass then
9: Amc := Mc;
10: else
11: keep Amc;
12: else
13: keep Asa;
14: Include Amc;
15: Include Asa;
16: Execute Asa;
B. Dynamic Embedment of Rich Environment Models
The proposed method of section IV-A can be extended to
consider the availability of rich environment models (REMs)
as well. A rich environment model may consist of cyber-
as well as physical model components, describing the CPS’
environment or parts of the system itself. Every control system
needs some kind of environment model, in order to fulfill its
application-specific control task. Such a model can be a very
simple state machine or closed-loop control algorithm like a
PID-control for example. Each model or model component is
assigned to an application-specific evaluation metric as well.
The Edge-peers of a CPS must implement at least one basic
model by themselves, to keep the system operational, even in
case of a network failure between the Edge- and Core-peers.
But if the metrics are fine, the system can become fitter by
the dynamic embedment of rich environment models from the
Core-peers (see algorithm 2). Such a rich environment model
can consist of several model-components, which are applied
in the control system within the sub-algorithms. The more
complex models or model-components are implemented on
the Core-peers, because they are much bigger dimensioned
than the Edge-peers. Third-party data-sources can be used to
generate or update them continuously. Moreover new models
or updates of models can be realized on a high-level servicing
point on the Core-peers instead of implementing and rolling
out complex firmware code on the Edge-peers and getting in
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Fig. 4. Example of a dynamic smart tracking algorithm
struggle with the Edge-peers hardware limits. The dynamic
embedment of rich environment models is a key feature to
react on changing system components or on a changing system
environment during run-time in an easy and economic way.
V. APPLICATION
The proposed method and architecture is practically imple-
mented and validated with an application out of the field of
renewable energies. The application addresses both advantages
of the proposed method:
• Dynamic embedment of resources and REMs
• Realizing a high-level servicing point
A CPS is constructed, which shows the architectural prin-
ciples through the realization of a smart photovoltaic facility
[10]. The physical basic conditions and the method of resolu-
tion is described as follows.
A. Physical Basic Conditions
While earth is rotating, this leads to an apparent movement
of the sun on the day’s sky. The energy-output Pout of a
photovoltaic module (PV module) depends on the surface
which is illuminated by the sunlight. Therefore, a fix mounted
PV module reaches its Pout,max only once a day, for a
very short period of time [10]. And this is only true, if the
unpredictable spatial conditions like weather etc. are optimal
as well.
B. Principles of Solar Tracking
A nearby solution is to move - track - the PV module
with the sun, in order to keep the illuminated area at its
maximum. The most simple approach is the astronomical
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tracking, where the module’s orientation is tracked by its geo-
location and day/time [15]. One of the biggest disadvantages
of this method is the disability of reacting to unpredictable
environment conditions like cloudy sky areas (see Figure 6).
The second basic approach is the sensoric tracking, where
the current sky conditions can be considered [10], [15]. This
method may result in very good results, if all conditions are
fine and into very bad results, if they are not (see Figure 7). A
high occurrence of short disturbances from the environment,
like light reflections for example, can cause system instability
and may lead to a negative energy balance (Pout < 0).
C. Pinciples of Smart Tracking
Both basic tracking methods could easily be implemented
on a lightweight embedded control system, but they are not
able to deal with a dynamically changing environment, like
unpredictable weather situations, reflections and shadowing ef-
fects etc. Predictable and unpredictable disturbances are able to
highly affect the systems’ energy balance. A smarter approach
is to combine the basic methods in an intelligent way, through a
dynamic evaluation of sensor data and third-party data sources.
This makes the system able to select the best method of a given
geo-position, time/date and present environment conditions.
Such evaluation metrics, models and algorithms are more
complex and need probable higher computing capacities and
more storage space. The ability of an incremental improvement
and maintenance of such algorithms is desirable. That is why
such an example algorithm is implemented using the proposed
multi-tier architecture.
D. Example of a Smart Tracking Algorithm
The benefit of the proposed method for the solar tracking
application is to have a basic tracking functionality on the
Edge-Peers. With the availability of the network and the
Core-Peers more sophisticated algorithms and models can
be applied in order to make the tracking more situation-
adaptive and efficient. The smart tracking algorithm gives
an example implementation of the dynamic embedment of
resource capabilities from Core-Nodes into Edge-Nodes as
described in section IV-A and algorithm 2. In the following, an
implementation of a smart tracking algorithm is described: A
set of application-specific execution-metrics are defined and
ordered ascending by their complexity. They are evaluated
during each control cycle. The sub-algorithm with the highest
complexity, which passes the evaluation, is executed (see line
4 in algorithm 1). As described in section IV-A, a dynamic
reaction on changes inside the system or from the systems’
environment gets possible. An example of a dynamic change
inside the system may be a lack of QoS in between Edge-
peers and Core-peers (see II). The exemplarily smart tracking
algorithm is implemented in such a way, that the systems’
basic operation keeps up and running, even with very bad
QoS or a broken connection between Edge- and Core-peers.
In fault state, the algorithm will point to a fixed fault state
orientation, energy output will be as good as a fixed mounted
PV module. If QoS is below a defined threshold (e.g. 150 ms
of latency), a simple astronomical tracking without optimiza-
tion of predictable spatial-conditions is executed (see Figure
4). If QoS is better, the external resources from the Core-
peers are embedded into the Edge-peers functionality and an
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Fig. 5. Example of a rich environment model in the context of solar tracking
which can continuously be updated and improved
optimized astronomical tracking is executed (see Figure 4).
In this example a first model component is applied, which
considers date/time and geo-location respectively the time
zone of the tracker. If the light-gradient (see next section) is
reaching a certain threshold, the sensoric tracking, realizing
an unpredictable spatial-condition optimization, is executed
(see next section and Figure 8). The benefit is to have all
this sub-algorithms, except the fault-state- and simple astro-
nomical tracking-algorithm, located on the Core-peers. Here
they are realized as a cloud-based resource running on top
of a GNU/Linux operating system. The implementation of the
Edge-peers firmeware is written in C99, the advanced and more
complex sub-algorithms on the Core-peers are implemented in
the high-level programming language Java.
E. Example of a Rich Environment Model
The rich environment model (REM) may consists of several
model components, each describing a certain aspect of the
system’s environment or its interaction with it (see Figure 5).
The model components are included in the smart tracking sub-
algorithms and can complement the systems’ ability to analyze
and decide, dependent on their availability, which is evaluated
by the respectively assigned metrics (see line 8 in algorithm
2). One part of the rich environment model of the proposed
example application is the computation model of the live light-
gradient, which will be described exemplarily below. It consists
of the 2-dimensional calculation of the brightest light source
in the sky, a set of thresholds, conversion and scaling formulas
as well as the possible positions and orientations of the light
sensors on the tracker. The models are implemented in C99
or Java, depending on their localization: On the Edge-peer
or Core-peer. A basic overview about the live light-gradient
is given below. The conversion and scaling algorithms are
summerized as sensor signal preprocessing (see Figure 3).
Everything which is not needed to be done on the Edge-peers,
in order to fulfill the basic system operation, is implemented
inside the REM on the core peer.
The live light-gradient describes the magnitude and direction
of the brightest light-source in the sky, evaluated by the
sensor data input, valid for each control cycle. The live light-
gradient is calculated within a 2-dimensional scalar field,
which represents the nonhomogeneous distribution of light in
the sky. As an optimal result, the live light-gradient points to
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the direction of the sun or - more precisely - to the energy
source with the biggest magnitude. The scalar field is defined
as the hemisphere represented by the sky. The 2-dimensional
scalar field is sampled by the four light sensors, once in each
control cycle. Four discrete initial values are generated as
a representation of the continuous scalar field. This values
are used for the component-by-component formation of the
live light-gradient. For instance the difference between the
azimuth-left and the azimuth-right signal and the altitude-
up and altitude-down signal are calculated. These form the
input values for the actual values of the semi-parallel working
control algorithms. Hereby, the live light-gradient is calculated
as the follows:
−→5g = ∂g
∂x1
· eˆ1 + ...+ ∂g
∂xn
· eˆn =
 ∂g∂x1...
∂g
∂xn
 (1)
The variables eˆ1 and eˆn are representing the unit vectors in
the direction of the coordinate axis. In the implemented model
there is no spherical transformation to the plane yet. This
approach produces working results in good approximation.
Therefore, for the present case in R2:
−→5g = ∂g
∂x
· eˆx + ∂g
∂y
· eˆy =
(
∂g
∂x
∂g
∂y
)
(2)
Where x is the azimuth- and y is the altitude measurement.
A example with realistic sensor values could look like the
follows: ∂g∂x = 2400 und
∂g
∂y = −1800. From this follows:
−→5g = ∂g
∂x
·eˆx+∂g
∂y
·eˆy = 2400·eˆx−1800·eˆy =
(
2400
−1800
)
(3)
Part of the live light-gradient model is a set of thresholds,
which defines the activation levels of the control algorithms, in
order to avoid frequent position changes of the tracker. Without
such thresholds it can lead to an unstable behaviour of the
gear controls. The thresholds are experimentally adjusted to
+/- 10 mV at this time. The model and its evaluation metric
are implemented on the Core-peer.
VI. PERFORMANCE AND STABILITY EVALUATION
As a quantitative evaluation, a timing performance mea-
surement is performed, which shows the full round-trip time
(RTT) of the communication messages between edge- and
core tiers [10]. The latency analysis is shown as a histogram,
representing the percentages of transmissions, grouped by
latency classes with a granularity of 5 ms (see Figure 9).
The method works out well for the evaluated application.
This is confirmed by the results from the quantitative timing
measurements, where over 97 percent of all resource requests
had a round-trip-time ≤ 45 ms. For more details about the
used testcase of this series of measurements see [10]. The
economies of scale model from [10] is improved. The model
considers the basic costs cb of the system as well as the scaling
costs csc in a more detailed way, now. Each type of scaling
costs take the different tier types from the adapted multi-tier
architecture into account. Figure 10 shows the trend of costs
with increasing number of nodes, changes and complexity per
tier type. The data were generated by example cost-relation
data.
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Fig. 6. Schematic power conversion with astronomical tracking without
(un)predictable spatial conditions optimization and with (un)predictable spatial
conditions (e.g. buildings, clouds)
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Fig. 7. Schematic power conversion with sensoric tracking (A: good
conditions, B: High occurrence of short disturbances e.g. reflections etc.)
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Fig. 8. Schematic power conversion with an adaptive smart tracking
algorithm, considering predictable and unpredictable spatial conditions
ct = cb + csc (4)
The parameters categories are the cost-numbers of system
nodes pno, the code changes Pch, and the algorithm complexity
pco. The cost categories are named as follows: Total costs ct,
the basic costs cb and the scaling costs csc. The scaling costs
csc are composed by the sums of the weighted parameter-costs
cp for each of the different tier types.
csc =
n−1∑
x=0
px · cp,x +
m−1∑
y=0
py · cp,y +
q−1∑
z=0
pz · cp,z (5)
with px ∈ P and P = {pch; pco; pti}. The economic
meaning of the method is confirmed by the economies of scale
model which was printed with a set of example values (see
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Fig. 9. Timing measurement: RTT including Internet latency between TCU
on a leased line and TGU on a cloud-service provider
Figure 10). It shows that, according to the model, the proposed
method brings significant lower costs, if the characteristic num-
ber of nodes, changes and complexity rises. The experimental
implementation of the adapted multi-tier architecture shows,
that a dynamic embedment of resource capacities and rich
environment models is possible in a real application. A basic
system operation is ensured, even during complete network
fails, as experimentally proven. An incremental complement
and improvement of sub-algorithms and model components
becomes possible in a comfortable way, using Cloud-based
resources on the Core-Peers as well as modern programming
languages like Java as high-level servicing points.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
In this article an adapted multi-tier architecture for future
CPS was shown. A method for the dynamic embedment of
resources and models from Core-peers into Edge-peers at run-
time was described. This allows an effective scaling and a
more adaptive behavior of automation systems in distributed
systems. A basic system functionality is ensured, even when
the network fails completely. Two algorithms for the dynamic
embedment of resources were described. An application ex-
ample was given from the field out of the renewable energies.
The expected advantages of the described method were met.
Timing measurements showed the practicle use of the proposed
method. The economies of scale model showed the positive
scaling effect for larger node numbers. This opens up a wide
range of possibilities of advanced analysis and processing
capabilities, triggered from lightweight Edge-peers. Further
possibilities of dynamic resource sharing between CPS nodes
are worth to explore.
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Abstract—Covert and Side-Channels have been known for a
long time due to their versatile forms of appearance. For nearly
every technical improvement or change in technology, such chan-
nels have been (re-)created or known methods have been adapted.
For example the introduction of hyperthreading technology has
introduced new possibilities for covert communication between
malicious processes because they can now share the arithmetic
logical unit (ALU) as well as the L1 and L2 cache which enables
establishing multiple covert channels. Even virtualization which is
known for its isolation of multiple machines is prone to covert and
side-channel attacks due to the sharing of resources. Therefore it
is not surprising that cloud computing is not immune to this kind
of attacks. Even more, cloud computing with multiple, possibly
competing users or customers using the same shared resources
may elevate the risk of unwanted communication. In such a
setting the ”air gap” between physical servers and networks
disappears and only the means of isolation and virtual separation
serve as a barrier between adversary and victim. In the work at
hand we will provide a survey on weak spots an adversary trying
to exfiltrate private data from target virtual machines could
exploit in a cloud environment. We will evaluate the feasibility
of example attacks and point out possible mitigation solutions if
they exist.
I. INTRODUCTION
While cloud computing is getting widely established, there
are still many obstacles that lead to unused possibilities for
both companies and end users. One of the most discussed
factors when migrating to cloud based solutions is the secu-
rity threat when entrusting a third party with sensitive data.
The obvious risks in a cloud environment like untrustworthy
providers, failure of service level agreement (SLA) fulfillment
or location based security risks like e.g. storing the data in US,
can be gauged and possibly be minimized beforehand. Despite
such obvious risks, there are other security risks that are known
for a long time but are still posing a threat since no general
mitigation solutions have been found. Even more, the impact
of threats like covert- and side channels does increase due to
the fact that in a cloud environment multiple companies or end
users share a multitude of resources and physical machines. In
an Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) environment, competing
parties can even share the same infrastructure and sources
of virtual machine generation (image- and datastores). While
virtualization stands for isolation, this is the case for known
and protected ways of communication. Covert- and side-
channels, on the contrary, can circumvent isolation and virtual
machine (VM) boundaries. In addition to the lack of mitigation
means, auditability is not easily carried out or even impossible
in some cases for such channels. Therefore the nontransparent
nature of many cloud providers and their services is even
more risky because of unreliable audits with respect to se-
rious security threats. Covert channels (CCs) use a shared
resource or object to communicate between two colluding
malicious processes by modifying content or properties of
the resource. CCs are traditionally categorized as storage and
timing channels (although for concrete channels classification
is sometimes vague), as indicated from the Trusted Computer
System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) in 1983 [1]. In storage
channels a sender transmits bits by modifying resources or
states of resources persistently (at least during a specific period
of time) which is then detected by the receiver who infers the
transmitted bits from the state. In timing channels the sender
modifies the timing of a resource to enable the receiver to
infer information (e.g. response or execution time by flooding
with queries). Sender and receiver in the CC scenario collude
and the sender is a malicious process placed in the target
environment. Side-channels in contrast use only a receiver
inferring information and data of the target by spying on
the use of a shared resource. Therefore a designated sender
is not needed and the target processes expose information
silently. Both types of channels allow an attacker to infer
sensitive data without any control by access mechanisms and
audits. This represents a violation of confidentiality, privacy
and auditability. The structure of the work is as follows: We
will first discuss the feasibility of covert channels in section
II. Section III will give an introduction to general aspects of
mitigation. A survey on CCs and SCs in the ”CPU” shared
resource is then conducted in section IV-A and section V will
conclude this paper.
II. FEASIBILITY OF COVERT- AND SIDE-CHANNELS
One important aspect of covert channels and side-channels
is the feasibility discussion. However, it has to be carried
out for every new infrastructure that changes access interfaces
and shared resources. While for a side-channel to exist, only
a badly programmed process or resource access component
is needed, covert channels require a sender that is infiltrated
into the target environment and a colluding receiver. In classic
literature on covert channels, bandwidth is generally consid-
ered the factor describing the feasibility of the channel. How
colluding processes are placed remains mostly undiscussed.
While we do not want to cover this aspect to full extent we
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can make some assumptions for a public cloud scenario in
the IaaS service model. If considering such a cloud scenario,
controlling the receiver can be regarded to be of few effort
because the attacker can create an account/virtual machine
which then contains the receiving process. The required co-
residency with the desired target machine can also be forced
in some cases or at least be detected (see [2]). The sender in
contrast, has to be infiltrated into the target machine. Typically
this is possible due to the means of distribution of trojans and
viruses. In a cloud scenario this can be extended by some
characteristics specific to a cloud.
• Updates / upgrades
• Cloud specific software obligated to be installed/used
(e.g. inside a VM)
• Insecure datastores / storage
• Faulty image store / contaminated base images
Malicious updates or upgrades are also a problem outside of
a cloud setting. Inside a cloud ecosystem they are under the
control of the cloud provider or some subcontractor unknown
to the victim. Therefore improper inspection of updates and
upgrades easily enables them to contain the malicious process.
Even if considering an infrastructure as a service scenario
(where the customer has the most control), the cloud provider
could oblige the user to use additional software which is
then prone to malignant updates or yet contains malicious
processes. Moreover, a cloud provider frequently does not
host the underlying storage infrastructure. There might even
be more than one subcontractor providing the requested ca-
pacities. Here the customer might not even know about such
relaying. Therefore it is indeed possible that covert channel
processes are introduced at the storage level (although at that
stage data might also be directly exfiltrated which renders the
CC useless). In a setting where users can create VMs on the fly,
base images which are cloned or shadowed (e.g VMware Fast
Provisioning1) are used. If there is a vulnerability in the image
store, new VMs could be created with a malicious process
yet in place. Additionally cloud app market places e.g. the
MultiCloud Marketplace2 allow third parties to create software
or executable code e.g. RightScripts3 that is then installed into
a VM and in the worst case can contain malicious processes.
Apart from bandwidth limitations or other obstacles related
to each specific covert channel, we thus believe establishment
of a usable CC in a public cloud to be feasible due to the
aforementioned possibilities to deploy sender and receiver
processes.
III. MITIGATION METHODS
Currently there exists no mitigation method which can be
applied to any generic covert channel despite full isolation.
1https://pubs.vmware.com/vcd-51/topic/com.vmware.vcloud.admin.doc
51/GUID-4C232B62-4C95-44FF-AD8F-DA2588A5BACC.html
2http://www.rightscale.com/library
3Community created scripts for the RightScale Cloud, supposed to au-
tomatically configure a virtual machine - https://support.rightscale.com/12-
Guides/Dashboard Users Guide/Design/RightScripts/
However isolation is costly and in many cases not even pos-
sible to maintain. Nevertheless as with covert channels itself,
mitigation means can be categorized. TCSEC recommends [1]:
• elimination of the channel
• limitation of bandwidth
• auditing covert communication
Elimination of the channel in most cases means avoiding
resource sharing between competing parties by adapting the
infrastructure or design of the system (e.g. by duplicating
resources). An example for elimination in a cloud scenario
would be separation of storage such that every VM gets its
own storage. To avoid the possibility of constructing a CC
regardless of separated hard disks, every connection to the
storage, such as buses have to be separated and dedicated to
one VM. Otherwise the access latency over the bus could again
be used as a CC. A boundary (upper limit) for acceptability
of a CC has been given by the TCSEC as 1 bit/second.
Regarding this limit, it is possible to mitigate CCs by limiting
the bandwidth of the channel to this boundary. Limitation can
be achieved by introduction of noise or delay rendering the
reception of data unstable or in the best case impossible. Noise
itself can be produced by introducing randomization of shared
resource access or extraneous processes randomly creating
fake load. In most cases noise and delay affect the whole
system by degrading performance and therefore represent a
trade-off between security and performance. A solution that
tries to minimize performance degradation while utilizing this
kind of mitigation technique is the C3-Scheduler proposed by
the authors of the work at hand [3]. The suggested scheduler
tries to mitigate a CPU cache covert channel by creating
noise while trying to reduce performance degradation reusing
processes identified as benign and already present in the
system. If it is not possible to eliminate a CC or limit its
bandwidth, it is desirable to at least audit (or detect) the covert
communication over the channel to make it less usable for an
adversary. Obviously, this method faces some difficulties. First
of all a sufficient amount of data has to be collected which
can be difficult also in a judicial way because auditing can
raise new privacy concerns. If enough data (audit trail) has
been collected, the CC has to be distinguished from legitimate
communication / interaction with the shared resource and noise
present in the system by default. In that regard another problem
is the identification and distinction of sender and receiver. C2-
Detector, a general framework for detecting CCs in the cloud
has been proposed by Wu et al. [4]. C2-Detector uses a hidden
markov model (HMM) and a bayesian detector to distinguish
CCs from legitimate communication. Although applicable to
multiple CCs, the CC has to be known and modeled into a
configuration file beforehand. For side-channels the same basic
ideas for mitigation, except auditing, can be adapted. Isolating
an attacker from spying on the victims communication with
some resource eliminates both possible CCs and side-channels.
An example for a noise based mitigation technique focusing
on cache based side-channels in cloud is ”Du¨ppel” proposed
by Zhang et al. [5]. Du¨ppel changes the kernel of the guest OS
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in a VM to periodically cleanse the cache used by its tenant.
This introduces noise and obfuscates timing information an
attacker could infer from spying on the cache. Because there
is no active communication to the adversary, auditing side-
channels is even more difficult than CC in which at least the
possibility to recognize communication patterns exist.
IV. SHARED CLOUD RESOURCES
Cloud systems in general require and base upon sharing
resources to reduce costs both at the side of the cloud provider
and at the customer side. One of the key criteria for cloud
”pay-per-use” where a customer only pays for the resources
actually used is only possible due to dynamic resource allo-
cation of shared resources. This holds for all service models
offered e.g. Infrastructure as a service (IaaS), Platform as a
service (PaaS) or Software as a Service (SaaS). Therefore it is
possible to identify shared resources common to those service
models:
• Memory architecture
• CPU including L2 and L3 Cache
• Storage
• Network
• Infrastructure
• Hypervisor
In regards to the mentioned service models, the easiest possi-
bility for an attacker to exploit resource sharing for covert- and
side-channels is IaaS which allows him to control a complete
VM co-resident to the target VM. Therefore in the remainder
of this work we suppose a cloud scenario or setting to be of the
IaaS type. In the following subsection, we will review some
of the proposed attacks and mitigation methods for the CPU
architecture including its caches, since they can be regarded
the most investigated shared resource up to now.
A. CPU based Covert- and Side-channels
A basic approach for creating a covert channel using the
CPU exists by forcing changes in the CPU load to transfer
information between sender and receiver. Okamura et. al. adapt
this approach for cloud computing, evaluating the impact of
virtual CPUs on the feasibility of such a channel [6]. Their
”Covert Channels using CPU loads between Virtual machines”
(CCCV) achieves a bandwidth of 0.49 bit/s with 100 to 91%
accuracy (ideal and non-ideal case). While such a channel is
not difficult to establish, bandwidth and detectability minimize
its feasibility. To eliminate the CC, the adversary or target VM
has to be migrated to a different CPU after its detection. As
the authors of CCCV outline, a chinese wall policy which can
be used in the MAC-based security extension sHype [7] would
also prevent VMs of competing users from executing on the
same physical processor although ”competing” users would
have to be identified beforehand. Noise could be easily intro-
duced by extraneous processes generating fake load, however
this probably introduces a noticeable performance degradation.
Detection and auditing is possible due to the forced switching
between high and low load which can be detected by pattern /
anomaly recognition. Additionally, if a virtual machine often
creates high load, the cloud system possibly solves this by
migration to a less utilized host.
A covert channel using a shared component of the processors
arithmetic logical unit (ALU) e.g. a multiplier in a simulta-
neous multithreading (SMT) environment applicable to cloud
has been proposed by Wang et al. [8]. The sender repeatedly
accesses the multiplier component of a core to send a 1-bit
and executes multiple NOP instructions to send a 0-bit. The
receiver can then measure the delay inflicted on the ALU
operations. While this channel can achieve high bandwidths of
approximately 500 kilobits/s it is questionable if such a SMT
only CC can be regarded as a threat in common cloud settings
since hyperthreading is disabled in most production systems
(because of security reasons) and the ALU is therefore not
shared. Elimination of the CC can be achieved by restricting
VMs to different cores. Introducing noise or delays in the
usage of a processors ALU is not an option because of
the massive performance degradation. However, detection and
audit of the channel is possible because of the irregularity in
ALU component usage which might be observable.
An own category for shared resources could be addressed
to cache based covert channels which have been extensively
studied. L2 and L3 cache has already been targeted for CC
and side channel construction. L1 cache is generally not taken
into account because it is flushed upon every context switch.
Ristenpart et. al. introduce two versions of a cache based
covert channel [2]. In the simplest version, the sender is idling
to transmit a ”0” and tries frantically to access the cache
to transmit a ”1”. The receiver can then observe the latency
when accessing a memory block. The refined version uses
the prime+probe strategy proposed by Percival [9] (extended
to prime+trigger+probe) and partitions the available cache
lines into an even and odd set. The receiver fills every cache
line with data (by accessing a memory block larger than the
cache). To send a ”0” the sender then accesses every even
cache line to evict the receivers data from that cache set.
To transmit a ”1” the ”odd” cache set is used likewise. The
receiver now probes the cache by accessing the even and odd
cache sets subsequently while measuring the latency for each
set, inferring the transmitted bit from the difference. While
high bandwidth is achieved in a laboratory environment the
channel itself was also tested under practical circumstances
within the Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) where noise
and core migration reduce the bandwidth to 0.2 bit/s. Xu et. al.
therefore further refine the channel by using a refined protocol
and achieve a maximum bandwidth of 10.46 bit/s with 28.13%
error rate and a minimum bandwidth of 1.27 bit/s with 0%
error rate in an Amazon EC2 environment [10]. The proposed
L2 cache channels suffer one important problem introduced by
virtualization called addressing uncertainty. Virtual memory
addresses are mapped to physical addresses by the hypervisor
and therefore determination of the accessed cache line depends
highly on the alignment of virtual and physical addresses
and the mapping function used. Therefore the feasibility is
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decreased and how to overcome addressing uncertainty is
still an open research question. Elimination of the L2 covert
channels could be achieved by the concept of oblivious RAM
proposed by Goldreich and Ostrovski [11] which describes
a method of access pattern hiding but for which a practical
scheme has yet to be found. Noise can be introduced to
limit the bandwidth or even render the L2 channels unusable
by deploying techniques as the already mentioned ”Du¨ppel”
extension proposed by Zhang et al. [5] or the scheduling
method proposed by the authors of ”C3-Sched” [3]. Auditing
could be possible by monitoring the cache miss count and
pattern which possibly changes because of the frantic access
and eviction of specific cache sets (resp. all cache lines) by
the sender (resp. receiver).
A relatively new channel, ”C5: Cross-Cores Cache Covert
Channel” proposed by Cle´mentine et al. uses the L3 or last
level cache (LLC) to construct a high bandwidth CC tackling
the problem of addressing uncertainty and core migration [12].
C5 uses a protocol close to prime+probe and relies on the
inclusive property of the LLC cache which means that the
LLC is a superset of the L1 and L2 cache and every cache
line that is evicted from the LLC gets removed from the L1 and
L2 cache likewise. The receiver accesses (probes) its L1 cache
and measures access time. If the sender wants to send a ”1”, it
completely fills the LLC which in turn results in eviction of the
receivers data from its L1 cache due to the inclusive property.
Therefore the receiver measures ”slow” access and infers a ”1”
because the data now has to be fetched from the main memory.
Bandwidth of such communication was reported to be as high
as 751 bits/s in a laboratory environment. However, evaluation
in a production environment such as Amazon EC2 has not
been carried out. Elimination of the channel can only be
achieved by partitioning the LLC (e.g. an adapted StealthMem
approach [13]) or removing the inclusive property (exclusive
caches as already used by AMD) which would cause the
obligation of a cache hierarchy redesign. Introduction of noise
(e.g. by C3 − Sched) or intermediary flushing of the cache
(Du¨ppel) would at least result in an increase of transmission
errors (sender is idle but receiver infers 1 because its L1
cache is evicted by other processes uninvolved in covert
communication). C5 could be detected by monitoring the LLC
because fully evicting the LLC on a regular basis might be an
anomaly in comparison to the cache usage without an active
CC.
Side-channels using cache to gather information about other
processes and particularly targeting cryptographic keys have
been widely studied in non-virtualized environments. Risten-
part et. al. proposed their prime+trigger+probe mechanism to
be used for cache utilization measurements which can then
help inferring CPU load of a target machine [2]. They used
the conducted load measurements to realize a coarse-grained
side-channel attack called ”keystroke timing attack”4. In an
idle virtual machine where there is only the event of someone
typing, a spike in the load can be brought together with a
keystroke. While Ristenpart et. al. suppose that such a scenario
is possible in practical settings as the Amazon EC2, feasibility
and applicability of such a sophisticated attack is regarded
very low. The attack itself however is a good demonstration
of possible side-channel adaptations to the cloud. Mitigation
methods include avoiding co-residency (elimination) as well as
the mentioned possibilities for introduction of noise and delay
(limitation of bandwidth). While auditing a side-channel is
considered difficult, the repeated execution of the prime step
(accessing the whole cache) can possibly enable detection and
audit of the channel.
While Ristenparts side-channel targeted the coarse grained
keystroke information categorically excluding cryptographic
keys, the recent attack proposed by Zhang et. al. indeed
targets such keys using a version of the prime+probe strategy
combined with an analysis stage to infer code-paths taken in
a cryptographic library (libgcrypt) [15]. In contrast to covert
channels, in the prime+probe protocol used for side-channels,
the receiver or spy fills the whole cache with its data (prime)
and then identifies the cache lines evicted by the (unknowing)
target through probing the cache. The information which
cache lines have been evicted can then be used to classify
cache patterns with a support vector machine (SVM). After
noise reduction using a hidden markov model and code path
reassembly, the initial code path that has been taken in the
cryptographic library can be inferred and allows conclusion
of ElGamal keys. Elimination of the proposed side-channel
is possible by avoiding co-residency or implementing side-
channel resistant algorithms. The first one might be impractical
in a public cloud scenario although the possibility to execute
sensitive operations as cryptographic computations in a ded-
icated instance. The latter only fixes a specific cryptographic
library. Limitation of reliable reconstruction of keys by intro-
ducing delays and noise as well as detection and audit of such
side-channels can be conducted as already mentioned for other
prime+probe based channels.
Table I summarizes the covert channels based on CPU
and Cache, their type (SC = side channel, CC = covert
channel), bandwidth and categorization of mitigation means (E
= Elimination, L = Limitation of Bandwidth, D = Detection,
A = Audit).
V. CONCLUSION
We like to note that although this survey is by far not
complete, we decided to publish such initial survey. In the
work at hand, we could nevertheless show that while isolation
in cloud environments is enforced through virtualization and
mandatory access policies, it is still possible to construct
various covert- and side-channels. Such channels circumvent
4The keystroke attack was first introduced by Song et. al. in a non-
virtualized environment in 2001 [14].
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Channel Type Bandwidth Mitigation
CCCV CC 0.49 bit/s E, (L), D and A
ALU based CC 500 kbit/s E, D and A
L2 Cache based (Ristenpart) CC 0.2 bit/s E, L, D and A
L2 Cache based (Xu) CC 10.46 bit/s E, L, D and A
C5 L3 Cache based CC 751 bit/s E, L, D and A
Keystroke timing attack SC - (E), L, D and A
Cryptographic key attack SC - (E), L, D and A
Table I
CHANNELS MISUSING THE CPU AND CACHES
isolation by making use of one of the most important benefits
of the cloud, namely shared resources. Elimination of such
covert channels by separating resources is sometimes possible
but often costly. Introduction of noise or delays can be used
for bandwidth limitation of the presented channels but nearly
always results in performance degradation of the system.
Therefore auditing solutions for CCs and SCs should be inte-
grated in the auditing frameworks already mandatory in some
cloud services where possible. Despite all presented CCs and
SCs, their feasibility in current production environments is still
low because of either low bandwidth or difficulties in estab-
lishing the channel. Research for mitigation solutions however
should not be abandoned because changes in technology and
therefore in the cloud will always lead to new versatile attacks.
Moreover as shown in this brief survey, there are almost no
general mitigation means and specifically designed methods
mostly decrease system performance. Also no guarantee for
preventing data leakage through covert channels can be given
by any of the analyzed countermeasures. Therefore currently
adoption of such security extensions by cloud providers or
developers of virtualization solutions for the cloud is highly
questionable. Invention of new mitigation possibilities with
low performance overhead, in the best case targeting whole
cloud components, could lead to a wider acceptance and
deployment in state-of-the-art clouds.
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Abstract—The detection of differences between images of a
printed reference and a reprinted wood decor often requires an
initial image registration step. Depending on the digitalization
method, the reprint will be displaced and rotated with respect to
the reference. The aim of registration is to match the images as
precisely as possible. In our approach, images are first matched
globally by extracting feature points from both images and
finding corresponding point pairs using the RANSAC algorithm.
From these correspondences, we compute a global projective
transformation between both images. In order to get a pixel-
wise registration, we train a learning machine on the point
correspondences found by RANSAC. The learning algorithm (in
our case Gaussian process regression) is used to nonlinearly
interpolate between the feature points which results in a high
precision mage registration method on wood decors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today a large proportion of all furniture or floors with a
wood-like appearance are made of artificially printed wood
decors instead of actual wood. Camera-based inspection is
used to ensure that the printed decors do not differ from an
initial reference. Based on the production environments, line
scan cameras are often used for the digitalization of the printed
decors. Many defect detection algorithms require an optimal
registration of the print and the reference before comparison.
This paper describes a registration method for images of wood
decors with an accuracy of at least one pixel.
There are several difficulties for this registration process
which partly result from the specific image structure of the
wood decors and from the setup of the line scan camera. One
problem is the repetitive structure of wood. This characteristic
leads to a typical correspondence problem for this use case, i.e.
image regions at different locations are erroneously matched
due to their high visual similarity. Another characteristic of
wood is that its visual structure is often oblong and thin—
there are many edges but few corners to extract. Edges alone
can only be used to locally match image regions in the
direction perpendicular to the edge. Along the edge, no unique
correspondence between image regions can be established.
This is the aperture problem in optic flow processing [1].
Line scan cameras raise more difficulties. Either the line
scan camera moves over the image that is digitalized or the
printed decor moves on a transport system under the fixed
line scan camera. Variations in the speed of movement cause
partial stretching or compression of the image in both setups.
The difficulty is that this type of image transformation will be
different all over the image so that this has to be corrected
locally. Similar local distortions arise also because of lens
distortions in the line camera.
This paper addresses the problem of pixel-wise image regis-
tration on wood decors based on a hybrid registration method.
The registration method is built in five steps. The first four
steps are a part of the global image registration solution which
includes the extraction of feature patches, the correlation of
these patches, the calculation of model parameters and the
validation of the quality. The global registration step can only
correct for perspective transformations (including translations
and rotations). The fifth step of the registration method can
be considered as a local registration as local parts of the
image are transformed differently to account for movement
variations and lens distortion. This step is done with the help
of a machine learning method, Gaussian process regression,
which leads to a dense, pixel-wise correspondence between
both images. This application of machine learning to image
registration constitutes the novelty of this paper as this – to
our knowledge – has not been done in the literature before.
The paper is organized as follows: we briefly discuss previ-
ous work in image registration on wood decors in Section II. In
Section III, we present an overview of the global registration
and describe the approach on local registration using Gaussian
processes. A detailed description and experimental evaluation
of each registration step are presented in Section VI. The paper
concludes with a discussion in Section V.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
Image registration strategies are divided into two main
classes, both of which deal with different problems. The first
class is global registration: an entire image is registered at once
by finding its transformation parameters such as translation,
rotation, scaling and shearing. In this case, every pixel of an
image is transformed in the same way in order to match the
other image [2]. The second class of registration problems is
the registration of local image regions. In order to register
these kinds of images, different transformations for different
parts of the images are needed. Within these two classes,
there are several subclasses which treat different registration
problems [3]. Whereas there is a large literature on image
registration in general, the specific problems arising in the
registration of wood decors have not been addressed in detail.
In previous work, we addressed the problem of local image
registration on wood decors using the classical Lucas-Kanade
algorithm for optical flow [4]. This algorithm is widely used
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to detect movements between pictures or within videos. The
application of an optical flow algorithm to the registration pro-
cess was also proposed by J.-P. Thirion [5]. If an optical flow
algorithm is applied to two images which are not registered,
it detects the transformations as independent movements of
parts of the image. When applied to wood decors, the Lucas-
Kanade algorithm ran into problems as the contrast of the
wood decor image is not strong enough for the algorithm
to detect the optical flow in all parts of the image. In these
areas, no transformation could be predicted. Additionally, due
to linear structure of the wood grain, the aperture problem
affects the vast majority of all image regions so that in these
regions only the flow component normal to the edges can
be calculated. In order to solve these problems, we applied
a variant of the famous Horn and Schunck algorithm [6] in
which the diffusion of the flow vectors is weighted depend-
ing on a contrast-dependent confidence measure. While this
method was capable of capturing the local variations caused by
movement variations and lens distortion, it performed poorly
on estimating the global transformation between the images
due to the systematic underestimation of image displacements
caused by propagating local displacement vectors affected by
the aperture problem.
III. REGISTRATION APPROACH
A. Feature selection
The geometric properties of the images are represented by
extracted features. Two feature algorithms were examined and
compared in this work. Features should have several qualities:
(1) they need a strong invariance against small transformations;
(2) they have to be localizable which means that the same
features are found in both images and that it is possible to
match these features; (3) it must be guaranteed that enough
features can be found. In an ideal case, these features are
evenly spread across the image.
The first feature algorithm examined was the Harris corner
detector [7]. The advantage of the Harris corner detector is
that it is easy to implement, efficient and that it finds corners
independently of their orientation. A recursive Gaussian-like
low pass filter was used as pre-smoothing method. For the
calculation we used a four point central difference derivative
operator. From these filters, the Harris detector computes a
local ”cornerness” function fo each pixel. A point is considered
as a feature point when its ”cornerness” exceeds a certain
threshold. The threshold has to be adjusted according the
image and the number of feature points needed. In order to
achieve this, an algorithm was developed which is shown in
Fig. 1. To obtain a faster convergence, the desired count of
feature points is given in terms of an upper and a lower bound.
The step width is only adjusted if the number of features is
outside of these bounds.
Harris features have the disadvantage that they are only
computed at one image scale and that the corners are found
only with a maximum precision of one pixel. They also tend
to be very sparsely distributed in the image. We therefore
tested a second, scale invariant feature detector: the scale
Fig. 1. Algorithm for determining the detection threshold of a feature. n is
the number of iterations, the black rhombus symbolizes a decision based on
counting the number of the extracted features.
invariant Laplace operator [8], referred to as blob features.
The blob operator creates a Gaussian scale space, which is
subsampled by a factor of two after every octave. Subsequently
a Laplacian scale space is formed by subtracting adjacent
layers of the Gaussian scale space. Blob-like image structures
are identified as maxima or minima in the Laplacian scale
space. The position of blob features can be calculated at sub-
pixel accuracy. The underlying theory of the scale space and
the blob detector can be found in T. Lindeberg, “Feature
detection with automatic scale selection” [8].
B. Global registration
For the global registration we used the RANSAC (Random
Sample Consensus) algorithm [9] based on the perspective
transformation model [10]. The perspective transformation
of an image is described by eight parameters ai, bi with
i = 1, 2, 3 and cj with j = 1, 2. That is why at least
four corresponding control points in the reference and the
transformed image are needed. For each of the point pairs
(with index i), the image coordinates (xi, yi) in the reference
are connected to (x′i, y
′
i) in the print by the equations
x′ia1 + y
′
ia2 + a3 − xix′ic1 − xiy′ic2 = xi (1)
x′ib1 + y
′
ib2 + b3 − yix′ic1 − yiy′ic2 = yi. (2)
These equations are linear in the unknown transformation
parameters, so they can be solved by a standard least squares
approach. We used the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse for this
purpose. However, the solution requires establishing point
correspondences between both images which is the objective
of RANSAC. Here, one chooses a large number of randomly
chosen subsets of feature points in both images as candi-
date correspondences and tests the performance of the found
transformation on other subsets of feature points. The best
performing transformation is chosen to globally register the
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images. This procedure converges very slow for the large
number of features we detect in the images due to its stochastic
nature. We therefore replace the random selection of subsets
by a more directed form of selection: we extract a local image
region around all feature points and find the most similar
image region around a feature in the other image by searching
for the candidate with the highest Pearson cross-correlation
coefficient. All corresponding point pairs found in this way
were ranked according to their cross-correlation. We restricted
RANSAC to select its subsets only from the group of the
highest ranking corresponding point pairs. This crucial step
led to a considerable runtime improvement which made the
proposed registration procedure feasible at all.
C. Local registration
After applying the global transformation to register both
images we applied a second, local registration based on
machine learning. The point correspondences between features
were used as training data for a nonlinear regression technique.
The two-dimensional image positions of the features in the
transformed reprint were used as inputs and the x- or y-
position of the correspondences in the reference were used as
outputs. The result of the training is a dense mapping from 2d
positions in the reprint to 2d positions in the reference which
can visualized as a vector field (see Fig. 5). In other words, the
machine learning interpolates the displacement field between
both images at all pixels in the images, not only at the feature
points and thus leads to a pixel-wise registration.
We choose Gaussian processes as our regression technique
because they adapt well to non-linear functions with added
noise, as described by Rasmussen and Williams [11]. This is
made possible by the ability to use a covariance function in
function-space. In addition, Gaussian processes include only a
small number of hyperparameters that can be optimized using
gradient descent.
Our implementation of the Gaussian process regression is
based on kernel functions [12]. Kernel functions are used
to calculate covariance measures in high dimensional spaces
without actually transforming the input data. The choice of
the kernel function influences the regression function and how
well it fits the sample data. In our work, the shape of the map-
ping was unknown. We tested the Gaussian kernel which can
model smooth displacement fields of arbitrary shape and the
inhomogeneous polynomial kernel which restricts the shape of
the displacement fields to follow two-dimensional polynomial
curves. Details on the training of Gaussian processes can be
found in the book by Rasmussen and Williams [11]. To find the
hyperparameters of the Gaussian process, we used a gradient
descent scheme on a smoothed form of leave-one-out error on
the training set (Geissers surrogate predictive log probability)
[11].
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed pixel-wise
hybrid image registration approach we applied the method on
different test sets with known and unknown transformations. In
order to get representative results the cross validation method
was used. For each test set the feature points were divided into
equal random subsets and all but one of them were used for
the calculation of the solution. This solution was afterwards
applied to the unused subset and the error rate of the result
was calculated. The error was measured in terms of the average
absolute value of pixel deviation between the transformed and
true feature point in the test set.
The test sets were divided into different categories. The first
test category was artificially generated by applying known
transformations. The town hall of the city of Tu¨bingen and
an artificially created wood decor served as test images.
The contrast to the natural scene is used as an example to
demonstrate the specific characteristics of wood decors. The
second test category was based on scans of wood decors.
Multiple scans of the same decor were made with different
scan positions using a line scan camera.
A. Feature extraction
Since feature extraction is important for both the global
and the local registration, we first examined the quality of the
feature extractors. The term quality is defined as a number
of properties of the feature extraction algorithm. The most
important property is that the algorithm finds the same features
in both images. Thus, it must be resistant to the noise of
the camera and the transformations that were applied to the
images. The number of features that can be extracted from the
image is also of importance. At least four matched features
were necessary for the calculation of the perspective transfor-
mation. For increasing robustness against imprecise features,
ten feature points were used to calculate the perspective
transformation by using the pseudo inverse. Additionally, five
more features were needed to verify the precision of the
calculated parameters. 1/6 of the features could not be used
as they were needed for the cross validation of the whole
system. Alltogether, at least about 20 correct matched features
were needed for our solution. The precision of the features is
a further measure of quality. To achieve the objective of a
pixel-wise registration of images, the features need to have a
precision of at least one pixel.
The first test was conducted to compare the feature ex-
traction on natural scenes and wood decors. Harris and blob
features were extracted from the test images and matched
manually to ensure that no mismatch was produced by the
correlation algorithm (see Fig. 2). 12 out of 15 features were
extracted by the blob algorithm from both images which
results in a retrieval ratio of 80%. The Harris algorithm
extracted 29 out of 63 from both images, resulting in a retrieval
ratio of a about 46%.
In the second image (artificial wood decor, see Fig. 3),
the blob algorithm extracted 10 out of 20 features from both
images (50% retrieval rate), the Harris algorithm 12 out of
17 features (70% retrieval rate). Obviously, the quality of
the feature detector strongly depends on the texture of the
images. Blob features are optimized for images with natural
scenes such as landscapes or buildings which is shown by
BW-CAR Symposium on Information and Communication Systems (SInCom) 2015
26
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2. The left images are the originals; in the right images, translation
and rotation are applied to the image. The features marked in green can be
retrieved in the second image. The red features could only be found in the
first image. (a) Correlated blob-features of the town hall of Tu¨bingen. (b)
Correlated Harris-features of the town hall of Tu¨bingen.
TABLE I
RESULTS OF THE FEATURE ALGORITHMS ON SCANNED WOOD DECOR.
Inliers / outliers Precision
Harris, wood1, T1 2.76 0.38
Blob, wood1, T1 1.22 0.18
Harris, wood1, T2 2.15 0.40
Blob, wood1, T2 0.97 0.20
Harris, wood2, T1 1.49 0.28
Blob, wood2, T1 1.06 0.18
their higher retrieval rate for this case, whereas the Harris
extractor seems to be more suitable for wood decors. We also
measured the average cross-correlation coefficient for both
feature algorithms which was much higher for blob features
as compared to the Harris features in both images.
In a second experiment, a full registration and a calculation
of the ratio of outliers (incorrect correspondences) to inliers
was conducted on the scans of the wood decors where the
correct transformation is unknown. The results shown in
Table I can be seen as indicators of two aspects of quality: the
number of common features retrieved from both images and
the quality or distinctiveness of the image areas surrounding
the feature points.
Table I is structured as follows: the first column describes
the test setup: the algorithm, the decor and the transformation
used. The number after the transformation in wood1 indicates
two different positions on the same decor during the scanning.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 3. Same as Fig. 2 for the wood decor.
The second column contains the quotient of the number of
matches (correct matches with a distance smaller than one
pixel) divided by the number of mismatched features. As can
be seen, the Harris detector always found a larger number of
correctly matched features than the blob detector. The third
column shows the mean distance of all inliers. This value
should be low in order to obtain a high precision. The values of
the third column show that the blob features are more precise
than the Harris features with a relative improvement of at
least 100%. The last aspect of quality is that the algorithm
has to be able to extract a sufficient number of features from
the image. As we said in the beginning of this section, at
least 20 correctly matched features are needed for finding a
reliable solution. To guarantee that this can be achieved we
found in our experiments that at least 150 feature points have
to be extracted from both images. To control the number of
features, the threshold for the minimum contrast of a feature
was adjusted according to the algorithm described in Fig. 1.
B. Image registration using Gaussian processes
Since this was the first time that Gaussian processes are
applied to image registration we first tested whether this
method is capable of estimating a known displacement field
of a complex shape. Due to its clear horizontal and vertical
edges the image of the town hall of Tu¨bingen was chosen for
this test. The town hall image was warped two times on a
grid, shown in Fig. 4a. No global transformation was applied.
The calculation of the Gaussian process response was done by
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TABLE II
PRECISION OF THE GAUSSIAN PROCESSES CORRECTION WITH A
GAUSSIAN KERNEL.
1without GP 1with GP 2F-score
Wood1, T1 0.1869 0.1891 3.17
Wood1, T2 0.2189 0.1006 1.17
Wood2, T1 0.1949 0.1210 3.00
1 Average precision in 5-fold cross-validation.
2 Number of improved features divided by degraded features.
TABLE III
PRECISION OF THE GAUSSIAN PROCESS CORRECTION WITH AN
INHOMOGENEOUS POLYNOMIAL KERNEL.
1without GP 1with GP 2F-score
Wood1, T1 0.1755 0.1800 2.60
Wood1, T2 0.2259 0.2044 2.07
Wood2, T1 0.1700 0.1570 5.66
1 Average precision in 5-fold cross-validation.
2 Number of improved features divided by degraded features.
a set of correlated blob features as trainings points. For this
configuration a Gaussian kernel was used.
The result of the Gaussian process can be seen in Fig. 4b.
The first grid line of the warp in the Gaussian response is
where the arrows change the direction. The second warp was
done in the same direction as the first line. The resulting
arrows, which point in the same direction, follow the correct
transformation. The long arrows in the sky above the town hall
indicate an incorrectly learned transformation in this region.
As the contrast was very low in this area, no features for
the training the Gaussian process could be extracted. As a
consequence, the predicted displacements vary widly in this
area.
C. Hybrid image registration
These tests analyze the performance of the full hybrid image
registration method on the scanned wood decor images. First
the global registration method were applied to the feature
points. In the second step, these corrected features were used
to train the Gaussian processes. As a last step, the Gaussian
processes were used to predict a correction of unseen feature
points in a validation set.
Fig. 5a shows the prediction of the Gaussian processes. The
error we observed in the previous experiment in the sky region
of Fig. 4b also occurred in the corners in Fig. 5a, where
due to the low contrast along the image edges no feature
points could be detected which led to a high uncertainty in
the prediction of the Gaussian process. The zoomed box shows
an enlarged portion of the displacement field. The results for
the inhomogeneous polynomial kernel are shown in Fig. 5b.
The edge effect observed in the Gaussian kernel is much less
pronounced here.
A quantitative evaluation is shown in Table II and III,
indicating a significant improvement in accuracy for most
cases.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 4. Image (a): grid warp of the image. Image (b): response of the Gaussian
process.
V. DISCUSSION
We presented a method for pixel-wise hybrid image reg-
istration on wood decors. Our experiments have shown a
considerable improvement in the registration quality using
Gaussian processes for local registration.
The results of several experiments show that the blob
features achieve a higher accuracy. As a first step, the ex-
tracted blob features are correlated by using the Pearson
cross-correlation coefficient. To guarantee that the succeeding
calculations can be done without outliers, only the feature
pairs with the highest correlation are retained. These feature
pairs are used as input values for the calculation of the
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 5. (a) Prediction of a Gaussian process with a Gaussian kernel on
wood decor; (b) prediction of a Gaussian process with an inhomogeneous
polynomial kernel on wood decor. Note that the arrows of the displacement
field are not to scale, but enlarged for better visibility.
transformation parameters of the projective transformation
model using the RANSAC algorithm. To increase the precision
of the registration, the local registration is used to interpolate
between the already globally corrected feature pairs. Thus, the
features are used as training data for the Gaussian processes.
The results of the global and the local registration process
depend both on the precision and reliability of the extracted
features. The Harris algorithm has better values with regard
to the ratio of inliers to outliers, but worse values in terms of
the position precision of the features. Since the blob algorithm
still has enough inlier features, its higher precision turns out to
be more important since the registration should be as precise
as possible. For this reason, blob features appear more suitable
for registering wood decors according to our experiments. The
global registration appears to be very robust against imprecise
features or outliers since only the subset with the highest
confidence is used to calculate the transformation.
We found a significant improvement in precision due to
local registration with Gaussian processes for most cases.
In the first test case, however, it is possible that the global
registration found a very good solution for the transformation,
so that the correction by the Gaussian processes did not
improve the precision of the features. The second and third
tests results in table II show that the precision is improved
– more than 100% in the second test. It comes as a bit of a
surprise that the quotient of the second test is the lowest. This
might result from the fact that the features which are corrected
are rather imprecise after global registration and the correction
of those seems to have a strong impact on precision.
The results of the Gaussian kernel and the inhomogeneous
kernel are comparable. The predicted correction in both cases
is almost completely smooth. It seems that the predictions of
the Gaussian kernel vary to higher degree across local image
regions and that it is more susceptible to an inhomogeneous
feature distribution, whereas the inhomogeneous polynomial
kernel generally gives a very smooth prediction. The training
data tended to be similar but not equal. The high value of
the F-score in the last test in Table III shows that there was
still a systematic error in the global registration which the
inhomogeneous polynomial kernel corrected best.
As a consequence, in order to use a Gaussian process with
a Gaussian kernel, the features should be evenly distributed
across the image. There are several options to deal with the
areas with a low number of features. One option is to use the
predicted variance of the prediction of the Gaussian process
which can be calculated together with the predictions [11]. In a
low contrast area, the predicted variance would be quite high.
In these areas, a correction with a Gaussian process can be
disabled or the correction can be done by using the predictions
from neighbouring features.
The overall algorithm has not been optimized for real-time
application yet. Especially the training process is computa-
tionally expensive and needs to be improved to be useful in
production systems, e.g. in an inspection system for printed
wood decors.
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Abstract—Modern transport infrastructure becomes a full
member of globally connected network. Leading vehicle man-
ufacturers have already triggered development process, output
of which will open a new horizon of possibilities for consumers
and developers by providing a new communication entity - a
car, thus enabling Car2X communications. Nevertheless some of
available systems already provide certain possibilities for vehicles
to communicate, most of them are considered not sufficiently
secured. During last 15 years a number of big research projects
funded by European Union and USA governments were started
and concluded after which a set of standards were published
prescribing a common architecture for Car2X and vehicles on-
board communications.
This work concentrates on combining inner and outer ve-
hicular communications together with a use of Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI).
Keywords—Automotive engineering, Embedded Software, TLS,
Security, Vehicle safety.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally car manufactures are concerned with passen-
ger safety in every possible situation on a road or parking
lot, human life is treated as most important thing. Several
decades ago car stopped being only a simple transport, but
begun being involved in everyday live of a driver and passen-
gers, car’s on-board computer started to provide information
about traffic and navigation. Together with media options they
formed an infotainment domain, and more than 15 years ago
a new concept of Car2X communications was born and safety
concept was expanded on security domain as well, where ”X”
stands for following: an infrastructure (signs, traffic lights,
wireless roadside units), pedestrians, and a car. Moreover,
about seven years ago a car was believed to be a closed system,
along with internal electronics evolution became an object of
attacks which can lead to a human injure. Even though security
objectives for Car2X and on-board communications differ from
traditional, it is believed that generic approach still can be
applied, for example asymmetric cryptography, also known as
Public-key cryptography.
This paper provides an overview of research and standard-
ization activities, as well as proposes a common approach for
security in the context of in-Car and Car2X communications
under Public-key cryptography domain. It is structured as
follows: Chapter II provides a brief overview of available
projects results. The analysis of available standards and related
projects is outlined in Chapter III and IV, respectively. Chapter
V present the authors view on a unified architecture which
possibly can solve a problem highlighted previously. Finally
Chapter VI summarizes the paper and provides an outlook to
future work.
II. OVERVIEW
Asymmetric cryptography certainly becomes a de facto
standard for systems where entities can’t fully trust each other,
because it provides a possibility to encrypt messages and verify
digital signature for public key holder peer, as well as decrypt
messages and generate signature for a private key holder. This
obviously holds true for vehicular communications in various
use cases, for instance technical report from ETSI [1] defines
ten application areas for Car2X communications:
• Stationary vehicle warning accident vehicle problem
• Traffic condition warning (includes traffic jam ahead
warning)
• Signal violation warning (includes stop sign violation)
• Road work warning
• Collision risk warning from Really Simple Syndica-
tion (RSS)
• Decentralized floating car data precipitations, road
adhesion, visibility, wind
• Regulatory/contextual speed limits
• Traffic information & recommended itinerary
• Limited access, detour notification
• In-vehicle signage
In fact security objectives for cases above are general, namely:
Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Accountability,and Au-
thenticity [2]. Despite the fact that some sub-objectives seem to
contradict each other; e.g., only authorized users should be able
to participate in the system, on the other hand privacy aspects
require anonymity or non-traceability, the main cryptographic
challenge in Car2X networks is to protect many relatively
short messages, which have to be authenticated, i.e., protect
integrity of sender and of data, in a mobile Ad Hoc network.
The communication happens in broadcast or unicast mode, and
latencies are very critical [3].
Slightly different situation is with on-board communica-
tions, where integrity and authenticity requirements come to
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the fore, where every Electronic Control Unit (ECU) can
be considered as potentially malicious device. This holds
true especially for modern cars which comprised of hundreds
ECU’s and provide various wireless and wired interfaces.
Nevertheless security objectives for distinct communication
areas are different and international standardization committees
established separate working groups, authors believe that two
areas can be secured in a frame of common and unified Public
Key Infrastructure [4].
III. STANDARDIZATION ACTIVITIES
A. IEEE 1609.2
The IEEE 1609 working group has developed the IEEE
1609 Family of Standards for Wireless Access in Vehicular
Environment (WAVE) USA [5], which defines an architecture
and a complementary, standardized set of services and inter-
faces to secure car-to-car (C2C) and car-to-infrastructure (C2I)
wireless communications. The IEEE 1609.2 standard specifies
a set of management plane WAVE Security Services available
to applications and processes running in the various layers of
the WAVE protocol stack as shown in Figure 1. The WAVE
Security Services consist of:
• Security processing services: provide processing that
is performed to enable secure communications that
comprise secure data and secure WAVE Service Ad-
vertisements (WSAs);
• Security management services: provide certificate
management services that are provided by the Cer-
tificate Management Entity (CME) and that manage
information related to the validity of all certificates;
provide security management services that are pro-
vided by the Provider Service Security Management
Entity (PSSME) and that manage information related
to certificates and private keys that are used to send
secured WSAs.
The services and entities within the WAVE Security Ser-
vices are shown in Figure 1, which also shows Service Access
Points (SAPs) that support communications between WAVE
Security Services entities and other entities. This standard
specifies the security processing via primitives defined at
these SAPs. Horizontal boundaries within the WAVE Security
Services in Figure 1 are abstract and do not correspond to
horizontal boundaries within the Data Plane. Data passed
across the SAPs in this standard is assumed to be secure and
trustworthy. This standard does not provide mechanisms to
ensure the trustworthiness of this data.
B. ETSI ITS
Core European activities in this field take place at Euro-
pean Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) as Euro-
pean regulatory body, which received the official mandate to
standardize C2X. ETSI’s Technical Committee on Intelligent
Transport Systems (TC ITS) is responsible for the production
and maintenance of standards to support the development and
implementation of ITS communications and services across
the network, for transport networks, vehicles and transport
users. Nevertheless ETSI ITS standards were composed in
tight cooperation with Car-to-Car Communication Consortium
Fig. 1. WAVE Protocol stack for IEEE 1609-2013 in USA [5]
Fig. 2. Protocol stack and Release 1 core standards for C-ITS in Europe [6]
(C2C CC) and in most aspects resemble IEEE 1609 standards.
There are some additional points which were added to support
better security. Comparing to IEEE 1609 WG ETSI WG5
explicitly assigns security services for different application
groups. But security primitives are the same: Authentication
and Authorization, Confidentiality and Privacy. Figure 2 shows
security as a vertical layer adjacent to each of the ITS layers
but, in fact, security services are provided on a layer-by-
layer basis so that the security layer can be considered to be
subdivided into the four basic ITS processing layers as shown
in [7]. According to ETSI TS 102 941 [8], the ITS-Station
(ITS-S) security life-cycle includes four stages: manufacture,
enrollment, authorization,and maintenance.
Communications security services [8] require, by defini-
tion, more than one element within their functional model.
The principle functional elements and reference points between
them can be determined by considering a simple ITS commu-
nications scenario such as that shown in Figure 3 [9]. This
shows an ITS-enabled vehicle which needs to communicate
with the following entities: an enrollment authority (lines 1 and
2), an authorization authority (lines 3,4,5), other ITS-equipped
vehicles (line 6).
C. Car-to-Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC)
Being a non-profit, industry driven organization initiated
by European vehicle manufacturers, C2C-CC became one of
the main contributors to an ETSI standardization body. The
main document regarding security aspects is the C2C-CC
PKI Memo distributed only within members of an alliance,
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Fig. 3. The placement of security services within the ETSI ITS station
architecture
however different sources can help to understand the general
architecture and approach to reach required security level.
Moreover C2C-CC security architecture is used as a base
for PRESERVE security architecture, which will be explained
further.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES
A. Digital Tachograph Systems (DTS) project
The digital tachograph succeeded the analogue tachograph
as a result of European Union regulation 1360/2002 that
made digital tachographs mandatory for all relevant vehicles
manufactured after August 1, 2005. Digital tachographs are
required as of May 1, 2006 for all new vehicles to which
EWG regulation VO(EWG)3820/85 applies, as is published in
the official newsletter of the European Union L102 from April
11, 2006.
A digital tachograph system consists of a sender unit
mounted to the vehicle gearbox, the tachograph head and a
digital driver card. The sender unit produces electronic pulses
as the gearbox output shaft turns. These pulses are interpreted
as speed data by the head.
The asymmetric cryptographic system based on the stan-
dard Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is used for securing
the communication between the Vehicle Unit (VU) and the
tachograph card. The DTS European Root Policy [10] defines
the general conditions for the PKI concerned and accordingly
contains more detailed information.
According to [11] DTS is well working system regulated by
German government, which is going to be a part of global ITS.
However DTS project shows an application area where Car2X
domain is tightly bound with on-board communications.
B. PRESERVE project
PRESERVE (Preparing Secure Vehicle-to-X Communica-
tion Systems) is a concluded EU project with a total budget
of 5.438 Me and 395 man months resources.
Three workshops were organized by this project aimed on
solving harmonization and implementation issues combining
efforts and outcome of different successful projects. A dis-
tinctive feature of the PRESERVE project is that it focuses
Fig. 4. C2C-CC System Architecture [11]
not only on the PKI part but also on secure communication
for on-board Equipment to be compliant with ETSI standards
complementing them with necessary implementation details.
The Vehicle Security Architecture (VSA) [12] is designed
to protect on the one hand the V2X communication between
ITS stations and the on-board communication system by using
results and solutions from the previous projects SeVeCom
[13] [9] and EVITA [14], [15]. On the other hand, privacy
protection is a very important aspect in Vehicle-to-X (V2X)
communications and therefore relevant mechanisms are con-
sidered in related processes. They are based primarily on
results of the projects SeVeCom and PRECIOSA [16]. Further-
more, the VSA aims at being compatible with specifications
defined by standardization bodies such as the ETSI, the IEEE,
and the industrial driven consortium C2C-CC. In order to
be practically relevant for close-to-market Field Operational
Tests (FOTs), operational and evolutionary aspects such as
re-usability, adaptability, scalability, and cost-effectiveness are
considered by the VSA. Based on this VSA a V2X Se-
curity Subsystem (VSS) is created that combines different
and partially enhanced security and privacy mechanisms from
previous projects. The PRESERVE VSS aims to be usable
in future V2X communication system implementations. The
main document regarding security aspects is the C2C-CC PKI
Memo distributed only within members of an alliance.
PRESERVE VSA consists of three different basic types
of Certification Authorities (relationships depicted in Figure
4): Root certificate authority (RCA), Long-Term certificate
authority (LTCA), Pseudonym certificate authority (PCA). The
role of the Root CA is to define common policies among all
subordinate certificate issuers. The RCA only issues certificates
for Long-Term CAs and Pseudonym CAs, which are valid over
long periods. A certification process which needs interaction
with the RCA is only required once a new LTCA or PCA is
created, and when the lifetime of an LTCA or PCA certificate
expires. If there are multiple RCAs, they may cross-certify
each other. For mutual trust between Root CAs, a cross
certification is reasonable because it allows more flexible trust
relationships between the Root CAs. However, the overall
number of RCAs shall be kept as small as possible.
In the PRESERVE solution as shown in Figure 4, a Root
Certificate Authority (depicted in Figure 4 as RCA2) on a
European level is proposed to be used as central trust anchor.
In order to extend the solution for world-wide interoperability,
all existing RCAs may cross certify each other. Every cross
certification is done with two new certificates stating the
mutual trust status between both Root CAs. Any other cross
certification between CAs other than RCAs, i.e. between Long-
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term CAs and between Pseudonym CAs, is not allowed. Every
LTCA has a Long-Term CA certificate that is signed with
the private key of the Root CA. With a similar process the
Root CA issues Pseudonym CAs that provide valid Pseudonym
CA certificates afterwards. In the proposed design only the
Root CA is able to issue Long-Term and Pseudonym CAs.
Afterwards, the LTCA issues for each responsible ITS station
one Long-Term Certificates (LTC), that is valid for a longer
period. Each LTC created by a LTCA is dedicated to identify
and authenticate the respective ITS station within the PKI and
potentially other services, but they are never exposed to the
ETSI ITS 5GHz based wireless (ETSI G5A) communication
for privacy reasons. In contrast, Pseudonym Certificates (PCs)
issued by PCAs are used for the ETSI G5A broadcast com-
munication. PCs are designed to have a short lifetime and
have to be exchanged frequently. The VSS is placed inside
the ITS station and aims to provide necessary security services
as defined by ETSI in the ITS station reference architecture
[24]. The VSS is connected to the on-board networks, the
application unit that runs the V2X applications and the V2X
communication entity that is connected with the outside world
(i.e. ETSI ITS-G5A network).
C. AUTOSAR framework
AUTOSAR (AUTomotive Open System ARchitecture) [17]
is an open and standardized automotive software architecture
(for in car communications), jointly developed by automo-
bile manufacturers, suppliers and tool developers. It is a
partnership of automotive Original Equipment Manufactur-
ers (OEMs), suppliers and tool vendors whose objective is
to create and establish open standards for automotive E/E
(Electrics/Electronics) architectures that will provide a basic
infrastructure to assist with developing vehicular software, user
interfaces and management for all application domains.
Nine Core members include the BMW Group, Daimler AG,
Ford Motor Company, General Motors, Opel, Toyota Motor
Corporation, PSA Peugeot Citron, Volkswagen and automotive
suppliers Bosch, Continental AG and Siemens VDO (now
Continental AG).
Nowadays AUTOSAR architecture is supported by all big
car and ECU manufactures, moreover according to a reviewed
literature ITS infrastructure is going to be implemented within
AUTOSAR specification. Due to AUTOSAR framework preva-
lence for car manufacturer it is reasonable to assume that all
security features will be implemented inside this framework.
In fact this environment has already standardize crypto ab-
stractions and security management entities, although limited
in functionality [18].
V. APPROACH
A. Basic idea
The basic idea of considered approach was to review
ongoing and concluded security related activities–briefly dis-
cussed in previous chapter–from the perspective of unified and
harmonized Car2X and in-Car security systems (see Figure 5),
particularly take as a base C2C-CC architecture and combine
it with standardized methods for on-board communications.
Moreover a special attention was paid for in-car communi-
cations, where most of links are established via CAN bus,
Fig. 5. Architecture of the anticipated communication system
Fig. 6. PKI for architecture
an interface which has a significant limitations for data-
rate and frame size. However, due to a fact that German
Federal Department for Security in Information Technology
already has specified TLS protocol [19] for a very constrained
environment – Wireless MBus [20], the TLS-based interface is
considered as being a suitable example of well studied security
solution which can be used for internal communications; e.g.,
to exchange symmetric keys and certificates.
Figure 6 depicts an overall PKI architecture for Car2X and
on-board communications.
B. Car interaction with Long Term CA
Long Term CA generates its public/private key pair and
sends a certification request to the Root CA to get certified.
It then has to prove whether it is allowed to sign Long Term
certificates (LTC) for cars. LTCs may be created during the
manufacturing process of gateways or are introduced into the
car at the end of the production line. Hence, either automotive
suppliers or manufacturers are considered as possible LTCA
operators for cars. But in the former case the supplier must
already know the complete vehicle information. The certifica-
tion process is summarized in Figure 6. The Root CA certifies
a CA certificate for LTCA, which certifies an LTC for the
car. Because the car needs to know with which CAs it can
communicate, CA certificates of trusted CAs are preloaded into
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Fig. 7. Pseudonym generation process
an internal certificate store of the car. The Long Term CA is a
server component that communicates with a client agent on the
car or with other CAs (Figure 7). Hence the LTCA software
receives requests, processes them and generates responses.
This is illustrated in Figure 7. For the LTC generation, the
LTCA receives a request containing: the vehicle information,
the public key to be certified, a signature of the request
generated with the private key.
LTC generation (initial, before expiring, after revocation):
In the LTC generation process, Figure 7, the LTCA receives a
certification request. After the verification of the request and
its authorization, a certification response containing a signed
certificate is stored locally and then returned back to the
requester. The detailed generation process can be found in [21]
and [22].
C. Car interaction with Pseudonymous CA and Long-term CA
As depicted in Figure 7, the Root CA certifies a CA
certificate for the Pseudonym CA, which is responsible for
certifying pseudonym certificates for cars. The certification
process of pseudonyms is discussed later in this section. The
car chooses a PCA from its database and sends the request
to it. After getting the PCs, they are stored in the internal
certificate store.
As the LTCA, the PCA is a server component, which
receives requests from cars and generates responses as il-
lustrated in Figure 7. Pseudonym generation: Because it is
recommended that PCA and LTCA are separate entities, the
LTCA must also be involved in the pseudonym generation
process, Figure 7.
1) The car generates a pseudonym certification request,
signs it and sends it to the PCA.
2) The PCA receives the request and checks the region
ID:
a) If the PCA is not the appropriate CA for the
request, it is forwarded to the next PCA. Al-
ternative: the PCA returns the address of the
appropriate CA to the car. This avoids traffic
between PCAs in areas close to frontiers.
b) If the PCA is the appropriate CA, a for-
warding request containing the original one
is created, signed and sent to the LTCA.
3) The LTCA receives the forwarding request.
4) The LTCA checks the authenticity of the PCA and
the validity of its certificate.
5) The LTCA checks the integrity of the original request
and the validity of the associated LTC. The LTCA
checks if the LTC has the requested permissions.
6) Finally a response is sent back to the PCA encrypted
with its public key.
7) After getting the response of the identity check, if it
is valid, then the PCA generates the pseudonym cer-
tificates from the received set of public keys. Finally
the PCA generates a response message containing the
pseudonym certificates and sends it back to the car.
8) The car receives the set of pseudonyms and saves
them in its certificates store.
D. Car and ECU interaction. In-car interactions.
There are further certificates needed to secure the in-
car-communication between the gateway and the ECUs and
between ECUs among themselves. It must be ensured that an
attacker cannot connect a fake ECU to the system. This ECU
certificate (EC) may contain an identification number for the
unit, the public key and the authorization of the ECU [23].
To be able to check this certificate, the gateway holds the
certificates of all trusted ECUs in its certificate store. Due to
this requirement, the original architecture of C2C-CC needs to
be extended.
1) Alternative 1 – external ECU CA (ECA): One possible
solution is shown in Figure 8: The PKI described for C2C-CC
is expanded by a further ECA. The ECA digitally signs the
certificate of the ECU and the gateway can verify it with the
certificate of the corresponding ECA from its certificate store.
2) Alternative 2 – In-car-PKI: Another possible solution
would be to use the EC from the ECU branch in Figure 8
only once like a quality seal for authorization at the first
installation and then to switch to the use of an in-car PKI
as shown in Figure 8: After that an in-car-PKI is established
in the following way: Prerequisites: 1) The gateway has its
firmware installed; 2) The gateway is equipped with means to
authenticate service commands from an outside service entity;
3) The new ECUs have their firmware installed and accept
connections from the gateway (without authentication); 4) The
ECU has a valid certificate for authorization
With a following assumption – the in-car communication
is allowed to be unsecured for the duration of the above
procedure. The car manufacturer or service facility (service
entity) is issuing an authenticated command to the gateway
triggering it to accept new ECUs. The gateway is connecting to
every new ECU (enumeration technique out of current scope)
and is executing the following procedure:
ECU with Trusted Platform Module: Upon the gateways con-
nection request the ECU generates a public/private key pair
and forwards the public key to the gateway.
ECU without TPM: The gateway generates a public/private key
pair and forwards the private key to the ECU.
In either case: The gateways in-car RCA issues and signs a
certificate for the ECU containing its public key and some
identifier (e.g. network interface address). The certificate is
forwarded to the ECU together with the gateways in-car root
and communication certificates.
As was indicated previously in Chapter V-A in order
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Fig. 8. PKI for in-car systems
to establish CAN bus based secure communication between
ECUs or Gateway and ECU, the TLS protocol was taken as a
base. However the broadcasting nature of CAN bus interface
can’t be mapped directly to the TLS protocol, as well as
its’ stateless delta version - DTLS protocol, due to they use
unicast addressing scheme. To overcome this limitation various
schemes based on additional transport layer was considered;
e.g. widely used in AUTOSAR framework ISO TP standard
[24].
VI. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
We presented a brief and compressed overview of available
security related projects for Car2X and on-board communica-
tions, as well as an Autosar – basic platform for in-car domain
applications. The main contributors for standardization bodies
are various pilot projects; e.g., C2C-CC and PRESERVE.
However there are plenty of uncovered issues and divergences
between different proposals; e.g., DTS application area where
on-board ECU needs to be included in a global PKI.
Currently work is ongoing to define a prototype architec-
ture which supports both Car2X and on-board domain, and use
standardized approaches like (D)TLS for CAN bus/Ethernet
communication within a vehicle.
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Abstract—Security in IT systems, particularly in embedded
devices like Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs), has become an
important matter of concern as it is the prerequisite for ensuring
privacy and safety. Among a multitude of existing security
measures, the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol family
offers mature and standardized means for establishing secure
communication channels over insecure transport media. In the
context of classical IT infrastructure, its security with regard
to protocol and implementation attacks has been subject to
extensive research. As TLS protocols find their way into em-
bedded environments, we consider the security and robustness
of implementations of these protocols specifically in the light of
the peculiarities of embedded systems. We present an approach
for systematically checking the security and robustness of such
implementations using fuzzing techniques and differential testing.
In spite of its origin in testing TLS implementations we expect
our approach to likewise be applicable to implementations of
other cryptographic protocols with moderate efforts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Given today’s pervasion of Information Technology (IT)
and in particular embedded Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs),
any flaw in or malfunction of such systems can cause economic
loss, impair privacy, or can even be dangerous to life [1]. To
ensure safety and privacy, many security measures have been
proposed, standardized, and implemented [2]. Among them
is the family of Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols1
[3], [4], [6] which offer mature and standardized means
for establishing secure end-to-end communication channels
over insecure transport media. TLS supports encrypted and
integrity-checked data transfer as well as peer authentication
using a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) or pre-shared keys.
The security of TLS protocols [10], [15] as well as their
implementations has been the subject of various research
activities [7], [8], [9], while implementations have mostly been
studied in the context of classical IT infrastructure. However,
as the use of TLS protocols in embedded environments re-
ceives increasing attention it is vital to consider the security of
TLS implementations specifically in the light of the peculiar-
ities of embedded systems. From an application’s perspective
these are mainly constrained resources (e.g. computing power,
memory, bandwidth, etc.) and physical exposure to potential
attackers [23], [24]. From a tester’s perspective it is primarily
the lack of efficient and convenient monitoring and control
mechanisms that are typically required when applying common
1In this paper, we use the plural form TLS protocols to refer to the diversity
of different versions and variants of TLS (including DTLS).
software testing techniques. To address this, we are developing
and implementing an approach to systematically test the secu-
rity and robustness of embedded TLS implementations using
fuzzing techniques and differential testing. It treats implemen-
tations as black boxes and does not require any memory or
execution monitoring. Our approach somewhat resembles the
concept of Frankencerts [7], though leveraging its ideas to
be applicable to entire TLS protocol implementations rather
than their certificate validation logic alone. While seeking to
automate the process it is expected to feature decent coverage.
We consider our approach supplementing other, more formal
or semi-formal approaches.
The paper is structured as follows: after this introduction
Section II will briefly present work related to ours. The TLS
protocol family will be introduced in Section III. Sections IV
and V present our test approach and the framework imple-
menting it, respectively. A summary and an outlook is given
in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Several generic approaches to test implementations of
communication protocols have been presented in the past [16],
[17], [18], [19], [20]. These approaches use random or semi-
random mutations to generate potentially invalid input and
various different techniques to identify invalid responses or
behaviour. Among these are response validation by means of
formal specifications or monitoring the system’s memory and
execution to detect abnormal program behaviour.
SECFUZZ is a tool that specifically addresses the com-
plications induced by the use of cryptography when testing
implementations of security protocols using fuzzing [21]. As
others do, it uses memory monitoring to detect abnormal
program behaviour.
Frankencerts is a tool and an approach to specifically
test the validation logic of X.509 certificates embedded in
TLS implementations [7]. It combines fuzzing techniques for
generating randomized certificates and differential testing used
as an oracle for discovering incorrect certificate validation in
TLS implementations. Frankencerts only considers certificates
as mutable input but does not alter TLS messages themselves.
Other approaches to identify flaws in implementations of
the TLS protocol state machines have been proposed and
implemented successfully in the past [8], [9]. With these
approaches, manipulated TLS messages are used to probe TLS
implementations for the possibility to trigger invalid transitions
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the (D)TLS protocol stack with its fundamental
Record protocol as well as its four higher-layer sub-protocols for connection
establishment (Handshake and Change Cipher Spec protocol), error signaling
(Alert protocol) and application data transmission (Application Data protocol).
in the state machines implementing the TLS protocol. Invalid
transitions are identified either by explicitly crafting offensive
input or by manual inspection of derived state machine models.
Formal verifications of TLS implementations are to the
best of our knowledge only performed for implementations
specifically designed for this purpose [26], [27].
III. THE TLS PROTOCOL FAMILY
The TLS protocol family provides a flexible framework
for cryptographically securing connections from end to end
over communication channels assumed to be under an active
attacker’s control. TLS is the successor of the Secure Sockets
Layer (SSL) protocol [5] introduced in the 1990s [6] and has
become the de-facto standard for secure internet communi-
cations. Since its outset, TLS evolved from version 1.0 to its
currently latest version 1.2 [3] incorporating important security
amendments. As TLS requires reliable transport (e.g. via TCP)
Datagram TLS (DTLS) [4] has been designed to accommodate
the specifics of unreliable transport media (e.g. via UDP). The
structure and concept of DTLS closely resembles the ones
of TLS but it introduces several important changes in the
protocol’s communication format and flow.
A. Structure of TLS
TLS (and DTLS) is connection-oriented and follows a
client/server model with well-defined roles. It is composed of
five sub-protocols as indicated in Figure 1. The fundamental
protocol is the Record protocol. It is fragmenting data from
higher layers and handling data encryption as well as genera-
tion and verification of Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
to ensure data integrity. Its protocol data unit (PDU) is called
a TLS record. Stacked on top of the Record protocol are the
Handshake protocol, the Change Cipher Specification protocol,
the Alert protocol, and the Application Data protocol. The
first two are responsible for establishing and negotiating TLS
connection parameters and keys. The Alert protocol delivers
error messages and the Application Data protocol is used to
transfer raw application-layer data.
TLS does not use fixed cryptographic algorithms but intro-
duces the concept of cipher suites to offer a multitude of pos-
sible combinations of cryptographic algorithms and schemes.
Each cipher suite selects a mechanism for key exchange and
authentication, an algorithm for message integrity checks, and
Client Server 
ClientHello 
ServerHello 
Certificate 
ServerKeyExchange 
CertificateRequest 
ServerHelloDone 
Certificate 
(ChangeCipherSpec) 
ClientKeyExchange 
Finished 
CertificateVerify 
Finished 
(ChangeCipherSpec) 
(Application Data) (Application Data) 
Fig. 2. Illustration of the sequence of messages exchanged between a TLS
client and a TLS server during the handshake. Messages with a solid dark
background are mandatory for a full handshake whereas messages with a
light background are optional or context-dependent. Messages correspond to
the Handshake protocol unless they are shown in parentheses. Messages within
the dashed box are omitted for an abbreviated handshake (session resumption).
a symmetric algorithm for bulk data encryption. Furthermore,
an extension mechanism allows clients and servers to negotiate
a multitude of optional features that are not part of the
core protocol standard, giving TLS an outstanding degree of
flexibility.
Any TLS connection is commenced by a handshake com-
posed of a sequence of binary-encoded messages exchanged
between the client and the server. It is triggered by the
client and initiated by the exchange of two Hello messages
facilitating – amongst other things – the negotiation of protocol
parameters. Authentication of the communication partners and
the establishment of a shared secret between them are achieved
by the exchange of dedicated Certificate and KeyExchange
messages. Finally, Finished messages complete the handshake
and confirm its authenticity in retrospect.
A full TLS handshake involves asymmetric cryptographic
operations for authentication and key establishment. Depend-
ing on the configuration and the type of Public-Key In-
frastructure (PKI) in place different cryptographic algorithms
such as RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DH), DH with ephemeral keys
(DHE), or the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) may be
used. For DH(E) and DSA, also variants based on Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECDH, ECDHE, ECDSA) are specified.
Session resumption omits authentication and key establishment
by reusing a previously negotiated shared secret.
Figure 2 illustrates the sequence of messages exchanged
between a TLS client and server during the handshake. Each
message is a complex structure of binary-encoded integer and
enumeration fields as well as nested sub-structures. Addition-
ally, cryptographic elements (signatures, random values, etc.)
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might be present.
B. Security of TLS and its Implementations
The formal and abstract security of TLS protocols has been
studied extensively in the past [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [10]
and many attacks and weaknesses in by now outdated protocol
versions and algorithms have been identified. However, to
the best of our knowledge TLS in its latest version can be
considered secure – assuming it is implemented correctly and
used with appropriate parameters.
Not least is the possibility of fixing security issues in
TLS attributable to its flexibility. However, this flexibility
comes at the expense of simplicity and implementations of
the protocol rapidly become quite complex as they seek to
cover the multitude of existing protocol variants, cipher suites,
and extensions. This fact enhances the potential for flaws in
implementations of TLS that impair the protocol’s abstract
security claims. Unsurprisingly, several studies have uncovered
serious security issues in popular TLS implementations [7],
[8], [9]. Virtually all of them were related to an insufficient
validation of input received over the network. Therefore, it is
crucial to confirm an implementation’s resilience against input
maliciously crafted to exploit certain implementation flaws.
IV. TEST APPROACH
Our approach strives to identify flaws in TLS implementa-
tions deployed in embedded environments while it is minimiz-
ing the need for manual intervention during the test process.
It focuses on automatically discovering unknown issues rather
than checking against common or known issues retrieved from
a suitable database. It treats TLS implementations under test
as black boxes and avoids the need for sophisticated execution
and memory monitoring. Furthermore, it does not impose any
requirements on the application operating on top of the TLS
stack to be tested, though certain application characteristics
might enable supplemental test features.
Our approach combines two techniques that by themselves
have already been used before (see also Section II). Fuzzing is
used to generate potentially invalid input and differential test-
ing is used as an oracle to detect improper system reaction. In
this respect it can be considered an extension of Frankencerts
[7], leveraging its concept to be applicable to entire TLS
protocol implementations rather than their certificate validation
logic alone.
A. Input Generation
Fuzzing involves monitoring a system for malfunction
while being passed randomly or semi-randomly generated in-
put that is likely to violate the system’s input specification [22].
Fuzzing approaches come in various different flavours, while
we make use of mutative fuzzing drawing message templates
from pre-recorded and sufficiently diverse TLS traffic. Based
on these message sequences, selection, mutation, manipulation,
and adaption operations are applied. This is done such that it
implicitly emulates the behaviour of either a TLS client or
server without explicitly implementing the TLS protocol.
For every message to be sent to the TLS implementations
under test a new message is selected from the database.
Messages are selected preferentially from the same sequence
in the same order they have been recorded. However, with
configurable probabilities messages are selected in a different
order, from a different but compatible sequence, or even from
completely incompatible sequences. Compatibility between
message sequences is evaluated using a dedicated metric based
on heuristics accounting for protocol parameters, algorithms,
and roles that have been used in the recorded protocol run.
Mutations applied to selected messages involve reordering
similar consecutive objects within a message (e.g. in an array
of fields), removing objects from the message, multiplicating
existing objects, or inserting objects taken from another mes-
sage. Manipulations involve selectively changing fields in the
protocol message by flipping bits, changing the value of fields,
or setting fields to invalid values. All these operations are
performed on multiple levels of nested message fields and in
multiple steps with configurable probabilities. As some fields
in protocol messages might be interrelated by consistency
requirements (e.g. fields that encode the length of other parts
of the message) these fields are updated after the mutation
and manipulation processes to restore consistency. Exceptions
to this are manipulations explicitly targeting such consistency
relations.
As the TLS Record protocol allows fragmentation and
coalescence of messages from higher-layer TLS sub-protocols
the corresponding degrees of freedom are likewise subject to
manipulation and variation.
B. Response Analysis
Differential testing makes use of one or more additional
systems that are supposed to behave identically but due to
structural or implementation differences bear the potential to
exhibit discrepant behaviour upon receiving equivalent input.
In such a setup, discrepant behaviour either points to an
imprecise specification the systems try to follow or – as is
more interesting for our purposes – indicates faulty behaviour
of at least one system involved. Differential testing makes use
of this fact to obtain an oracle for invalid system behaviour
without requiring a specification of the expected behaviour.
However, it relies on the assumption that there is no flaw that
similarly affects all systems involved.
In our approach, the TLS implementation to be tested is
accompanied by additional, structurally different TLS imple-
mentations of different origins. The evaluation of the con-
sistency of the responses across involved implementations is
done by means of a metric similar to the one which is used
to evaluate the compatibility of different message sequences
from the database. That is, the type of response sent by TLS
implementations (e.g. handshake or alert message) as well as
the messages’ content are compared and the compatibility is
evaluated.
C. Destructive State Probing
Among others, an interesting question when testing TLS
implementations is whether an attacker is able to fraudulently
trick a TLS implementation into accepting and forwarding ap-
plication data without being in possession of valid permission
and/or credentials. Therefore, in any state of the test process
– and in particular during an ongoing handshake – application
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data is sent to involved TLS implementations with configurable
probability for the mere purpose of probing its acceptance.
Such premature application data injection would trigger a valid
TLS implementation to close the current connection with a
fatal alert2. We refer to this type of probing as destructive
state probing as it destroys the current connection state.
D. Dealing with Cryptography
In the context of TLS both the generation of input as well as
the use of differential testing are complicated by certain proto-
col features and TLS’ inherent utilisation of cryptography. For
each TLS connection session keys inevitably are different un-
less both client and server use fixed data in lieu of randomness.
As only one side is under the tester’s control, cryptographic
fields have to be recalculated before data is passed to the TLS
implementations. Similarly, variations in responses induced by
differing cryptographic keys have to be harmonized before data
can be compared across implementations.
E. Issue Discovery Capabilities
Our approach is expected to allow to identify a wide range
of security-relevant issues in TLS implementations that are
somehow related to an improper parsing and/or validation of
input received over the network. However, since we refrain
from using invasive system monitoring we also expect our
approach to miss important issues as they won’t express
themselves in discrepant system responses, e.g. out-of-bounds
read operations in memory.
V. TEST FRAMEWORK
Currently, we are developing a test framework that is going
to implement the test approach presented in the previous sec-
tion. It consists of several components illustrated in Figure 3.
A. Sending Messages
A database (Message sequence database) holds the pre-
recorded TLS message sequences and makes them available
to the component (Message selection / test control) which
is responsible for selecting messages for further processing.
Selected messages are passed to the component (Message mu-
tation/manipulation) that is applying mutation and manipula-
tion operations before passing them to the component (Crypto
adaptor) which is transparently injecting and/or harmonizing
cryptographic dependencies. The crypto adaptor is passing
messages to the component (Encoder / decoder) which is
handling message encoding and decoding. This also includes
handling message fragmentation and coalescence. As TLS
protocols are multi-layered, messages might need to circulate
multiple times between the latter two components before being
dispatched to the TLS implementations under test.
2DTLS, unfortunately, does not behave in this way necessarily. Therefore,
this kind of probing is only applicable to DTLS if the corresponding applica-
tion allows to feedback received application data to the test system.
Message 
mutation/manipulation 
Response analysis 
Message sequence database 
Control 
stream 
(D)TLS 
station (1) 
(D)TLS 
station (2) 
… 
(D)TLS 
station (n) 
Message selection / test control 
Crypto 
adaptor (1) 
Crypto 
adaptor(2) 
… 
Crypto 
adaptor(n) 
Encoder / 
decoder 
Encoder / 
decoder 
… 
Encoder / 
decoder 
Fig. 3. Architecture of the framework for testing implementations of a TLS
protocol. The framework’s boundary is indicated as a dashed box.
B. Receiving Messages
Messages sent by the implementations under test are pro-
cessed by the encoder / decoder and crypto adaptor com-
ponents before being passed to the component (Response
analysis) which is evaluating and comparing the systems’
responses. The results of this evaluation are fed back to the
component (Message selection / test control) controlling the
test process.
C. General Message Handling
Our strategy for generating input (message mutation,
manipulation, adaption) and analysing responses requires a
machine-readable description of the format and encoding of
TLS messages. Unfortunately, the on-the-wire representation
of messages tends to impede the implementation of such opera-
tions in a way that is both simple and flexible at the same time.
This is mostly due to the necessity of implementing complex
and protocol-specific code for efficiently translating between
the raw binary representation and the structured high-level
representation of messages. Furthermore, handling data on bit-
level in high-level programming languages is a tedious and
error-prone task. Therefore, as an integral component of our
test framework we are developing a C++-based framework that
starting from the description language defined for specifying
TLS [3] automatically generates source code for translating
between packet representations.
In supporting the encoding, decoding, generation, and
dissection of TLS messages, our message handling tool is
similar to FlexTLS [25], a tool for rapidly prototyping and
testing implementations of TLS protocols. However, our tool
aims for providing protocol-agnostic services to easy our test
approach’s adaptability to other security protocols.
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D. Test Control
As indicated in Section IV, the test process is semi-
random and depends on several configurable probabilities.
Each decision within the process that is based on probabilities
is come to by evaluating a continuous stream of opaque control
data. Blocks of data are read from this stream and interpreted
as encoding integer values. Probabilities are implemented by
accordingly mapping decisions to corresponding ranges of
these integer values. The opaque stream of control data is
provided by a component (Control stream) which is delivering
either random or semi-random data or – in order to enable
reproducibility and determinism – taking data from a deter-
ministic input, e.g. a stored file.
VI. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
We presented an approach for discovering flaws in imple-
mentations of TLS protocols in embedded environments. Pre-
recorded TLS traffic is semi-randomly – though purposefully –
mutated to provoke faulty behaviour in these implementations.
This input generation strategy does not explicitly but most
likely produce invalid input. Instead of examining responses
by means of verified references or monitoring implementations
for abnormal execution states we employ differential testing
to detect suspicious behaviour. We expect our approach to be
capable of detecting a broad range of input parsing and/or
validation issues in TLS implementations as they express
themselves in suspicious system responses.
Currently, we are implementing the test framework and
refining our test approach including evaluation metrics and in-
put generation strategies. A theoretical study of the approach’s
capabilities as well as their dependence on test parameters is
ongoing. Furthermore, we are studying the adaptability of our
approach to other cryptographic protocols.
We are going to apply our approach to a list of popular as
well as a proprietary TLS implementation that are individually
running an small embedded platforms to experimentally assess
its effectiveness.
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Abstract—Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) introduces technol-
ogy in the living environment of elderly people to support them in
their daily life and to prevent emergency situations. This is done
by the use of middleware-systems that have to be installed in a
user’s home. Recent projects consider cloud platforms as more
cost effective and flexible for delivering services for AAL. In this
paper we present the status of research for a privacy preserving
way of delivering services through a Platform as a Service
in a hybrid cloud environment. Commonly used concepts are
transferred to our platform approach and particular differences
are presented.
Index Terms—PaaS, AAL, Hybrid Cloud, OSGi, Privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the increasing average life expectancy and the
decreasing birth-rate the proportion of the young working
population in developed countries world-wide is shrinking
continuously [1]. Extended families that are able to care for
their elderly relatives are slowly disappearing and families are
getting smaller in general. Programs for new nursing or day-
care facilities are introduced by politics, but there is still a
lack of trained personnel and existing facilities. To keep the
needed time-span for professional care facilities minimal, with
AAL new technological concepts are introduced in the known
living environment of the elderly people and people in need
of help. As surveys show, elderly people want to stay at home
as long as possible [2] and therefore support this trend.
AAL platforms are often based on concepts of smart-home
environments that combine input-devices like sensors, user-
interfaces or cameras and output-devices like alarms, emer-
gency call functionality, databases or graphical user interfaces.
This is provided by a configurable middleware and compute-
power that has to be installed in the user’s living environment.
If new demanding services are introduced into the smart home
environment, the existing computing equipment has to be
renewed or extended as well.
Our research focuses on delivering cloud based services
for AAL. Cloud computing enables service providers (e.g.,
care givers or day care facilities) to deliver services without
the need for investing in expensive technical equipment in
advance. By delivering services through the cloud, the high
start-up costs can be reduced significantly and it will be
feasible for service providers and users to try out new or
innovative services without the need of a high investment.
This flexibility can be provided by a customizable Platform
as a Service (PaaS) that is run by the service provider. The
PaaS is considered to run in a private cloud, as adaptation
of the system to the user’s need is heavily based on personal
user data. The downside of this setting is that it will not scale
beyond the boundaries of the physical hardware that is used
for running the private cloud.
For this the context-aware PaaS is run in a private cloud,
that can be extended with services in the public cloud for
better flexibility, scalability and maintainability according to
the definition of a hybrid cloud [3]. This hybrid cloud ap-
proach poses new challenges for personalisation of services,
as personal information is often not allowed to be passed
to third parties. Privacy and security constraints have to be
considered and methods for providing adaptation of services
while preserving privacy have to be introduced in the PaaS for
AAL.
Section II gives a brief overview of existing platforms and
first approaches to introducing cloud service for AAL. The
platform speciAAL is introduced in section III and followed by
the main motivations for running the platform in a hybrid cloud
environment in section IV. First approaches to privacy when
delivering services outside of the Private Cloud are presented
in section V. Section VI gives a conclusion and a further
outlook of upcoming research topics.
II. RELATED WORK
Existing platforms in the field of AAL are mainly focused
on delivering customizable middleware for smart home envi-
ronments and the whole computing power has to be installed in
the environment itself. Examples are SOPRANO [4], AMIGO
[5], ProSyst [6] and universAAL [7] that are providing mid-
dleware and techniques to gather user data, do reasoning based
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on ontologies and recognize events or incidents that lead to
corresponding system reactions.
Kim et al. [8] present a platform approach to share health
data in the cloud in a secure way. The patient-centric solution
provides strong security and privacy characteristics and is
entirely governed by the patient. It allows sharing of health
data between hospitals, trained care-personnel or relatives to
indicate changes in the health conditions amongst different
support groups of the user.
Ekonomou et al. [9] developed an extensible OSGi-based
architecture for highly heterogeneous smart home systems.
This architecture is focused on the integration of new devices
by using a cloud-based service for discovering drivers in a
manual, semi-automatic and automatic way.
The project Cloud-oriented Context-aware Middleware in
Ambient Assisted Living (CoCaMAAL) [10] moves the con-
text generation and classification of incidents in the cloud.
Data of installed sensors and devices in the smart living
environment is collected by a Data Collector on-site and
transferred to a context aggregator in the cloud, that sends
back appropriate actions.
III. SPECIAAL
The security and privacy enhanced cloud infrastructure
for AAL (speciAAL) focuses on delivering personalised and
adapted services for information, communication and learning.
It is based on the project Person Centered Environment for
Information Communication and Learning (PCEICL) [11]
which is developed in the Collaborative Centre for Applied
Research on Ambient Assisted Living (ZAFH-AAL) [12].
The Plattform as a Service (PaaS) is based on OSGi. OSGi
supports installing, starting and stopping software bundles
during runtime. Dependencies are managed and resolved by
BND-tools, so that dependent services are installed and started
prior to starting a new service. This provides the flexibility
that is needed for a platform in terms of extensibility and
updatability during run-time without the need to restart the
whole environment.
The communication inside the platform is performed by
software agents with role-based access and communication
rights to secure the data-flows inside the platform. These
agents communicate based on the Agent Communication Lan-
guage (ACL) [13] that is backed by an ontology [14] to persist
the concepts of passed data or attributes throughout the whole
platform.
Information about the user and his environment is stored in
an ontology database. This data can be evaluated by software
agents for the purpose of adapting a certain behaviour of a
service to the supposed need of a user at the current time.
The stored information is gathered by configuration (e.g.,
during initial installation and configuration of the platform
for the user), through connection with existing sensors in a
smart-home environment or by data, that is coming from other
services inside the PaaS, e.g., a calendar service, a contacts
service or a weather service. Ontop of this there is still ongoing
research for profile building with machine-learning techniques
by analysing user behaviour.
New services can be retrieved and installed through a bundle
repository based on OBR [15]. This bundle repository is
extended with useful information about the proposed service
(e.g., name, description, images or screen shots) and usage
information.
The whole management of the platform, the management of
services, the communication between platforms and with the
underlying Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) is centralized in
the AAL PaaS Manager.
SpeciAAL continues this research but focuses on security
and privacy aspects, when running the PaaS in a hybrid cloud
environment.
IV. FROM LOCAL INSTALLATION TO THE CLOUD
As mentioned in section II the majority of platforms for
AAL rely on installation in a users home environment. This
requires that hardware and software has to be setup for each
subscriber of the platform. This is likely associated with high
costs prior to convincing a user of the benefit of the platform
or the usefulness of a specific functionality for the user.
By delivering service through a cloud approach, it becomes
feasible to both, the service provider and the user, to test
services while keeping the initial installation and configuration
costs minimal.
It is assumed, that the service provider for such scenarios
would be directly connected with a health care provider (e.g.,
the german red cross [16], ASB [17] or CARITAS [18]) or
even be the health care provider itself. As the health care
providers are already working with possible future users (e.g.,
meals on wheels, nursing, day care and emergency services)
they could introduce the AAL platform to the users as well.
The cloud approach would be a Private Cloud hosted by the
service provider. This enables scalability and extensibility for
the environment as new nodes can be started when needed and
the platform is able to grow as new users and new services
are added. On the other hand this simplifies the maintenance
of the platform, as updates can be applied centrally and don’t
have to be rolled out at local installations in the users’ homes.
The privacy aspect in this setting is controlled by a security
and privacy layer based on ACL as mentioned in section III.
The storage of data and data-flows within the Private Cloud
are considered to be within the legal boundaries and are not
passed to third parties.
To further reduce costs or to dyncamically adjust to chang-
ing resource requirements, it may make sense to go one step
further and shift services with higher resource needs to a
Public Cloud (e.g., of a third party cloud provider). Due to
service level agreements and legal restrictions this means,
that a different consideration and decision has to be made:
What information is needed by the service for delivering
a personalised or adapted service and what information is
allowed to be passed to services that are not run in the closed
ecosystem of the Private Cloud at the service provider. This
contradiction of personalisation and privacy concerns must be
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handled by special methods and tools inside the platform as
well as before provisioning a service through a service or
bundle repository.
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR PRIVACY IN HYBRID CLOUD
ENVIRONMENTS
The directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament [19]
defines personal data as follows:
Personal data shall mean any information relating
to an identified or identifiable natural person (’data
subject’); an identifiable person is one who can
be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to an identification number or to one or
more factors specific to his physical, physiological,
mental, economic, cultural or social identity.
The ’Article 29 Data Protection Working Party of the EC’
[20] further explains in Opinion 4/2007 [21] that this definition
covers any information that relates to an identifiable, living
individual. The differentiation directly or indirectly identifiable
is best described by examples: A person’s full name and
address is an obvious identifier (direct identifier). But a person
can also be identifiable from other information, e.g. hair-
colour, shoe-size, usual activities and combinations thereof.
If there is too much unspecific information the information
can be combined to meaningful information and an individual
can be identified. This definition is also technology neutral -
it does not matter how the personal data is stored.
For cases where the EC directive is not applicable, national
legislation is still applicable and in some cases more specific
and restrictive. To keep things simple in the conceptual phase
we are focusing on EC jurisdiction.
A. Preconditions for the platform
To determine what data is considered personal or private
information of the user, the stored data has to be categorised
when building up the ontology. The challenge for this categori-
sation is to be in accordance to legal requirements. This will
make it necessary to not only define what information may
or may not be released to third parties (direct identification),
but also what information may not be released together with
what other information (indirect identification, as mentioned
before). These policies are applicable for data transfer to the
public cloud, but also for data transfer to external services.
Figure 1 gives an overview of an installation process for a
new service in the Public Cloud. It is assumed that the user has
triggered the installation process and by some requirements
(e.g., shortage of resources or cost efficiency) the new service
has to be started in the Public Cloud. The Install Helper
then requests the needed data for the initial configuration and
adaptation of the service. The Privacy Module checks the
AAL Privacy Policy whether there are policy breaches in the
requested information. In this scenario no breaches exist and
therefore the data may be passed to the Install Helper which
then passes it over to the Install Helper in the Public Cloud
to install the New Service.
Fig. 1. AAL Privacy Policy and Privacy Module
If the policy check fails, the Install Helper has to request
new resources from the PaaS Manager to be able to install
the service in the Private Cloud. One exception to this policy
driven decision making could be, that the user actively en-
forces a service to get data beyond this policies as shown in
section V-D.
B. Preconditions for services
The simplest service doesn’t need any adaptation for
the user, because it just delivers information (e.g., a web-
server, that has no access tracking in place and just delivers
multimedia-content).
As soon as adaptation is necessary, the data that is needed
to adapt a new service for a user has to be documented.
The suitable places are in the service description and in
the manifest-file of each involved OSGi bundle to address
the modular characteristics of services based on OSGi. This
information is stored in a machine-readable syntax and can be
accessed by the Install Helper and Privacy Module and used
to determine whether the service is considered to be installed
in the private cloud or may be installed in the public cloud.
As an analogy, the federated identity solution and sin-
gle sign-on service Shibboleth [22] handles these so called
attributes that are passed to a third-party service provider
by agreements between the identity provider and the service
provider. These agreements are added to the attribute-filter list
(in our approach the policy), a XML-based description file and
is the base information for the identity provider service to pass
attributes to the service after authentication.
Private data that is passed to a service has to be kept
inside the service and may not be passed to third party
application. This has to be guaranteed for the services in a
trustworthy environment. In official smart phone ecosystems
like the Google Play Store or Apple Appstore this is not only
required for developers of new applications but also tested
prior for adding the service in the application store. These
tests are done in a hybrid manner: By automated testing of
the application and by code reviews of the applications. For
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a trustworthy platform for ambient assisted living, these tests
are required as well.
C. Reevaluating data access
Besides installation and initial configuration, user data is
also requested for adapting and reconfiguring a service during
run-time. This reconfiguration is triggered by changes in user
data that are reasoned by agents and combined in events. An
example would be a fitness service with video-trainings that
is reconfigured to exclude trainings for feet after the user has
sprained his ankle. The service is registered in the service
registry (as shown in figure 1) together with the documentation
of the needed data for configuration. With this information the
Privacy Module can reevaluate if the policies are still met and
the updated information is allowed to be passed in the Public
Cloud.
This reevaluation is needed because a change in user data
can mean that an information that was not defined during
installation of a service now has some value and is considered
a breach of privacy. In the fitness example above, the service
was used with no restriction before the sprained ankle and
after the information of the sprained ankle has to be passed
for adaptation. If the sprained ankle is defined as personal
information (see [21]) the reconfiguration requires the service
to be shifted to the Private Cloud.
D. Transparency
One feasible solution for compliance when transferring user
data to third parties is transparency. As a legal requirement, a
user has to be informed about user information that is passed
to third parties. This can be used to ’override’ the policies that
are evaluated automatically in the Privacy Module.
In Android the user is informed when installing a new
application about what sensitive information will be used by
the application (e.g. contact details or the whole address book)
and the user has to decide if the application is allowed to
access the data or not. Sometimes this decision results in not
being able to use the application at all. This consequence is
not the desired behaviour of services for AAL.
Fig. 2. AAL Privacy Policy and Privacy Module
Figure 2 shows the same scenario as Figure 1 except this
time there is a privacy policy violation. A Transparency Mod-
ule is triggered about the violation and the user is informed
about the personal information that will be passed to the
service. In this scenario the user complies with the data
transfer, the decision is saved in the Service Registry and the
New Service is installed and started in the Public Cloud. If
the user disagrees, the service cannot be started in the Public
Cloud.
The difficulty of transparency in our case is the way
in which the information is displayed to the user and the
motivation for a user to allow the transfer of data to a third
party: If information is to detailed for the user (especially
in the field of AAL) the user gets unsettled, confused or
annoyed. Especially when a service is expected to be adapted
continuously, the user is required to examine each changes
or tick the infamous ’Always’ box, that is also often used
in personal firewall installations when a service changes its
connections. The second question that comes in mind is: Why
would a user do it in the first place? What is the benefit for
the user for having the service running in the Public Cloud
(or by lack of concept ’somewhere else’)? The considerations
of the service provider (reduced costs or extending resources)
can’t be transferred to the user.
E. Anonymisation or Pseudonymisation
As noted by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party
[21] anonymisation and pseudonymisation can be used to
avoid storing or transferring personal data. But the require-
ments for both are very strict. Anonymous data is data that can
not be used to identify a natural person. But the definition of
anonymous data needs to be considered case-by-case, as even
anonymous data can be used to indirectly identify a person.
Pseudonymisation is often used in IT systems to provide
personalised services for a user. In Shibboleth the persistentID
is a pseudonym of a user. This pseudonym can be passed to
third parties to omit sending the real name of a natural person.
This pseudonymised ID can be used, e.g., to save a reading list
at a publisher for the user. The pseudonym is generated using a
encrypting algorithm and the relation between natural person
and pseudonym is only stored at the identity provider. This
concept could be considered for services that are exclusive to
a specific user, but do not need to be further adapted based on
additional personal information.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we presented the status of research for a
privacy preserving way of delivering service through a hybrid
cloud environment. The paper presented the challenges and
showed first directions for further research.
One big next step will be the development of a method for
categorising user data and defining privacy policies as a basis
for further research. This categorisation is then implemented in
the prototype to evaluate the made assumptions. Furthermore,
it has to be examined if pure configuration changes (e.g., user-
interface-colour set to blue) and the configuration data can be
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assumed as anonymous data and also lead to personalisation
in the sense of AAL. The question would then be: Can there
be personalisation without personal data?
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Abstract—In network simulations a correct representation
of the physical layer is essential in order to achieve reliable
results which are comparable to real hardware performance.
The network simulator ns-3 specifies two error rate models for
the calculation of the bit error rates and corresponding packet
error rates for orthogonal frequency division multiplexing, the
YANS [1] and NIST [2] error rate models. In [2] both models
are validated and the NIST model is recommended for the
calculations because of the overly optimistic results in the YANS
model. However, still some inaccuracies are present in both of
the models which shortly have been discussed in [3], where also
a new model has been briefly sketched. In this work, the new
model initially proposed in [3] is outlined in detail, including a
full discussion of the differences to the prior models in [1] and
[2]. Additionally, corrections for the inaccuracies in the YANS [1]
and the NIST [2] models are proposed. The upper bounds for the
packet success rate, calculated with the new model as well as with
the corrected versions of the YANS [1] and the NIST [2] models
are compared with an exact physical layer simulation using
Matlab and with measurements over an AWGN channel with
a typical IEEE 802.11 a/b/g/n wireless LAN module. Thereby
the new model leads to results that are consistent with exact
simulations of the IEEE 802.11a PHY and being comparable to
real hardware performance.
Showing the importance of a correct abstraction of the physical
layer, finally the influences on network simulation results of
the three models are evaluated in a ns-3 simulation covering a
hidden node scenario as an example of a typical WLAN network
problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) are used in many
application architectures such as Smart Home, Internet of
Things, Emergency Systems or Vehicular Networks. In order
to predict the behavior of such a communication network, the
network can be simulated by a network simulator because of
the high complexity and effort of real testbed measurements.
The network simulator ns-3 is a packet-based, discrete-event
network simulator with modules according to the WLAN stan-
dard IEEE 802.11 [4] and others [2]. As in most network sim-
ulators, the ns-3 physical layer implementation is abstracted.
A high simulation time due to a complex implementation of
the physical layer and memory expenses are the reasons. This
comes with the cost that the influence of alternative physical
layer techniques on the network performance is not observable.
The accuracy of the simulation results is dependent on the
reasonability of the abstraction. The ns-3 physical layer model
is based on the calculation of bit error rates (BER) taking
into account the forward error correction e.g. present in IEEE
802.11a. The model calculates the received signal–to–noise
ratio (SNR) based on parameters used in the simulation model
and calculates a packet error rate (PER) based on the mode of
operation (e.g. modulation, coding rate) to determine the prob-
ability of successfully receiving a frame (packet success rate
- PSR). Two error rate models are present in ns-3, the YANS
(Yet Another Network Simulator, [1]) and NIST (National
Institute of Standards and Technology, [2]) model. Assuming
an Additive White Gaussian Noise channel (AWGN), binary
convolutional coding and hard decision viterbi decoding, the
PER can be upper bounded by using the equations in section
II-B and II-C. Both models are validated and a new model
which clarifies some inaccuracies is presented. Finally the
calculated PSRs are validated by comparison with the results
of an exact simulation of the IEEE 802.11a physical layer in
Matlab and measurements of a typical WLAN module. Needed
changes to the simulator are proposed and the importance of
the physical layer abstraction is shown by applying all three
models within network simulation of a typical hidden node
scenario for a WLAN mesh network.
II. STATE OF THE ART – VALIDATION OF NS-3 ERROR
RATE MODELS
A. Abstraction of physical layer
The implementation of the ns-3 IEEE 802.11a physical
layer model follows the implementation described in [1] for
both, the YANS and the NIST error rate model. The physical
layer is abstracted by using a path-loss propagation model in
order to calculate the SNR at the receiver, followed by the
calculation of a raw BER covering the used modulation and
by deriving a resulting error probability (BER coded) based
on the decoding of the convolutional coded bits. Finally, the
PER can be derived, according to [1] by drawing a random
number from a uniform distribution within the interval [0, 1]
and comparing it to the PER. If the random number is larger
than the PER, then the packet is assumed to be successfully
received. Several path-loss models are available in ns-3, such
as the Log Distance Path-Loss Model or the COST-Hata
Model. An overview and evaluation of these path loss models
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is given in [5]. The two error rate models available in ns-3
which cover the calculation of the corresponding bit error and
packet error rates are discussed in the following sections.
B. YANS error rate model
According to the YANS model [1], the BER pBPSK for
BPSK (Binary Phase-Shift Keying) and pQAM for QAM
(Quadrature Amplitude Modulation) are calculated by equa-
tions (1) - (4). Thereby the bit error rate for the M-QAM-
system is calculated by transfering the M-QAM system to an
equivalent
√
M -PAM-system (Pulse Amplitude Modulation).
In this paper we have corrected equation (3) with respect to
what is presented in [1] by a factor 1/ log2(M) in the error
probability for a single symbol in order to correctly take into
account the number of bits per QAM symbol. The calculation
according to equation (3) stands also in conjunction to the
implementation in ns-3. P√M is the probability of error of a√
M - ary PAM system with half of the average power in each
quadrature signal of the equivalent QAM system. [6]
X = erfc
(√
1.5
M − 1 log2(M)
Eb
N0
)
(1)
P√M =
(
1− 1√
M
)
X (2)
pQAM =
1− (1− P√M )2
log2(M)
(3)
pBPSK =
1
2
erfc
(√
Eb
N0
)
(4)
The calculation of the SNR per bit in YANS is shown in
equation (5). EbN0 is calculated by the fraction of the noise
bandwidth Bt over the raw bitrate Rb times the Signal-to-
noise-plus-interference-ratio (SNIR).
Eb
N0
= SNIR
Bt
Rb
(5)
The performance achieved by the Viterbi decoding algorithm
in the receiver can be estimated by calculating the first-event-
error probability. Thereby the pairwise error probability Pu2 (d)
of incorrectly selecting a path within the trellis when the
Hamming distance d is even or odd is shown in equation (6).
p is the bit error probability pBPSK for BPSK or pQAM if
QAM is used. [6]
Pu2 (d) =

d∑
i= d+12
(
d
i
)
pi(1− p)d−i (d odd)
d∑
i= d2+1
(
d
i
)
pi(1− p)d−i
+ 12
(
d
d
2
)
p
d
2 (1− p) d2 (d even)

(6)
There is no simple exact expression for the first-event error
probability Pe, but the error probability can be overbounded
by the sum of the pairwise error probabilities Pu2 (d) over
all possible paths that merge with the all-zero path at the
given node within the trellis diagram [6]. With this calculation
scheme the so called union bound can be obtained [6] which
is used in YANS [1]. The coefficients αd represent the number
of paths corresponding to the set of distances d.
Pe <
∞∑
d=dfree
αdP
u
2 (d) (7)
The union bound (Eq. (7)) is calculated in the YANS model for
the sum of αdPu2 (d) with d = dfree (i.e. K=1) for BPSK and
[d = dfree, dfree + 1] (i.e. K=2) for QAM (K is the number
of coefficients αd used for the calculation of the error bound).
Finally, the packet success rate (PSR) is calculated by using
equation (8) with the number of raw bits L.
PSR ≤ (1− Pe)L (8)
C. NIST error rate model
For the calculation of the BER in the ns-3 NIST model [2]
the equations (10) - (13) are used. These equations represent
an approximation of equations (1) - (3) with inserted values
of the number of constellation points M. Equation (10) is
corresponding to equation (4) of the YANS model. The SNIR
in equation (9) represents the SNR per symbol and doesn’t
account for the ratio of used subcarriers in the OFDM system
as used in the YANS model.
Eb
N0
=
SNIR
log2(M)
(9)
pBPSK =
1
2
erfc
(√
SNIR
)
(10)
pQPSK =
1
2
erfc
(√
SNIR
2
)
(11)
p16-QAM =
3
4 · 2erfc
(√
SNIR
5 · 2
)
(12)
p64-QAM =
7
8 · 3erfc
(√
SNIR
21 · 2
)
(13)
In the ns-3 NIST model, equations (14) and (15) are used for
the calculation of an upper bound (also called Chernoff Bound)
P cb on the probability of a bit error instead of the the first-
event error probability Pe in YANS. Using the upper bound in
equation (14) instead of the expressions in equation (6) yields
to a looser upper bound on the probability of a bit error P cb . In
this approach it is assumed, that the probability of a bit error
can be determined by using the number of nonzero information
bits that are in error when an incorrect path is selected in
the trellis as compared to the the all-zero path. Thereby the
multiplication factors βd correspond to the number of nonzero
information bits that are in error when an incorrect path is
selected for the specified hamming distance d. p is the bit
error probability for the different modulations. In this way the
Chernoff bound can be obtained.1 [6]
P c2 (d) < [4p(1− p)]d/2 (14)
1b = (1, 2, 3) for code rates (1/2, 2/3, 3/4). The additional factor of 1/2
which is presented in [2] but not in [7] is not further used.
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P cb <
1
2b
∞∑
d=dfree
βdP
c
2 (d) (15)
The packet success rate (PSR) is calculated as shown in the
YANS model by using equation (16) with the number of raw
bits L.
PSR ≤ (1− P cb )L (16)
The difference between the two models lies in the fact, that
YANS is using the union bound with K=1 for BPSK and K=2
for QAM and NIST is using the Chernoff bound with K=10.
Beside that, the SNIR is calculated in a different manner which
leads to an additional shift of the resulting PSR. The SNIR
in equation (9) represents the SNR per symbol and doesn’t
account for the ratio of used subcarriers in the OFDM system
as used in the YANS model in equation (5) by the fraction of
the noise bandwidth Bt over the raw bitrate Rb.
III. NEW NS-3 ERROR RATE MODEL
A. New model for abstraction of the physical layer
So far the YANS model which is using the union bound
(Eq. (6) and (7)) and the NIST model which is using the
Chernoff bound (Eq. (14) and (15)), detailed in sections
II-B and II-C, are using an inaccurate calculation of the
corresponding SNR and a wrong calculation of the PSR
by an inadequate number of bits L (Eq. (8) and (16)). The
new model detailed in the following section is using the
upper bound (Eq. (21)), a correct representation of the SNR
(Eq. (20)) and a correct number of data bits for the calculation
of the PSR equivalently to equation (16).
The relation between the available energy per bit Eb
and the transmitted energy per OFDM symbol EOFDM is
described in [8]. This is the energy distributed along the
whole symbol, including signaling overheads (see Eq. (17)).
Eb = EOFDM
(
NFFT
NFFT+NCP
)(
Ndata
Ndata+Npilot
)
·
(
1
NdataNBPSCSR
) (17)
NFFT is the FFT length2. NCP is the length of the cycling
prefix (CP). Ndata is the number of data subcarriers and Npilot
the number of pilot subcarriers respectively. NBPSCS is the
number of coded bits per symbol in each OFDM subcarrier
and R the code rate of the Forward Error Correction (FEC).
Based on the relation in equation (17) the SNR (Signal-to-
Noise Ratio) and EbN0 (SNR per bit or the ratio of energy per bit
to the one-side noise spectral density N0) can be determined.
The SNR is defined as the ratio of signal power to noise power.
The signal power is the energy (variance) per time sample. [8]
Psignal =
EOFDM
NFFT+NCP
(18)
N0 is the noise power. Therefore using (17) and (18) the SNR
can be calculated as:
SNR =
Eb
N0
(
Ndata+Npilot
NFFT
)
(NBPSCSR) (19)
2For an IEEE 802.11a OFDM system NFFT = 64 (FFT - Fast Fourier
Transform), NCP = 16 with a guard interval of 0.8µs, Ndata = 48,
Npilot = 4, NBPSCS = 6 for QAM64, R=1/2, 2/3, 3/4.
The representation in YANS, equation (5) doesn’t take into
account the energy per bit to noise power spectral density ratio
Eb
N0
correctly which is used for the BER calculations. EbN0 is
calculated in equation (5) by the raw bit rate Rb (calculated by
the number of bits per OFDM symbol) over the symbol interval
time. This formulation doesn’t take into account the reduction
of energy due to the cycling prefix (1st term in Eq. (17)) and
the reduction of the net energy due to the pilot carriers which
do not transport information (2nd term in Eq. (17)) [8]. On the
other hand equation (9) of the NIST model doesn’t account for
the ratio of used subcarriers in the OFDM system and CP at
all. Equations (1) - (4) can be used in order to calculate the
bit error probability pBPSK for BPSK and pQAM for QAM,
where, however, in order to correctly calculate the raw bit
error probability, the raw EbN0 (Eq. (20)) has to be used.
3(
Eb
N0
)
raw
= SNR
(
NFFT
Ndata+Npilot
)(
1
NBPSCS
)
(20)
The performance achieved by the Viterbi decoding algorithm
in the receiver then can be estimated by calculating the upper
bound Pub on the bit error probability. The probability of
incorrectly selecting a path when the Hamming distance d is
even or odd is shown in YANS equation (6). As discussed
above the error probability can be overbounded by the sum
of the pairwise error probabilities Pu2 (d) over all possible
paths that merge with the all-zero path at the given node. The
multiplication factors αd used for the calculation of the union
bound in YANS correspond to the number of pahts of the
set of distances d. Instead the multiplication factors βd which
corresponds to the number of nonzero information bits that are
in error when an incorrect path is selected for the specified
hamming distance d have to be used to obtain the so called
upper bound on the probability of a bit error. The coefficients
and dfree for punctured Codes can be taken from [9]. We thus
obtain the upper bound for the error probability according to
equation (21). [7]
Pub <
1
b
∞∑
d=dfree
βdP
u
2 (d) (21)
The packet success rate (PSR) is then calculated using
equation (16) where the number of data bits L has to be used
instead of the number of raw bits4.
B. Validation of the error rate models
The upper bounds are validated using a Matlab implemen-
tation of the equations shown in sections II-B, II-C and III-A
and an exact physical layer simulation of an IEEE 802.11a
OFDM transceiver system (Figure 2). Figure 1 shows the
results of the ns-3 implementations for the YANS and NIST
model and the calculation of the union bound, upper bound
and Chernoff bound for K=1 and K=10 in Matlab compared
to the new model for BPSK (R = 1/2). The SNR in the Matlab
implementation is calculated by using equation (20). The bit
error probability pBPSK is calculated as in the YANS and
NIST models shown in equations (4) and (10). The union
3It has to be noted that interference is assumed to be zero and SNR is used
in the calculations instead of SNIR.
4raw bits = data bits / code rate.
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bound is calculated by equations (6) and (7), the upper bound is
calculated by equations (6) and (21) and the Chernoff bound is
calculated by equations (14) and (21) respectively. The packet
success rate (PSR) for the union, upper and Chernoff bound
is then calculated by using equation (16) with the number of
data bits L = 8000 bits while YANS and NIST are calculated
with the number of raw bits.
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Fig. 1. Comparison of ns-3 and Matlab implementation.
As expected, the Matlab implementation of the upper
bound with K=10 (red solid line) corresponds to the ns-3
implementation of the new error rate model (black dash-dot
line). The upper and Chernoff bound vary less than 1dB for
BPSK (R=1/2). The ns-3 YANS model is using the union
bound with K=1 and the NIST model is using the Chernoff
bound with K=10. Because of the inaccurate SNR calculation
and the wrong number of bits for the calculation of the PSR
(raw bits instead of data bits which are double the size for
R=1/2) the YANS model is overly optimistic (about 2dB)
whereas the NIST model is pessimistic (about 2dB) when
compared to the Matlab implementations using the respective
bounds used in the YANS and NIST implementations. The
results outlined above indicate the following changes to the
ns-3 implementation of the YANS and the NIST model:
First the number of raw bits used in equation (16) must be
multiplied by the code rate R. Second the calculation of the
SNR must be changed to the representation in equation (20).
Third it is recommended to use the upper bound for the
calculation instead of the Chernoff or the union bound.
The exact simulation of the physical layer for an OFDM
link according to IEEE 802.11a includes the convolutional
coding, interleaver, modulation and cycling prefix at the
transmitter and an ideal channel estimation, demodulation,
deinterleaver and hard decision Viterbi decoder at the receiver
(Fig. 2). The traceback length of the Viterbi decoder is 35 in
all simulations which is 5 times the constraint length of the
convolutional code with the generator polynomial [133,171].
The SNR in the simulation is calculated using equation (19).
Figure 3 shows the result of the exact physical layer simu-
lation in Matlab. The simulation has been carried out using
107 symbols. The result asymptotically approaches the upper
bound with K=10 and confirms the calculation of the new
model. Finally, the implementation of the new error rate model
in ns-3, proposed in this paper and based on the calculation of
the upper bound with K=10, showed a computational overhead
of about 14% compared to the NIST implementation. The ns-3
simulations have been carried out by sending 81000 packets.
OFDM
OFDM
Source
Convolutional
Encoder
Inter-
leaver
Modulation
(QAM, BPSK)
S
P
... 64 slots
... IFFT
...
Cycling
Prefix
...
P
S
Sink Viterbi Decoder
Deinter-
leaver
Demodulation
(QAM, BPSK)
S
P
...
Ideal Channel
Estimation
... FFT
...
Remove
Cyc. Pref.
...
P
S
C
h
a
n
n
el
N
o
ise
B
E
R
C
O
D
E
D
P
S
R
ID
E
A
L
B
E
R
R
A
W
F
ig
u
re
3
:
M
a
tla
b
W
iF
i-S
im
u
la
to
r
Fig. 2. Exact physical layer simulation in Matlab of an IEEE 802.11a OFDM
communication link.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of the BPSK PSR from Upper Bounds and exact Matlab
simulation of the physical layer for an IEEE 802.11a communication system.
IV. WIRELESS TESTBED MEASUREMENTS
A. Estimation of hardware parameters
The PSR of a typical WLAN module over an AWGN chan-
nel is measured with a transmitter and receiver module using
a wired connection with a variable attenuator. The WLAN
receiver module is placed in a shielded box. The schematic
of the receiver is shown in Figure 4. The module consists
of an external Front-End-Module (FEM) [10] including a low
noise amplifier (LNA) and a switch. The noise figure (NF) and
gain of the LNA are shown in Table I. Measurements of an
evaluation board of the FEM confirmed the values shown in
Table I.
TABLE I. NOISE FIGURE AND GAIN
Hardware Parameters
NF LNA1 NF1 = 2.8 dB
Gain LNA1 G1dB = 12.0 dB
NF LNA2 NF2 = 5.8 dB
Noise Figure NF = 3.185 dB
In order to compare the measured PSR to the simulation
results, the SNR at the A/D converter in the WLAN receiver
has to be estimated. One possibility is to use the Received
Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) provided by the WLAN chip
(Fig. 4). According to [4], the RSSI is an optional parameter
that has a value of 0 through RSSI Max. This parameter is
a measure provided by the PHY sublayer and indicating the
energy observed at the antenna used to receive the current
Physical Protocol Data Unit (PPDU). An absolute accuracy of
the RSSI values reported by the modules is not specified [4].
[11] shows a practical conversion from RSSI to dBm values.
The mean RSSI from different vendors have been compared
in [12] revealing significant differences between individual
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vendors. The RSSI reported is also dependent on design
choices made by the manufacturer. For more advanced chipsets
using IEEE 802.11n multiple-input multiple-output techniques
this becomes even more challenging and the calculation of
the RSSI is not published by the vendors. Because of these
inaccuracies the measurement of the RSSI is not practicable
to evaluate the PSR. Another approach is the measurement of
the signal power at the receiver input and calculation of the
SNR at the ADC by subtracting the calculated noise figure of
the LNAs. For this purpose, an exact knowledge of the RF
front-end design is required.
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Mixer
Baseband
Pogrammable
Gain Filter
Rx out I
Rx out Q
Switch
State Machine/Scrambler
Descrambler
Decoder
De-Interleaver
Stream Deparser
De-Interleaver
MIMO ML Equalizer/Spatial Combiner
FFT FFT
FIR FIR
ADC ADC
To PCUdata control
Receive Chain
BalunLNA1 LNA2
Fig. 4. WLAN receiver block.
The SNR at the A/D converter in the WLAN chip (Fig. 4)
can be calculated by subtracting the thermal noise floor N1 and
the noise figure NF of all components in the signal chain from
the measured received power Prec at the antenna connector (Eq.
(22)) (assuming quantization noise is neglectable).
SNR [dB] = Prec [dBm]−N1 [dBm]−NF (22)
With the Noise Floor N1
N1 = 10 log
(
kTB
1mW
)
(23)
and the over all Noise Figure NF.
NF = 10 log(F ) (24)
F = F1 +
F2 − 1
G1
(25)
k is the Boltzman constant, T the temperature and B the
noise Bandwith. F
1
and G
1
are the noise factor and gain
of the external FEM (LNA1 Tab. I). F
2
is the noise factor
of the internal LNA (LNA2 Tab. I). The packet size in the
measurements and calculation of the PSRs is 1000 bytes.
B. AWGN channel measurements
Figure 5 shows the result of the measurement over an
AWGN channel compared to the upper bound and Chernoff
bound for K=1 and K=10 as well as the ns-3 implementation
of the model proposed in this paper. The results show a
good correspondence of the measurement results with the
upper and Chernoff bound for K=10 as well as with the ns-3
implementation of the new model. With the changes described
in the previous sections and including the noise figure of the
WLAN hardware module in the network simulation, the YANS
and NIST model – then using a correct SNR calculation and
correct number of bits in ns-3 – could be used as well to
estimate the performance of the physical layer of a typical
WLAN module. In this case YANS would correspond to the
union bound with K=1 and NIST would correspond to the
Chernoff bound with K=10. With the hint that as seen in
Figure 1 the YANS model changed would still show too
optimistic results of about 1dB and the NIST model would
show pessimistic results by less than 1dB compared to the
new model.
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Fig. 5. Result of the ns-3 implementation of the new model when compared
to the Upper Bounds and PSR of BPSK for R=1/2 over an AWGN channel.
The flattening of the measured AWGN graph might be
due to inaccuracies in the measurement setup, where only the
WLAN receiver module is placed in a shielded box. Part of
the signal from the transmitting module might be propagating
over the air and feeding back on the screen of the cable, finally
entering at low amplitude the screened box where the receiver
is placed. This results in a slightly frequency selective fading
characteristic. To prevent this the transmitting module needs to
be placed in a shielded box as well and cable lengths should
be as small as possible. Therefore essential for the validation
is the region of low packet success rates.
V. NETWORK SIMULATION RESULTS IN NS-3
The evaluation is carried out with four communication
links, involving five nodes which are placed in a rectangular
grid. Figure 6 shows the topology in ns-3 (version ns3-22)
where distances are in meter. Each node is initialized as a
Mesh Station (MSTA) based on the IEEE 802.11s standard [4]
and is part of a mesh network. Each MSTA which is in range
of another MSTA establishes a peer link in between them and
allows the routing of data throughout the stations. In Fig. 6 the
communication links from Node1 to Node3 (Connection 1)
and Node3 to Node1 (Connection 2) are relayed by Node2
because no direct link is possible. A relaying over Node4 is
also possible which is decided by the routing process. Node4
and Node5 are connected by a direct link (Connection 3 and
Connection 4). Also some of the nodes are hidden to others.
Each communication link has a duration of 100 sec and each
connection is modeled as UDP data stream with 500 kbps.
Connection 1 starts at a simulation time of 2 sec, Con. 2 at
2.1 sec, Con. 3 at 10.2 sec and Con. 4 at 10.3 sec. With the
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packet payload of 922 bytes, IP and UDP headers the packet
becomes 1000 bytes in total. For the calculation of the received
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Fig. 6. Topology of the Simulation in ns-3 with 5 nodes and 4 connections.
signal power at the individual nodes, the Log Distance Path-
loss model is used with an exponent of 2.7 and the Reference
Loss calculated at a center frequency of 5.6 GHz. The transmit
power is chosen 0 dBm and the noise figure is 3.185 dB.
Tab. II shows the resulting SNR values and PSRs of the
three models based on the simulation parameters for different
transmission distances dt for BPSK coderate 1/2.
TABLE II. RESULTS OF THE PSR FOR DIFFERENT DISTANCES dt
Distance dt 48 m 55 m 57 m 65 m
SNR 4.973 dB 3.377 dB 2.9583 dB 1.4182 dB
YANS PSR 1.0 1.0 0.9999 0.9795
NIST PSR 0.9972 0.3502 0.0157 0
New Model PSR 1.0 0.9947 0.9761 0.0277
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Fig. 7. Mean packetsuccess in % depending on the configuration.
Figure 7 shows the mean packetsuccess of each individual
connection of the three models (YANS, NIST and the New
Model) with 1000 simulation runs. The different error rate
models yield to different PSR’s for a given SNR, resulting
in different transmission ranges as seen in Tab. II and the
specified model is highly sensitive to this fact. The YANS
model has a packetsuccess of almost 100% for all connections.
With the NIST model almost no transmission is possible with
Connection 1 and 2 and the New Model has a packetsuccess
of about 82% for Connection 1,2 and 98% for Con. 3,4.
VI. CONCLUSION
The simulation results of the new ns-3 error rate model in
sec. III show a good correspondence with the measurement
results of a typical WLAN module (sec. IV-B) as well as
with an exact physical layer simulation in Matlab of an IEEE
802.11a OFDM communication link (sec. III-B). Key elements
of the new model are the usage of the upper bound (Eq.
(21)) with K ≥ 10, correctly taking into account the SNR
at the receiver input (Eq. (20)) and correctly taking into
account the number of data bits used for the calculation of
the PSR in equation (16). Because of the inaccurate SNR
and PSR calculations in YANS and NIST the YANS model
is overly optimistic (about 2dB) whereas the NIST model is
too pessimistic (about 2dB) when compared to the new error
rate model. The calculation of the SNR should be changed in
both, the ns-3 NIST and YANS error rate models in order to
correctly take into account the error rate in the OFDM system.
The number of data bits used in the calculation of the packet
success rate should be changed as well in order to take the
convolutional coding into account correctly. With the proposed
changes both models could be used, resulting in more reliable
performance estimations of the PSR. The Chernoff bound
shows a deviation of less than 1dB when compared to the
upper bound and can be used in time consuming simulations.
In order to get reliable results in the ns-3 simulations, it is
crucial to take into account the noise figure of the RF-Front-
End. Finally it has been shown, that the network simulation
results are highly sensitive to the specified error rate model
which shows that an abstraction of the physical layer avoiding
any unnecessary inaccuracies is key for reliable simulation
results on network level.
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Abstract—Cloud Computing is an increasingly popular
paradigm that allows instant access to virtually unlimited re-
sources via the Internet. Despite all research efforts during
the past years, the security state, however, remains uncertain
and source of mistrust and problems. These problems amplify
with the advent of more pervasive technology like Mobile Cloud
Computing, where more and more end users begin utilising these
services – often ineptly or even unknowingly with unintended
consequences to their privacy. The purpose of this paper is
to briefly outline the general problematic in Cloud Computing
privacy, present various existing solutions to preserve privacy
in such an environment and describe a feature set that an end
user facing tool would need to provide in order to efficiently and
effectively allow control over sensitive data.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud Computing is a paradigm that allows instant on-
demand access to virtually unlimited resources of the Cloud
Service Provider (CSP) over the internet. Having access to this
vast computing power while only renting, but not buying the
necessary hardware grants the flexibility to up- and downscale
at will and has lead to a wide adoption of this concept.
Despite that widespread usage, security issues are far from
being solved, both psychologically as well as technologically
[1]. Most common source of security considerations is the
shared nature in public clouds, where potentially sensitive data
is stored and processed not only not exclusively, but right next
to virtual machines of competitors [2]. It all boils down to the
fact that, once data leaves corporate boundaries, it also escapes
the company’s control.
It only seems consequent, that fear of data loss or data
breaches still remain among the most often mentioned fears
[3] and prevent the Cloud Computing paradigm from fulfilling
its potential [4]. While the technological fundamentals are well
understood, the security state still remains “puzzling” [5].
The aforementioned problems get worse when end users are
exposed to cloud services, which is increasingly happening in
today’s world driven by more and more pervasive technology
[6].
Parallel to the rise of Cloud Computing, smart devices
have become increasingly popular, forming the field of Mobile
Cloud Computing, which can be defined as “an integration of
cloud computing technology with mobile devices to make the
mobile devices resource-full in terms of computational power,
memory, storage, energy, and context awareness” [7].
While it only seems logical to combine resource-limited
smart devices with infinite computing power from the cloud,
it also makes cloud services almost omnipresent, integrated
into daily lives and easier to access and harder to identify as
such. This isn’t necessarily bad, but it also makes inadvertent
exposure of personal sensitive data a more imminent problem.
Not only are personal users often less educated with regards to
technology than company professionals, but also simply less
aware or less caring about the risks involved. Finding ways
to adequately protect users’ data and privacy is thus more
required than ever. It’s easier than ever to unintentionally share
sensitive information, which now not only contain some secret
company numbers, but potentially health-related information
about the user itself.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II
attempts to find a definition of the concept “privacy” and
describes end-users’ attitude as well as threats towards it. In
section III, we will briefly show, why cryptography can only be
(an important) part of the solution but by itself is not enough
to protect sensitive data in cloud environments. Consequently,
section IV will present and analyse existing privacy-protecting
approaches to devise requirements imposed on such solutions.
Section V will draw a conclusion and summarise the findings.
II. END-USERS AND THEIR PRIVACY
Similarly to the corporate environment, end-users are afraid
of potential misuse of their information and worried about
who has access, while still using the services anyway [8], [9].
In contrast to companies, they’re often not as well educated
in regards of computer security and thus unable to react
appropriately or sometimes even unaware of their utilisation
of cloud services when tightly integrated into other systems
[7].
Moreover, users traditionally show risky online behaviour
and are unwilling or unable to change their behaviour [9],
[10].
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A. Definition of Privacy
Many authors have tried to come up with a holistic definition
of the concept of privacy and came to the conclusion that it’s
far from an easy task. As an interdisciplinary subject, authors
often tend to focus a definition on their area of research while
neglecting the others [11], [12], [2], [13]. Furthermore, [14]
emphasised, that any definition can only be valid for a group
of people, but not generally applicable as the understanding of
the term varies too much depending on cultural background,
personal history and other factors.
Like many authors before and backed by the survey con-
ducted in [14], for the rest of this paper, we will fall back
to a definition that puts data into focus: Privacy in our
understanding is the right to know where and why personally
identifiable information are collected and in particular the
ability to remain in control over this data (i.e. allow and
disallow access).
To demonstrate the weakness of this definition, consider
the following example by [15] (based on [16]): Plenty of
CCTV cameras are installed in a place. Is the privacy of
people passing this place invaded? What, if these cameras are
installed, but never turned on? Is the privacy still invaded?
In the second scenario, no data has been collected, so by
the above introduced definition, no invasion has taken place.
However, people are likely to have behaved differently due
to the anticipation of being observed, so obviously something
must have happened.
B. Threats to Privacy
Two potential issues with outsourced data have been pointed
out by [2]. The CSP could use entrusted data and reuse them
(against the user’s knowing and will) to generate profit. The
concept of “data for service” is known and agreed in many
areas (e.g. targeted advertising), but the potential of secondary
usage, like selling to third parties, remains.
Another point made by [2] is the problematic arising from
data storage in different locations and jurisdictions. Large
CSPs usually have data centres across the globe and might
store user data in countries with weaker privacy protection
laws than the user’s home country. Regulations like the Safe
Harbour Agreement between the EU and the US were meant
to ease these tensions, but have failed to solve all problems
[17].
Obviously, in shared infrastructures, it always remains pos-
sible that other users are able to gain access to sensitive data,
e.g. by abusing security vulnerabilities. This, however, is not
strictly speaking a privacy problem, but goes back to computer
security in general and is thus not discussed in detail.
With the increased amount of data collected (Social Net-
works, Smart Devices, Online Tracking) and more sophisti-
cated data analysis techniques, it becomes possible to combine
small and seemingly anonymous and innocent pieces of data
and generate user profiles [18].
One last threat to a user’s privacy is the user himself:
Despite all efforts and supportive tools, the user is still able
to make stupid decisions.
III. WHY CRYPTOGRAPHY IS NOT ENOUGH
Naturally, when trying to protect sensitive data in potentially
hostile environments, cryptography plays an important role.
Various laws and regulations require the CSP to encrypt
sensitive or personally identifiable information before storing
them, which protects the CSP from law enforcement, but not
user data from the CSP [19].
The concept of Cloud Computing, is far too flexible to have
all eventualities covered by a single tool. Simply encrypting
data might be sufficient for rudimentary scenarios where a
single client stores files on cloud services, such as Dropbox1.
Assuming no technical flaw in the encryption software, this
prevents the Cloud Service Provider from snooping through
the user’s data. The limitations of this solution become ap-
parent when considering data sharing with other users ([20])
or the desire to not only store data remotely, but also use the
available computing power.
Considering the latter point, homomorphic encryption as
first suggested by [21] has long been seen as the “holy grail”
[22] and solution to most of the problems. Fully homomorphic
encryption, such as designed by [23], allows arbitrary compu-
tation over encrypted data. A remote system would thus not
need to decrypt data to be able to answer user queries. While
this solves a few problems, [22] point out that it is still not
enough, as it by itself only satisfies the “Private, single-client”
use-case. The problem of easily sharing subsets data with a
changing group of people is not solved by this.
IV. EXISTING APPROACHES FOR PRIVACY PROTECTION
AND REQUIREMENT ANALYSIS
In this section, we define three phases of a life cycle,
sensitive data passes and introduce existing solutions to protect
data during each phase. Based on these approaches, a list of
requirements for privacy-protecting tools will be compiled.
A. Generation of data and publication
The best and technically easiest way to protect data from
being misused it to put as little as possible out there [24].
While this statement is generally true, it suffers from similar
drawbacks as mindless encryption, i.e. making sharing of
data impossible. Moreover, it is often not the user’s concious
decision to share data, e.g. when referring to CCTV cameras
or tracking of online behaviour. In those scenarios, data is
automatically being collected and the user would have to
actively prevent that. To do so, however, he first needs to be
aware and bothered2 by this.
Furthermore, collecting users’ data is not always necessarily
a bad thing: Personalised systems who “know” the user, his
preferences and current situation often come up with better
results. Searches for “restaurants near me” would not be
possible without the service knowing where the user currently
is.
It is thus not about simply blocking all data from being
transferred to the provider. Instead, it is about selectively
1https://www.dropbox.com
2“I have nothing to hide”
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reducing the amount of information shared and only expose
them in return for an actual benefit.
When the user finally decides to share data, it still can be
protected to some extent [25], [26], [24]. Sticking with the
above example, reducing the accuracy of is location would
be one option. An alternative would be transmitting various
different values and receive results for multiple completely
different locations. The added benefit of keeping his exact
location secret, in return, leads to less optimal results. Further-
more, [27] have pointed out that this additional noise generated
also results in additional overhead and thus finally in additional
costs.
In corporate areas, inadvertent leakage of sensitive has
been in the focus of research for a while and resulted in
systems like Data Leak Detection as a Service by [28].
This detection, unfortunately, is not so simple to automate
in personal environments, as [29] have shown at the example
of smart phones: A user’s perception of what’s too sensitive
to share and what not remains too volatile to be reflected
by a strict set of rules or a set of fingerprints of sensitive
data. It is thus difficult to distinguish between the inadvertent
transmission of sensitive data and the deliberate decision to
do so.
Nonetheless, [13] and [30] have proposed similar models
to regulate data flow, similar to the above mentioned “Data
leak detection”, albeit being either very generic or focusing
on specific problems. Special Privacy Enforcement Points are
introduced in various locations, such as a home user’s network
gateway to monitor passing data. According to various rules
and depending on the destination, the information flow can
be blocked to ensure privacy. In both cases, however, the
problem described by [29] remains: While certain rules may
be consistent over time, others could be too volatile for such
a system.
B. Access control and monitoring
Once the data is shared with a third party, it is important the
data owner remains able to define and enforce access rights. In
the most extreme scenario, this would allow him to exclude
the service provider itself from being allowed to access the
stored information.
As stated in the definition, privacy is perceived very dif-
ferently depending on various factors, including time. Conse-
quently, changing access rights must be possible at any time.
One way to cryptographically enforce access control is
Attribute Based Encryption, which finds application in log
encryption [20] or in various schemes to protect personal
health records (PHR) [31], [32]. Using such systems allows
to issue different keys to different persons who would then be
able to only decrypt certain fields of a log file or a PHR. The
solution of [31] also defined “break-glass” attribute to make
PHRs available to emergency services when required. In such
scenarios, most users are accepting a loss of privacy in order
to maintain their physical health [13]
Another aspect of Access Control has been shown by [1]:
Apart from restricting access, it is also important to monitor
who (if multiple people/institutions are allowed) accesses the
information when and why. The goal of this is to create
transparency and allow the user to trace their data and thus
ultimately generate trust in the system.
C. Deletion
At some point, a user might want to remove his data for one
of many conceivable reasons, e.g. a change of CSP, no further
need for the data or simply an uneasy feeling with certain data
store online.
If the data was cryptographically secured and the key
available to only one person (cf. the Dropbox example above),
data deletion is of no concern for the user as it’s not accessible
for other entities anyway.
However, it has been shown, that this is not always the
case as cryptography does not provide a holistic solution to
the problems presented. It is thus to be assumed, that parts
of the data remain either in plain text or decryptable by other
persons. In a world of globally-distributed data centres, copies
and backups of the data are equally scattered around the
globe ([2]), which makes it difficult to track down every copy.
Considerable amount of research has dealt with verifying the
existence/availability of data, but a lot less effort has been put
into veritably deleting information [33].
D. Requirements summary
Any solution that aims to protect user privacy has to fulfill
various requirements and goals in order to be accepted, useful
and efficient.
• Configurability
Privacy is a very personal concept and consequently
interpreted differently by everyone. The user must be able
to modify the system to reflect his attitudes rather than
being dictated what’s best for him [34], [24], [32].
• Simplicity
Studies have shown that the average user is not willing
to invest much time; even for his own privacy [9].
A too hard to understand tool would most likely be
rejected by the intended audience. In order to remain
simplicity, it has been suggested to add no more than
three options for any given category as is too difficult
to sensibly distinguish between more choices [35]. Such
options could be from “trusted/semi-trusted/untrusted” or
“primary practitioner/other practitioners/other” [36].
• Reducing data exposure
Whenever possible, the user should be encouraged and
supported to not share information, unless absolutely
required as this remains the safest form of misuse pre-
vention [34], [13], [30]
• User feedback and education
The user needs to be informed about why his data is
requested, what it is going to be used for and how it’s
about to be processed in order to come to a sensible
decision.
• Dynamic Access Control
It has been shown, that the set of people allowed to
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access certain data is changing and potentially frequently
changing. “Break glass”-functionality as shown by [31]
can proof life saving in emergencies.
• Transparency
A lack of transparency creates fear and thus discourages
from usage [13]. This not only means that the tools should
aim for making existing processes more transparent and
comprehensible ([1]), but also that they themselves must
be doing so transparently.
• Secure infrastructure
Obviously, the solution itself and potentially required
infrastructure should implement known best practices in
order to not itself become an additional threat to the user’s
privacy [1].
V. CONCLUSION
One of the biggest problems when dealing with end-user
privacy is the unclear definition of it due to its flexibility,
interdependence on many other aspects, varying perception
over time and interdisciplinary nature. The common view on
privacy as sum of and control over personally identifiable
information scores with its simplicity but can be shown to
be too simple and not fully covering all aspects easily. In
this paper, we have split a data life cycle into three distinct
phases, analysed existing solutions to protect data during each
of these phases and shown that a combination of protective
measures is required to cover the whole cycle. Based on the
characteristics of these approaches, we have compiled a list
of requirements that any future tool would need to fulfill in
order to be usable and efficient aid in the hand of end-users
to enable them to protect their own privacy according to their
very own definition of the term.
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Abstract—Using Cloud offerings for resource intense High
Performance Computing (HPC) seems like a self-evident step,
as they offer on-demand access to virtually infinite resources.
This should seem especially attractive for small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), usually not operating own data centers,
avoiding the high investment costs that go with them.
There are several reasons behind the fact that HPC in
the Cloud is not that widespread used as one would expect.
Lack of trust and fear of competitors easily gaining access
to confidential data, as well as more technical reasons, like
performance degradation due to widespread use of virtualization
or complicating existing workflows, among them.
This paper presents a taxonomy for HPC-aware Clouds, in
how far they distinguish from current offerings and how much
effort it will take to raise HPC-awareness of a current cloud.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the adoption of Cloud Computing has be-
come increasingly popular for workloads of all kinds. As this
paradigm offers convenient on-demand access to configurable
resources, including services, storage and systems, it became
the delivery model of choice for all sorts of use-cases.
The promise of elasticity, access to virtually infinite re-
sources, combined with a pay-as-you-go model seems like a
perfect match for resource-intense computing needs. But High
Performance Computing (HPC) in cloud, often labeled High
Performance Computing as a Service (HPCaaS), is not that
widespread used as one would expect and is only a small
fraction of the business which arose around Cloud Computing.
A. HPC in Clouds
Applications in the domain of HPC have massive require-
ments when it comes to resources like CPU, memory, I/O
throughput and interconnects. This is the reason why they are
traditionally run in a bare-metal setup, directly on physical
systems, which are interconnected to so-called clusters. The
operating system of choice is in general Linux.
Large enterprises and scientific institutions utilize their own
clusters and have HPC-specialized operators. As these clusters
are usually optimized for a specific workload, the primary
reason for considering a cloud-based HPC setup is usually
cost-driven, especially when additional resources are only
needed for a short amount of time. As their HPC data centres
are frequently not yet operated as a Private Cloud, such
cloudbursts still require certain work in advance and are thus
seldom used. Furthermore, their systems often offer potential
for optimization of existing resources, for example turning
them into private clouds.
But especially for small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs), for example in the field of computer aided engi-
neering (CAE), the use of cloud resources for HPC seems
attractive, as it avoids the significant investment costs that
come with local clusters, their infrastructural needs (cooling,
high-speed interconnects) and costs of operation. As they are
usually short on HPC-trained IT-staff, moving from worksta-
tions to the Cloud for shorter turnaround times of compute
jobs and thus increased productivity would seem natural, even
though the aspect of workflow integration still would need to
be solved.
B. Reasons for Limited Acceptance of HPC in Clouds
Even though projects like The UberCloud Experiment
[UberCloud, 2015], trying to bring together cloud providers,
HPC experts, independent software vendors (ISVs) and HPC
users, took place over the last years, HPCaaS is still not widely
used. The reasons behind this and what distinguishes HPC-
aware clouds from regular clouds will be discussed in this
paper, thus hopefully leading to improvements in current cloud
architectures and leading to a higher amount and acceptance of
HPC-aware offerings. We consider this information valuable
for both private and public cloud providers, as well as cloud
customers.
II. TAXONOMY OF HPC-AWARE CLOUDS
Our taxonomy is split into six main categories relevant for
HPC-aware clouds, as pictured in figure 1.
Fig. 1. HPC-aware Clouds Taxonomy: Overview of Categories
The main categories, including a brief description, are as
follows:
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Lifecycle
Most of the lifecycle aspects need adjustment on the
cloud consumer side, as the use of dynamic cloud
resources has a rather high impact on existing HPC
workflows.
Security
The fear of security degradation is one of the major
aspects limiting the adoption of cloud services for
many potential consumers.
Business
The business side of a cloud offering requires some
adjustments, as several additional aspects need to be
included for HPC-awareness.
HPC-optimized Architecture
HPC relies on systems with a very good perfor-
mance. Modifying cloud installations with focus on
HPC-optimized Architecture is a pivotal aspect to
consider.
Operations Management
There is few difference when it comes to monitoring
and managing HPC-aware cloud resources. Most of
the Operations Management adaptations need to take
place on the consumer side, ensuring the suitability
of obtained services.
Service Level Agreements
Extending currently established Service Level Agree-
ments (SLAs) for HPC requirements is essential, as
there are several aspects not covered with regular
cloud SLAs.
For this paper we focused on the categories and several
subcategories we identified to be most relevant for raising
the HPC-awareness of a cloud offering. This includes the
main categories HPC-optimized Architecture and Service Level
Agreements, as well as the subcategories HPC Add-ons and
Resources (both belonging to the category Business) and
Stability (subcategories of the category Security). The subcate-
gories are color-coded according to their affiliation to the main
categories from figure 1 and the captions of the figures are also
labeled accordingly. The categories Operations Management
and Lifecycle are not in the focus of this paper.
The complete taxonomy, also including aspects relevant for
regular clouds can be found online [Lab, 2015] at The Cloud
Research Lab (Institut fu¨r Cloud Computing und IT-Sicherheit)
which is part of the Department of Computer Science at the
Hochschule Furtwangen University, Germany.
A. HPC Add-ons (Subcategory of Business)
There are several HPC add-ons providers need to include
in their business offering for HPC-aware clouds, as pictured
in figure 2.
HPC jobs in general do not only consist of one single
computation process, but of several interlinked steps, including
pre- and post-processing for example. Depending on the
offered service model the way workflow integration has to
be provided is different, but essential for the suitability of
such a solution. When a consumer uses HPC in a cloud based
Fig. 2. HPC-aware Clouds Taxonomy Detail: HPC Add-ons (Subcategory of
Business)
on Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), means to integrate the
dynamic resources into his his current load sharing mecha-
nism, like queuing systems, are important. When utilizing a
Platform as a Service (PaaS) resources scenario, job workflow
integration is still required, as the availability of the input data
for the computation has to ensured, as well as licenses - often
required for commercial applications. Even though Software
as a Service (SaaS) HPC-offerings are virtually non-existent
yet, they would still require for example some sort of remote
visualization tool, offering decent 3D-performance. As it is
often not feasible to download output data locally due to size,
one would rather decide to store all the data at the cloud
provider’s site, but would still require graphical access for
example for 3D-modelling.
These integration aspects show that for HPC in clouds
providers and customers in general are more closely tied and
need to interact more than in a traditional complete self-service
cloud scenario, a step providers have to be aware of.
Another important aspect is the availability of several guar-
antees, in general agreed upon in corresponding SLAs. As
HPC jobs sometimes take several days to process data, a
customer could require a guaranteed job completion policy
for long-running jobs, to ensure that his computation does
not get terminated prematurely, as some applications offer no
checkpointing, where intermediate data gets saved, enabling a
restart at the latest saved state, saving time for re-computation.
Even though a customer should be able to consider his cloud
provider trustworthy after all, the availability of guaranteed
privacy is important for clients processing confidential data,
as they often fear privacy breaches and competitors gaining
access to their data, especially in multi-tenant environments.
Non-shared networking-components or customer separation
on a per-system basis, preventing hypervisor-level attacks in
virtualized environments, might be agreeable here for different
level of guaranteed isolation.
The same conditions apply for performance, as especially
customers with own data-centres fear performance degradation
in a cloud scenario. Providing strictly separated components
for guaranteed performance offerings and avoiding over-
optimizing utilization by over-booking for customers requiring
optimized performance might be valuable here. Traditional
cloud providers often over-optimize their systems to a degree
of capacity utilisation which makes them unsuitable for HPC
applications. As far as possible a provider should offer his
resources for HPC on a Quality of Service (QoS) basis rather
than best-effort, as this significantly increases the service
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dependability.
B. Resources (Subcategory of Business)
Another subcategory of the business aspects are the re-
sources a cloud provider has to provide for a well-suited HPC
cloud offering. We pictured the ones most relevant in figure
3.
Fig. 3. HPC-aware Clouds Taxonomy Detail: Resources (Subcategory of
Business)
When it comes to sourcing a provider has two options:
offering access to self-hosted systems and services, or acting as
a reseller of resources of a third party, sometimes with added
value. Combining the two sourcing strategies in a transparent
way, for example by providing long term storage from a
different provider, is also possible. Also of interest could be to
act as a specialized broker of HPC-aware resources, but this
option is not further discussed here.
Choosing the right service model for HPC in clouds is
important. Currently most providers focus on offering HPC
IaaS resources, as this is the easiest way to implement for
a provider. But for a consumer this is the most tasking to
utilize in terms of integration. The beforehand mentioned The
UberCloud Experiment [UberCloud, 2015] for example relied
on experienced system integrators (and ISVs) for bridging the
gap between consumers and providers and turn mere IaaS
resources into a usable platform. Especially for SMEs with
few well-versed integration specialists this delivery model is
suboptimal. We consider HPC provided as PaaS, or even as
SaaS as far more suitable for those customers, as the reduced
integration cost would lower adoption barriers.
As further discussed in section II-C the way the underly-
ing systems are provided is relevant to overall performance.
As cloud is usually centred around virtualization as main
pillar, which can decrease performance, offerings for bare-
metal HPC clouds still exist, for example Bull extreme fac-
tory [Bull, 2015] or Penguin Computing on Demand (POD
[Penguin Computing, 2015]. Even though they offer a cloud-
like pay-per-use billing model and web portal interfaces they
differ for instance from regular clouds in terms of flexibility.
For example availability of applications is limited to a set
of pre-configured applications, which is valuable for some
consumers, but can pose a challenge if a different version or
application is required as they will have to be installed by
or at least with the help of the provider. The effort and time
to deliver a new application can be significantly reduced by
deploying applications using container-based virtualization, as
it encapsulates an application and all required libraries into a
single container. This is especially useful for applications with
conflicting dependencies, as the underlying operating system
(OS) is turned into a runtime environment for these containers,
reducing the need to modify the installed OS for different
applications and customers.
The aspect of application support is closely linked to the
applied service model, as who is responsible for roll-out and
configuration depends on it. This is gaining further importance
if commercial software has to be used. It often requires
licenses and sometimes also certification on operating system
level. This usually limits the operating system choice to an
enterprise Linux distribution, requiring a license or some form
of subscription too. Application licensing in cloud scenarios
is a complex topic, as most ISVs do not offer pay-per-use
licensing mechanism. This means a user has to purchases
the right to use a certain software for a maximum number
of concurrent systems for an amount of time in advance, a
year for example. As these licenses are usually quite expensive
they are ordered corresponding to estimated regular utilization
and their agreed upon usage is enforced by license servers
residing on the customer site. Even when these servers can
be made reachable from a cloud, this means that for a cloud-
burst scenario additional licenses would need to be available,
which is generally not the case, due to costs. As such dynamic
usage in clouds is strongly limited by the static good software
licenses, we hope for ISVs to open up and offer pay-per-use
licenses, realizing this step could lead to more revenue instead
of less as they fear and making it easier for cloud providers
supporting commercial HPC applications.
C. (HPC-optimized) Architecture
Offering HPC-aware clouds has by far most impact on
architectural aspects as how to design a cloud environment
and what sort of systems are required. Figure 4 shows what
infrastructural optimizations should be considered for HPC-
awareness.
From a basic hardware systems perspective applications in
the field of HPC rely on ideally latest generation hardware,
as they provide optimal performance in terms of general
overall improvements and thus shorter job completion time.
As different applications and sometimes even different input
files of the same application can have divergent requirements,
a set of different (system) categories is required, for example
providing lots of memory, access to fast locally attached
temporary scratch space or fast interconnects.
A requirement for different options is also true for the way
underlying resources are provided. As the use of hypervisor-
based virtualization can still lead to severe performance degra-
dation [Younge and Fox, 2014] there are several providers
offering access to bare-metal clouds, as mentioned before. As
an alternative, we propose the use of Container-Based Virtu-
alization for HPC. As own research [Gantikow et al., 2015]
and general performance evaluation [Felter et al., 2014] has
shown, it offers almost bare-metal performance and other
advantages, for instance encapsulating dependencies. As se-
curity may be considered weaker, compared to hypervisor-
based virtualization [Jackson, 2015], this should be especially
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Fig. 4. HPC-aware Clouds Taxonomy Detail: (HPC-optimized) Architecture
considered by private cloud providers and providers offering
exclusive access to physical systems, as there is in general less
risk from multi-tenancy involved.
Furthermore there’s a need for choice when it comes to
single versus multi systems as some applications perform best
with one fast single system, whereas other profit from utilizing
multiple systems at once for distributed computations.
HPC codes strongly benefit from latest systems, especially
due to CPU micro-architecture advancements. For example the
introduction of the Intel Advanced Vector Extensions (AVX)
Instructions essentially doubled the floating point capability of
Intel processor, which led to significant performance improve-
ments for HPC [Saini et al., 2014]. This shows that a provider
has to be aware of improvements and make them available to
his customers early on.
For optimizing the performance of HPC applications it
is important to pay close attention to details, especially
in virtualized environments, for example by utilizing fea-
tures like hypervisor-level affinity. This improves performance
[Gupta et al., 2013] when using multiple virtual cores, as it
avoids the possible mapping of multiple virtual cores onto
the same physical core. Cloud providers should have a deep
understanding of performance optimization, as for instance
this feature, as opposed to CPU pinning, which binds a single
process to a specific (virtual) core, cannot be user-enabled.
As not all HPC codes are yet optimized for systems with
many cores, but instead still benefit from fewer CPU(-core)s
with higher clock speed, cloud consumers should be able to
utilize systems with different characteristic, enabling some
architecture-aware selection of resources. In case a provider
is offering HPCaaS with a service model providing higher ab-
straction than mere infrastructure components, he should have
a deep insight into application and workload requirements for
providing reasonable assumptions on the optimal underlying
system configuration, as optimal performance usually depends
on both an optimized hardware and software stack.
For high throughput and especially low latency for com-
munication middleware such as Message Passing Interface
(MPI), which is needed for distributed computations, HPC
usually relies on fast interconnects like InfiniBand. For certain
use cases using 10GBit Ethernet or only 1GBit Ethernet as
interconnects may be sufficient, especially if there is very
little communication during a distributed computation, but in
general Infiniband is favored. As a result close attention should
be paid to the placement strategies of requested resources, as
low latency and multi-region resources are in contradiction.
Also of interest are accelerators like Intel Xeon Phi and
NVIDIA Tesla: they are not necessarily essential for all HPC
applications, but are getting more and more common in more
recent installations and thus getting expected by consumers.
Those specialized resources only became available in Cloud
environments recently due to improvements in hardware vir-
tualization features, such as Single Root I/O Virtualization
(SR-IOV), finally enabling the use of InfiniBand in virtu-
alized environments [Jose et al., 2013] and bridging the gap
between virtualized and bare-metal performance, if tuned right
[Musleh et al., 2014].
The availability of these HPC-enablers is currently mostly
limited to bare-metal HPC cloud providers, as full support
in cloud computing platforms like OpenStack or OpenNebula
is still lacking. But when trying to raise the HPC-awareness
of an infrastructure one should take this specialized hardware
into consideration, as support for virtualized environments is
getting better over time.
Another important aspect for certain HPC applications is
the availability of access to high-end storage systems, as
applications can generate several terabyte of scratch or result
data. This data can usually be transferred to slower drives after
the actual computation, but fast storage is at least required
temporary. In general quickly gaining access to vast amounts
of storage in clouds is no problem. Businesses like Dropbox
for example rely on Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3) - but
HPC requires much faster storage backends. In traditional on-
site scenarios HPC-suitable storage is commonly provided in
the form of fast storage systems, directly attached to a compute
node or by utilizing fast distributed parallel filesystems like
Lustre [Zhao et al., 2010], GPFS or Ceph [Weil, 2007], again
accessed by fast interconnects. As from a cloud consumers
perspective the possibility to use fast storage backends makes
sense, a HPC-aware cloud provider should be able to offer
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these. Both ways of implementation are possible, whereas es-
tablishing a performance optimized parallel filesystem shared
among multiple customers looks more reasonable from a
economic point of view.
D. Service Level Agreements
Service Level Agreements (SLAs) are of major importance
for all sorts of cloud services. Going further than regular
SLAs and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) applicable for
generic cloud scenarios [Frey et al., 2013], response time for
instance, HPCaaS has additional requirements, which need to
be negotiated in equivalent SLAs.
Figure 5 extends the Service levels for high performance
computing providers presented in [Ku¨bert, 2014] by an op-
tional Job runs to completion SLA, further increasing the
suitability of the HPC SLAs for long running jobs in clouds.
Fig. 5. HPC-aware Clouds Taxonomy Detail: SLAs
This is essential for computations running several days,
ensuring a successful termination in cases where the applica-
tion offers no checkpointing feature, which is also discussed
in section II-E. As HPC jobs are in general run on a best
effort base, meaning they get queued after submitting and then
started as soon as sufficient resources become available, this
can result in long delays.
In cases where the job runs to completion SLA is com-
binable with a short guaranteed maximum waiting time SLA
this can result in a significant improvement for customers
considering an alternative to local clusters with long waiting
time, leading to more QoS-oriented computations.
E. Stability (Subcategory of Security)
Convincing customers planning to process confidential data
of the security of a cloud offering can be challenging. Even
if services offer all required and applicable certificates and
utilizing cloud resources could even provide increased security
over the status quo of their on-site environment for some
customers, security is still an obstacle for adoption of clouds in
general. Transport layers can be secured by accepted standards,
data stored in a cloud can be encrypted, but by the time
it is getting processed it has to be unencrypted. Even if
there has been some research on homomorphic encryption
[Gentry, 2009], this concept is currently far from suitable for
any practical use in the field of HPC.
Our approach is to take the quality of the offered service
into consideration, as we think the stability is an appropriate
instrument to build up trust between cloud provider and
consumer if all relevant security standards are implemented.
Figure 6 shows the relevant aspects to consider for the
stability of a HPC-aware cloud.
Fig. 6. HPC-aware Clouds Taxonomy Detail: Stability (Subcategory of
Security)
As there can be long running HPC computations, a provider
has to be reduce risks for system failure. While for other
use cases, an application hosted on a webserver farm running
in the cloud for instance, where mechanisms to ensure the
availability can be implemented in form of a load balanc-
ing proxy, such measures, providing application-level failure
protection, do not exist for HPC applications in general. If
one node participating in a distributed computation becomes
unresponsive this commonly results in an aborted job. Due to
this the overall robustness of the environment has to assured.
To handle planned service interruptions, like downtimes for
maintenance work, there are several technical measures widely
applied in data centres, for example redundancy of power
supplies or network links. In environments using hypervisor-
level virtualization High Availability (HA) features like Live
Migration can be used for moving virtual machines (VMs)
from one host to another without service interruption. Such a
feature is currently lacking for container-based virtualization,
but might change, as Project CRUI [CRIU-Project, 2015] is
working on implementing checkpoint and restore functionality
for Docker containers.
Preparing for unplanned interruptions is more complex, as
HA features are not sufficient and Fault Tolerance is necessary.
For virtualized environments there is an option to run VMs
in lockstep on several hosts. As this requires additional hosts
and in some cases has problems with multiple cores, this is in
general not to be considered suitable for HPC.
Another aspect of stability is more related to the stability of
the computation environment. Some customers need to ensure
the repeatability and reproducibility of their computations,
for example car manufactures due to product liability. This
means that a job has to be re-computable using the exact same
BW-CAR Symposium on Information and Communication Systems (SInCom) 2015
61
application and library versions as the original computation,
available on all participating resources. Providing virtualized
resources to customers with such strict requirements can
clearly represent an advantage, as it is easier to preserve
defined release levels.
III. LEVEL OF REQUIRED ADJUSTMENT
To supply an overview of the level of required adjustment
needed to offer and utilize HPC resources in clouds we provide
table I. It lists an estimate for each of the categories of our
taxonomy and rates them with one of the adjustment levels
minor, medium and major, required to make a cloud offering
suitable for HPC workloads, for both providers and customers.
Our expected level can only represent a rough estimate,
as for providers the level of adjustment strongly depends on
factors like the desired degree of HPC-awareness and for
consumers mainly on the available service model.
TABLE I
ESTIMATED REQUIRED LEVEL OF ADJUSTMENT FOR HPC-AWARENESS
OF A CLOUD (FOR BOTH PROVIDER AND CONSUMER)
Level of Adjustment
Category Provider Consumer
Lifecycle minor major
Security medium medium
Business major minor
(HPC-optimized) Architecture major minor
Operations Management minor minor
Service Level Agreements medium minor
As the table shows, most of the major adjustments are
required for cloud providers, as raising HPC-awareness of
their offering requires invest in several supplemental add-ons,
optimizations of overall architecture and a deep understanding
of HPC requirements. This might be the reason for the limited
amount of HPCaaS offerings, as the the number of customers
interested in those highly specialized services is only a small
fraction of the overall Cloud Computing market.
On the other hand for customers an increased availability
of HPC services in clouds would be quite worthwhile, as
basically all their major adjustments need to focus on their
workflows related to computing. If these are adaptable with
justifiable effort, HPCaaS can considerably reduce their in-
vestment costs related to HPC systems and reduce turnaround
times of compute jobs.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our taxonomy shows that there are many aspects to consider
if cloud resources have to be used for HPC, even though the
concept itself seems self-evident, especially for SMEs.
HPC has a need for lots of resources and providing them in
a suitable performance-optimized way requires adjustment on
several general aspects and even more on details. Performance
wise the use of virtualization is getting less of an issue,
especially with the support of the discussed HPC enablers and
operating system level virtualization providing near bare-metal
performance and also improving the packaging, delivering and
access to complex software.
From a workflow perspective a transition to cloud services
always results in a modification of processes, which is true
for HPC too. For HPC this is especially tasking due to data
storage and transfers of often huge amounts of data, but can
be eased by hosting the data directly at the provider.
But the hardest aspect to solve is the element of trust. Even
in cases when using cloud services can be considered secure
enough this can be an aspect limiting their adoption. This
is why we consider future research on improving workflow
automation aspects with regard to security as important, as
not all jobs require guaranteed privacy by running in a private
data center, but could be processed at a cloud provider.
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Abstract—This paper deals with event detection applied
to non-intrusive load monitoring. In the course of the paper
a scheme to improve the event detection for non-intrusive
load monitoring is introduced. It is shown, that by adding
adaptive thresholds to an event detector it is possible to
decrease the amount of missed or falsely detected events. As
reference two event detectors are used. Their performance
is evaluated and the causes for detecting non-existing events
and missing events are pointed out. Finally, it is shown that
the performance of the aforementioned event detectors is
improved by applying time dependent thresholds.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, one of the most pressing topics is energy
consumption and its reduction. Monitoring the energy
consumption is done by using a smart meter and
Non-Intrusive Load Monitoring (NILM). Using NILM
makes it possible to determine the power consumption
of each appliance, using only one smart meter, instead
of equipping each appliance with its own measuring
unit. The detailed information gained by applying NILM
is used to analyze appliance behavior and optimizing
their usage in order to achieve energy savings.
Based on the measurements, the event detection
of a NILM system determines the point in a time
dependent signal where a transient occurs. Between
two transients there is a steady-state. In a NILM
system the time of occurrence of a transient and the
duration of a steady-state are of interest. Being aware
of the times events occur, it is possible to perform a
classification. The classification determines the probable
composition of the aggregated signal. Knowing the
energy consumption and its components, it is possible
to perform energy tracking to determine the energy
consumption of each appliance.
This paper deals with event detection. A reliable
event detection is crucial for the classification and the
energy tracking. Assuming that event detection fails,
classification and energy tracking are not working well.
The cause for event detection failure is highlighted and
a method to improve the event detection is introduced.
Section II reviews the state of the art. In section
III the dataset used in this paper is introduced. Section
IV presents the event detectors considered and section
V shows the problems inherent to the event detectors.
Sections VI and VII introduce the developed solution
and its performance evaluation.
II. STATE OF THE ART
In this paper the focus is on event detectors applying
a threshold to a signal. Furthermore, the focus is limited
to event detectors that are used in NILM. The following
summary of event detectors is by no means exhaustive
but provides an overview about techniques used for event
detection in NILM.
In [1], [2] a threshold is applied to the mean of the power
signal. In [3], the differentiation of the power signal is
thresholded. In [4], the differentiation of the power signal
is calculated. If the change in the differentiated signal
is bigger than 10 % an event is detected. In [5], the
harmonics of the power signal are searched for patterns
indicating the occurrence of an event. The patterns are
derived by calculating the mean of the harmonics, and
searched for relevant changes during a training phase.
In [6], the mean of the power signal is windowed by
two adjacent windows and the frequency distributions
of the windows are compared. When the difference of
the frequency distributions is above a threshold an event
is triggered.
III. THE DATASET
For the simulations done in this paper measure-
ments of various appliances are used. The measure-
ment data provides ground truth information, i.e. each
event is marked. The data was collected during two
different campaigns. In the first campaign single ap-
pliances were recorded. Altogether 2474 events were
recorded. The dataset is called "D1". The appliances,
which were recorded without simultaneous operation
were: two fridges, an immersion heater, an iron, a kettle,
a mixer and three ovens. In the second campaign multiple
appliances were hooked up to the grid at the same time
and 2893 events were recorded. The second dataset is
called "D2". Datasets D1 and D2 feature sampling rates
of 1 kHz. Both campaigns were performed at Furtwangen
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University.
In [7], the measurement system which is used to collect
the ground truth data is described. The system incor-
porates a switching box, which toggles the appliances
and therefore enables the detection of events. The event
markers have an error of approximately 100 ms.
IV. ALGORITHM DESCRIPTION
Two event detectors are used. The two event detectors
are the ones introduced by Hart (H1) [3] and by Berges
(B1) [6]. The performance of the event detectors suffers
from multiple events caused by an appliance’s single
switching process. In the following the event detectors
are described and the choice of parameters is explained.
The parameters are chosen to enable best performance
using a fixed threshold. The results achieved based on
those parameter sets are used as reference later on.
The event detector H1 applies a threshold to the
differentiated power signal. When the differentiated
power signal is above the threshold, an event is
detected. Hart normalized the power signal to account
for fluctuations in the grid voltage.
Instead of the change of the signal, as exploited by H1,
the event detector B1 uses the probability distribution of
the power signal. Two adjacent windows are applied to
the signal. The probability distributions of the windows
are estimated and compared using a χ2-test. When the
test finds the distributions unequal, an event is detected.
The event detector B1 is applied to the mean of the
power signal calculated over one period of the power
signal.
The parameters selected for the event detectors
are geared to the needs of the data set which were
introduced in sec. III. The threshold for the approach
H1 was chosen so that events of the appliances with
the smallest change in the mean of the power signal are
still detectable – but high enough so that the threshold
is above the noise level. The threshold is set to 10 W.
The approach B1 had a window length of 20 datapoints,
80 bins and a threshold of 80 W. The length of the
windows was selected to be shorter than the length of
the smallest event in the data pool. The number of bins
enables the detection of the event with the least change.
The threshold was selected applying the same reasoning
as with Hart’s approach.
V. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
In this section, it is shown that one device caused
multiple events, when switched ON or OFF. The causes
for those multiple events will be analyzed and a strategy
for canceling those falsely detected events is introduced.
All the event detectors introduced are applied to
the mean of the instantaneous power. The mean is
used in order to remove the periodicity of the signal.
Applying the same preconditioning for all event
detectors enables comparison between them. P is the
mean of the instantaneous power. N is a period of the
instantaneous power. P is calculated as follows:
P (k) =
1
N
N−1∑
n=0
P (k + n) (1)
P contains peaks, noise and damped or undamped
oscillations. Often the events are followed by over- or
undershoots. Those disturbances of P are caused by
the composition of the appliance. Since the property
of P exploited by the event detector is affected by
those disturbances the quality of the event detection is
affected too; the distortions are detected as additional
events.
In the case of Hart’s approach, each change in the
signal and especially fast changes cause corresponding
changes in the differentiated signal. In Fig. 1 P and
d
dkP of a freezer are shown. The figure shows one
turn ON and one turn OFF event. However applying
the threshold, shown on the graph multiple events are
detected. When using an event detector that relies on
the differentiation of a signal, there are problems with
suppressing those additional events.
Because of the offset of the event marker (sec. III),
multiple events within 100 ms after the turn on event
cannot be distinguished. For example, the freezer’s
rising slope in P is approximately 120 ms in length.
Therefore only the events within the ellipse in Fig. 1
can be identified as false events without a doubt. The
events in the rectangles are approached as followed:
the first event detected is considered to be the true
event and the following events are considered to be
false events. The multiple events caused by a turn OFF
event have to be approached in the same way since the
event marker of the turn OFF event is facing the same
problem as the one of the turn ON event.
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Fig. 1: Section of P and its differentiation
Berges compares two frequency distributions using a
χ2-test. If the difference of the distributions defined
in Eq. (2) is higher than a threshold, an event is
triggered. In Eq. (2) N is the number of bins. yi and
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xi are the numbers of samples in bin i of the first and
second window. Disturbances have an impact on the
distributions.
χ2 =
N∑
i=1
(yi − xi)2
xi
(2)
At a certain point each of the above mentioned event
detectors apply a threshold to a property of P . There are
disturbances that cause the property of P to rise above
the threshold.
One possibility is to blank out all events after an event
occurred for a period of time. But blanking out those
events might lead to missing events caused by other
appliances.
A better approach is to adapt the threshold applied to the
property of P . For the event detector H1 this corresponds
to adapting the change over time in P triggering an
event. Considering the approach B1, the adaptation of
the threshold results in varying allowed divergences
between the two monitored probability distributions. In
the following section the adaptation of the thresholds is
further invested.
VI. APPROACH
The cancellation of the events caused by the dis-
turbances in the monitored property of P is done by
adapting the applied threshold. Again, P is the mean
of the instantaneous power and the mean is applied in
order to remove the periodicities of the power. Adding
an adaptive threshold to H1, the resulting event detector
is called H2. Likewise the combination of B1 and an
adaptive threshold is called B2. The adaptation of the
threshold in H2 is shown in Fig. 2. The box ddk is the
differentiator applied H2. For adapting the threshold in
B2 the box ddk in Fig. 2 is replaced by the calculation of
frequency distributions over windows. Threshold genera-
tion is the adaptation of the threshold and Event detection
applies the adapted threshold to the signal.
d
dk
Threshold generation
Event detection
P (k)
Fig. 2: Approach for adapting a threshold
The adaptation of the threshold in H2 is done by using
the standard deviation of P . For the generation of a
time dependent threshold T (k) a preselected factor C is
multiplied with the mean of the standard deviation σPM
of the mean PM of P . C is a constant that accounts
for measurement noise. Before multiplying by C it is
checked if σPM (k) is smaller than one. In the case that
σPM (k) is smaller than one, σPM (k) is set to one.
PM (k) =
1
L
L−1∑
l=0
P (k − l) (3)
σPM (k) =
{
1, σPM (k) < 1√(
P (k)− PM (k)
)2
, else
(4)
σPM (k) =
1
M
M−1∑
m=0
σPM (k −m) (5)
T (k) = C · σPM (k) (6)
The time dependent threshold applied in B2 is calcu-
lated by applying Eq. (3) to Eq. (5) and by replacing
Eq. (6) by Eq. (7). Instead of multiplying C by the
standard deviation the standard deviation is added to C.
The observation window used to calculate the adaptive
threshold is defined by Eq. (3).
T (k) = C + σPM (k) (7)
VII. SIMULATIONS
In order to verify the selected approach the data
described in sec. III is used for simulations. First the
event detectors H1 and B1 are tested. Second the
adapted versions of the event detectors are used for
simulations (H2, H3, B2). The adaptation is done in
accordance with the approaches introduced in section VI.
In order to evaluate the performance of the different
event detectors the metrics True Positive Rate (TPR)
and False Positive Rate (FPR) [8] are applied. The TPR
and FPR are defined as follow:
TPR =
TP
TP + FN
∈ [0, 1] (8)
FPR =
FP
FP + TN
∈ [0, 1] (9)
In addition to those metrics the power difference between
the threshold and the power at the time instances where
false positives or false negatives occurred is calculated.
Those power differences are measures used to evaluate
the goodness of the applied adaptive threshold, for
example a false negative with a small power difference
is less grave than the ones with a large power difference.
In Eq. (10) and Eq. (11) PFN and PFP are those power
differences and FNidx and FPidx are vectors containing
the indexes of the false or missed events respectively. A
is the total number of false negatives and B is the total
number of false positives.
PFN =
A∑
a=1
[
P (FNidx(a))− T (FNidx(a))
]2
(10)
PFP =
B∑
b=1
[
P (FPidx(b))− T (FPidx(b))
]2
(11)
BW-CAR Symposium on Information and Communication Systems (SInCom) 2015
65
TPR FPR ·10−6 PFP · 109 PFN · 109
B1 0.7566 142.5 57.397 0.936
H1 0.7946 59.89 6.952 0.611
B2 0.5691 67,96 53.669 32.019
H2 0.6200 7.832 0.474 0.876
H3 0.7821 15.18 1.211 0.731
Table I: Simulation results based on event detectors with
a fixed and a time depending threshold. Dataset D1 was
used. There are 2474 events in dataset D1.
TPR FPR ·10−6 PFP · 109 PFN · 109
B1 0.4998 9.18 · 103 2.929 3.6066
H1 0.6097 127.8 88.789 2.921
B2 0.0839 1.890 0.461 5.823
H2 0.3802 896.6 · 10−3 0.314 5.077
H3 0.6505 4.733 2.322 2.759
Table II: Simulation results based on event detectors with
a fixed and a time depending threshold. Dataset D2 was
used. There are 2893 events in dataset D2.
In Table I the results for the simulations using dataset
D1 are presented. Table II shows the results achieved
with dataset D2. The upper parts of the tables show the
simulation results for the unmodified event detectors
(B1, H1) and the lower parts show the results for the
event detectors applying an adaptive threshold (B2, H2,
H3).
The parameters used for B1 and H1 are the ones
introduced in sec. IV. B2 and H2 are using the
same parameters. Additionally the parameters for the
adaptation of the threshold are chosen as followed:
L = 5, M = 20 and C is the same value as the value
for the fixed threshold. H3 is using the same parameters
but C is set to 5.
The choice of parameters was done in order to minimize
the error functions in Eq. (8) to Eq. (11).
For dataset D1 H2 resulted in the lowest FPR. Compared
to H1, the FPR was reduced by 52.058 · 10−6. The
drawback is that the TPR has decreased by 0.1746.
H3 has a FPR which is lower than the FPR of H1 by
10.447 · 10−6. But the TPR only decreased by 0.0125
compared to H1. Looking at PFP and PFN the result
is the same.
B2 achieved a reduction of the FPR by 74.54 · 10−6
but at the same time the TPR decreased by 0.1875
compared to B1.
Regarding dataset D2, the approach using H3 achieved
the highest TPR. The FPR decreased by 123.067 · 10−6
and the TPR increased by 0.0408. H2 reduced the FPR
by 126.9034 · 10−6. But in exchange the TPR decreased
by 0.2295. Considering PFP and PFN the outcome is
the same. If the task is to reduce the FPR as much as
possible one must use H2. For the best TPR H3 must
be used.
The approach based on B2 reduced the FPR by
9.178 · 10−3 in comparison to B1. In the same time the
TPR decreased by 0.4159 compared to B1.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper a novel approach to event detection
in non-intrusive load monitoring was introduced.
Applying adaptive thresholds to the event detection,
the number of false positives caused by a single event
has been reduced. The event detectors of Hart [3] and
Berges [6] were extended by adaptive thresholds. The
results achieved with the modified event detectors are
compared to the results achieved with the original
ones. The simulations done to verify the new approach
were done based on datasets collected at Furtwangen
University.
With respect to the approaches of Hart and Berges, the
overall performance of the event detection is improved.
In order to achieve those results, different sets of
parameters were tested. Evaluating the tests, necessary
steps for choosing the parameters of the event detectors
became obvious. First the parameters of the unmodified
algorithms have to be optimized. Second, the parameters
for the adaptation of the threshold have to be chosen.
Further work will be focused on the verification
of the results. The plan is to apply the event detectors
with time dependent thresholds to different public
datasets. Since the adaptation of the event detectors
seems to be very promising, further algorithms will be
adapted for usage with time dependent thresholds.
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Abstract—We present a 3d-laser-scan simulation in virtual
reality for creating synthetic scans of CAD models. Consisting of
the virtual reality head-mounted display Oculus Rift and the
motion controller Razer Hydra our system can be used like
common hand-held 3d laser scanners. It supports scanning of
triangular meshes as well as b-spline tensor product surfaces
based on high performance ray-casting algorithms. While point
clouds of known scanning simulations are missing the man-made
structure, our approach overcomes this problem by imitating
real scanning scenarios. Calculation speed, interactivity and the
resulting realistic point clouds are the benefits of this system.
I. INTRODUCTION
In science and industry 3d laser scanners are widely used
to acquire 3d point data of real world objects. The result
of a scanning process is a 3d point cloud. Often a CAD
representation of these point clouds needs to be recovered
for the subsequent processing. This task is performed by the
reverse engineering process. Thus, the quality of the CAD
representation depends on the chosen reverse engineering
process.
Evaluating reverse engineering algorithms is only possible
if a large set of point clouds is available. To acquire these
points clouds CAD models are scanned virtually. There are
two reasons for this approach. First, we often lack enough
suitable physical objects to scan and, second, point clouds of
hand-scanned physical objects often lack corresponding CAD
information. However, point clouds of hand-scanned physical
objects and synthetically generated point clouds differ heavily
in their structure in terms of scan-strategy and scan-path.
Fig. 1: FARO
Edge ScanArm
(www.faro.com,
09/25/2015)
Since each human operator has a dif-
ferent scan-strategy and scan-path, the
resulting point clouds differ much in
structure, even if the same object was
scanned. On the one hand this structure
is not completely random, on the other
hand there is no good model for the
human scanning procedure. For a fair
evaluation of reverse engineering algo-
rithms with realistic data this man-made
structure must be incorporated into the
data. To generate scans of CAD models
that capture this man-made structure we
propose a virtual reality (VR) scanner
setup. We present a method to generate
3d point clouds from CAD models consisting of triangle
meshes and b-spline tensor product surfaces with a simulated
hand-held laser scanner in a VR environment. Our goal is to
create a realistic simulation of the scanning process with a
hand-held laser scanner like the FARO Edge ScanArm (Fig.
1). Using this approach we can compute 3d point clouds of
CAD models using a virtual laser scanner with a man-made
scan structure.
This paper is laid out as follows: First we describe our
experimental setup and the used peripherals in Chapter II.
Chapter III outlines parameters of the scanning simulation and
the used data structures. We then explain the process of ray-
casting for triangle meshes in Chapter IV and for b-spline
surfaces in Chapter V. Results are presented in Chapter VI.
A. Related Work
The two most commonly used methods for high accuracy
3d scanning are laser scanners and structured light scanners.
While hand-held laser scanners project a laser line onto the
object surface structured light laser scanners project a pattern
of light. Especially since the Michelangelo Project [1] laser
scanning systems have received increasing attention. Resulting
point clouds are used in numerous research fields. Ip and
Gupta [2] are retrieving matching CAD models by using
partial 3d point clouds. They use real and synthetic point
clouds. To generate the synthetic point clouds CAD surfaces
are evaluated at random parameters. Mitra et al. [3] register
two point clouds by minimization of the squared distance
between the underlying surfaces. They use synthetic point
clouds from random evaluation with an unspecified noise.
Bernardini and Bajaj [4] use synthetic point clouds generated
by sampling a surface uniformly for an automatic reconstruc-
tion process. In [5] Tagliasacchi et al. extract curve skeletons
from incomplete point clouds. They use a bounding sphere
around a CAD model at its center to get different viewpoints.
These viewpoints are used for orthographic ray casting from a
uniform grid. A very similar approach is used in [6] where a
fan of rays with origin on a bounding sphere is swept along the
model surface from different viewpoints. However, all these
approaches do not capture a realistic scan structure.
The application of VR is widespread in various scientific
areas. Especially in medical research VR has a huge potential
using it for surgery trainings [7] or the medication in occupa-
tional therapy [8]. In the future, there will be many different
applications of virtual or augmented reality simulations. A
collaborative approach to develop those applications is given
by [9] which also contains a collection of motion control tech-
niques. Numerous different tools are available and individual
techniques should be selected according to a concrete target
application at hand.
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II. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
For the simulation of a hand-held 3d laser scanner we
propose a VR environment. The structure of the synthetic point
clouds generated in this VR is similar to man-made scans of
physical objects due to the manual scanning process (Figure
2). The virtual scene consists of a workshop with a table, that
carries the CAD model, and a virtual model of the scanner,
see Figure 3.
Fig. 2: VR setup.
The user can move freely in the scene, change the perspec-
tive and field of view in terms of the CAD model and operate
the laser scanner.
For the VR setup two essential peripherals are used (Figure
4): the VR headset Oculus Rift [10] for visual immersion and
the motion controller Razer Hydra [11] for scanner control
and scene navigation.
The Oculus Rift provides a 3d view of the VR scene
and allows to freely explore the 3d scene. Integrated sensors
provide data about the user’s head position and orientation.
Due to its large field of view the degree of immersion in the
scene is very high.
The Razer Hydra consists of two wired controllers and a
base station, which creates a magnetic field to determine the
controllers’ spatial positions. It can capture hand movements
and orientations accurately and provides joysticks and buttons
for control tasks.
Both devices are integrated using the manufacturer’ APIs:
Oculus Rift SDK [10] and Sixense Core API [11].
III. SIMULATION PARAMETERS AND DATA STRUCTURE
A. Laser line probe
The simulation is based on ray-casting computing intersec-
tions of a ray and a triangle mesh or b-spline tensor product
surface. The ray is emitted by a virtual laser line probe. The
virtual scanner simulates a real laser scanner by sweeping a
planar cone of n + 1 rays R0, . . . , Rn over the surface, see
Figure 5. The rays originate from scanner position O and lie
Fig. 3: The virtual scene.
Fig. 4: Left: Oculus Rift (www.giga.de, 09/25/2015), Right:
Razer Hydra (www.roadtovr.com, 09/25/2015)
within a cone with axis D and aperture angle ϕ. Two rays
Ri−1 and Ri have angle ϕ/n for i = 1, . . . , n.
The orientation of the operator’s hand controls the view
direction D. The number of rays n and the aperture angle ϕ
are adjustable. The scan line S is the set of intersection points
of the rays R0, . . . , Rn with the surface.
Fig. 5: The setup of the simulation of a laser scanner.
The laser line probe model contains two types of noise.
The first noise affects the scanner position O, where a random
offset is added. This noise affects all intersection points of one
cone equally. The second noise affects the distance of each
intersection point from O by modifying the direction of each
ray slightly. Both noises are defined by a normally distributed
offset with zero mean and user defined variance.
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B. Data structure
An octree with axis aligned bounding boxes (AABBs) as
nodes is used to partition the bounding box of the CAD model
recursively. For a triangle mesh, the triangles are directly
inserted into the octree using a triangle-box overlap algorithm
[12]. For a b-spline surface, the surface is segmented to
determine the parametric interval where the ray intersects the
surface. Each segment is bounded by its segment bounding box
(SBB). The axis aligned SBBs are inserted into the octree’s
AABBs by checking their corner coordinates. The octree’s
leaf nodes contain the triangles or SBBs. To eliminate non-
intersecting geometry, ray-box-intersections are tested as in
[13, p. 741-744]. If the ray-box-intersection test is positive,
the octree is recursively traversed to a leaf node. This process
yields a set of leaf nodes possibly containing the actual surface
intersection. The geometry inside each of these leaf nodes is
tested for intersections (see Chapters IV and V). Finally, the
intersection point closest to the scanner position O is selected
as the correct ray-surface intersection.
IV. RAY-CASTING FOR TRIANGLE MESHES
Intersection testing for an arbitrary ray with a triangle in
3d is one of the most important non-trivial operations in ray-
tracing oriented rendering. The presented solution [14] first
checks if a given ray R from P0 to P1 intersects a plane P
spanned by triangle T with normal n. If P is intersected, the
intersection point P (rI) is checked to be inside T .
First, the intersection point P (rI) of the ray R = P0 +
r(P1 − P0), r ∈ R, with P is computed. P (rI) has the
parameter
rI =
n · (V0 − P0)
n · (P1 − P0) (1)
on R. A valid intersection between R and P occurs only if
the denominator of (1) is nonzero and rI is real with rI ≥ 0.
Second, the coordinates PI of P (rI) in the plane are
computed. A parametrisation of P is given by
V (s, t) = V0 + s(V1 − V0︸ ︷︷ ︸
u
) + t(V2 − V0︸ ︷︷ ︸
v
)
where V1, V2, V3 are the corners of T and s, t ∈ R. PI =
V (sI , tI) is inside the triangle T if
sI ≥ 0, tI ≥ 0 and sI + tI ≤ 1.
PI is on an edge of T if one of the conditions
sI = 0, tI = 0 or sI + tI = 1
is true. Each condition corresponds to one of T ’s edges, see
Figure 6. In order to compute sI and tI , we use barycentric
coordinate computation using a 3D generalized perp operator
on P as in [15]. With w = P1 − V0, which is a vector in P ,
we solve the equation
w = su+ tv.
Fig. 6: Ray-triangle intersection
The final result uses five dot products
sI =
(u · v)(w · v)− (v · v)(w · u)
(u · v)2 − (u · u)(v · v) ,
tI =
(u · v)(w · u)− (u · u)(w · v)
(u · v)2 − (u · u)(v · v) .
V. RAY-CASTING FOR B-SPLINE SURFACES
A non-uniform b-spline tensor product surface is defined as
s(u, v) =
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
ci,jN
p
i (u)N
q
j (v).
Npi (u) and N
q
j (v) are the b-spline basis functions of degree p
and q while ci,j are the surface control points. The following
ray-casting approach is based on [16]. To find the exact ray-
surface intersection point, Newton’s method is used. This
method requires a good initial guess for parameters u and v of
the intersection point. Therefore, we first subdivide the surface
into simpler, close to linear, surface segments. These segments
are enclosed in SBBs. Testing the ray for intersections with the
SBBs, we can eliminate segments that will not be intersected.
If a box is intersected, the median of the parametric interval
in which the ray possibly intersects the surface, is used as
initial guess. Convergence of Newton’s method is tested for
each intersected SBB.
A. Surface refinement
Each SBB encloses a surfaces segment defined over one
knot interval, see Figure 7. In order for Newton’s method to
converge fast and robustly, it is necessary that the initial guess
(u∗, v∗) is already close to the root. To achieve this, the control
point mesh, respectively the knot vector, is refined such that
each segment fulfills a curvature-based flatness criterion. The
extent of refining a segment defined over knot-span [ti, ti+1) is
given by the product of its maximum curvature κ and its arc
length δ. Regions with high curvature should be subdivided
to avoid multiple roots. Long curve segments should be
subdivided to ensure that the initial guess is reasonably close
to the root. The heuristic for the number of knots n which
will be added to a given knot-span is therefore
n = C · max
[ti,ti+1)
(κ) · δ3/2, (2)
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where C allows to control the extent of the refinement. δ is
estimated by the sum of distances of sampled segment points.
Since a rough guess of maximum curvature is sufficient, a
simplified calculation
max
[ti,ti+1)
(κ) ≈ max[ti,ti+1) (|c
′′(t)|)
avg[ti,ti+1)(|c′(t)|
2
)
can be used. This heuristic is applied to each row of the knot
grid. The maximum number of knots over all rows determines
the number of knots that will be inserted into each u interval.
This process is repeated for all columns.
Fig. 7: A b-spline’s segments bounded by SBBs in between
knot intervals and intersected by ray R.
B. Segment bounding boxes
To acquire tight bounding boxes which completely enclose
the part of the surface between two knots, the multiplicity
of each knot is increased to the degree of the surface. This
yields the Be´zier representation of the segments. Using the
convex hull property of the Be´zier representation coordinate-
wise yields axis aligned SBBs, which are inserted into the
octree data structure.
C. Root finding
For root finding the ray is described as the intersection of
two planes P1 = (N1, d1) and P2 = (N2, d2) in Hessian
form. N1 and N2 are the orthogonal vectors of unit length,
perpendicular to the ray. The roots (u∗, v∗) of
F (u, v) =
(
N1 · S(u, v) + d1
N2 · S(u, v) + d2
)
yield the intersection points. F measures the distance of the
evaluated point (u, v) on the surface to both planes. These
roots are computed using Newton’s method. It converges
quadratically if the initial guess is close to the root and the
root is simple, which is ensured by the preceding refinement.
Newton’s iteration for the two parameters u and v is described
as (
un+1
vn+1
)
=
(
un
vn
)
− J−1(un, vn)F (un, vn), (3)
where the Jacobian matrix J of F has the form
J = (Fu, Fv) =
(
N1 · S∂u(u, v) N1 · S∂v(u, v)
N2 · S∂u(u, v) N2 · S∂v(u, v)
)
.
Using the initial guess for u and v the iteration is started.
This process is iterated until the stopping criterion is met.
The iteration is stopped when the difference of the parametric
values of successive iterations is smaller than pre-defined ε
|un − un−1|+ |vn − vn−1| < ε.
The resulting parameters provide the intersection point PI .
There are cases, when the iteration will not converge within
the given knot intervals. Thus, iteration is cancelled if one of
following criteria is met:
• The iteration diverges after converging.
• u or v lie outside the parameter domain of the segment.
• The number of iterations exceeds a pre-defined maxi-
mum.
In our application we observed that the algorithm usually
converges after three to four iterations. We set the maximum
number of iterations to ten, to ensure convergence for almost
all cases.
The implementation of this surface intersection algorithm is
based on the OpenNURBS library [17].
VI. RESULTS
A. B-spline refinement factor
The chosen value C in the surface refinement process (2)
influences the size of the parametric intervals and therefore the
number of SBBs. This affects how well Newton’s method is
converging. If it is chosen too large performance decreases,
if it is chosen too small reliable convergence cannot be
guaranteed. In practice a value between 30 and 40 provides
good results, meaning that there were no performance issues
and high convergence rates.
B. Performance analysis
There are certain requirements to achieve interactive feed-
back of the scan simulation. First, the frame rate is fixed to 60
frames per second (FPS). This is achieved by using multi-
threading where the main thread is responsible for rendering
only. All remaining threads perform ray-casting jobs. Those
are available for each new frame with the current orientation
of the scanner. To avoid an overflow of ray-casting jobs a
thread will only start a new job after finishing its previous
job. Therefore, we set a target number of rays per frame. If
a job is not finished within 1/FPS seconds, additional jobs
may be discarded. This technique yields both the maximum
throughput and maximum interactivity. The application was
tested on two systems one with a i7-4770k processor (Machine
1) and one with a Core2Quad Q9300 processor (Machine 2).
Target rays per frame Machine 1 Machine 2
1000 Rays ∼60’000 Rays/s ∼60’000 Rays/s
3000 Rays ∼180’000 Rays/s ∼90’000 Rays/s
10000 Rays ∼415’000 Rays/s ∼145’00 Rays/s
TABLE I: B-spline surface results with C = 30.
Different targets of rays per frame have been evaluated to
discover the upper bound of possible ray-surface intersections
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Target rays per frame Machine 1 Machine 2
3000 Rays ∼180’000 Rays/s ∼180’000 Rays/s
4000 Rays ∼240’000 Rays/s ∼190’000 Rays/s
10000 Rays ∼600’000 Rays/s ∼190’000 Rays/s
TABLE II: Triangle mesh results.
per second for each system. The results are presented in
Tables I and II. In both cases, either triangle meshes or b-
spline surfaces the processing speed is high enough to produce
accurate point clouds of the scanned geometry. It is beneficial
to keep the number of rays per second small in order to avoid
a rapidly increasing size of generated points.
C. Point clouds
Fig. 8: Wishbone point cloud of a scanned B-Spline surface.
The color scheme is created by interpolating colors over
the scanning object and only serves a comfortable visual
perception.
Each resulting point cloud has a unique scan structure. Each
operator has a different scanning approach and generates a
personal point cloud structure. Figure 8 shows a synthetic point
cloud from a b-spline surface representing a wishbone model
scanned with the presented system. On the left half of the
figure the different angled scan lines are clearly visible. The
right half of the point cloud has higher density, but the human
factor is still visible. Figure 9 shows a point cloud result of
scanning a triangular mesh rocker arm model. In the upper
half of the figure, a cylinder can be seen. Especially on curved
geometry with cutouts the human scanning approach cannot
be predicted and will generate unique point clouds for each
individual scan.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a virtual-reality 3d-Laser-Scan
Simulation. Our solution makes scanning of CAD models
inside a VR environment possible. Interaction with our sys-
tem matches the process of operating a real hand-held laser
scanner. The resulting point clouds cannot be differentiated
from non-synthetic scans. Interactivity and execution speed
of our application meet the expectations. The scan process
Fig. 9: Rocker arm point cloud of a scanned mesh.
is realistic and easy to perform. Nevertheless there are a few
drawbacks. The Razer Hydra is not connected to a leading arm
like some real laser scanners which leads to difficulties moving
the scanner calm and precise. This could be compensated by
an adjustable factor which decreases the sensitivity of the
Hydra. Since the Oculus Rift is still in development there are
a few points which will certainly improve with later versions.
Especially the resolution causes the problem of a visible pixel
grid and a blurry perception of concrete shapes on looking
around in a scene. This problem will hopefully get fixed with
newer versions which should have a higher pixel density.
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